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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Corporations are republics. The ultimate authority rests with 
voters (shareholders). These voters elect representatives (directors) 
who delegate most decisions to bureaucrats (managers). As in any 
republic, the actual power-sharing relationship depends upon the 
specific rules of governance. .... Presumably, shareholders accept 
restrictions of their rights in hopes of maximizing their wealth, but 
little is known about the ideal balance of power.” 
     Gompers et al. (2003) 
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Can firms’ ownership structures influence firms’ risk and hence the stocks’ 
return generating process? Up to now, existing finance literature has focused on how 
the presence of certain blockholders – mainly family blockholders – influences firm 
performance using accounting measures. My research objective is to look at the 
stocks’ return generating process and extend the literature in that direction.  
Following the findings of La Porta et al. (1999, 2000), finance research has 
started looking at different types of blockholders (large shareholders), analyzing their 
economic incentives and behaviour, and their final impact on a whole gamut of 
corporate finance issues.  
Broadly-speaking, we can distinguish between two classes of ownership 
structures: (a) closely-held firms, where a blockholder (large shareholder) holds 
enough shares to control a firm, and (b) widely-held firms, where the ownership 
structure is populated entirely by small shareholders none of whom has an ownership 
stake big enough to control the firm. 
Existing literature in corporate finance has found that firm’s ownership 
structure influences directly the type and level of agency costs that investors have to 
bear. Exploiting the relationship between ownership structure and agency cost I will 
show that ownership structure matters for stocks’ returns generating process.  
The main result that I find using different methodologies is that ownership 
structure matters for stock returns and their risk. Moreover, I also consider that the 
effective agency costs induced by blockholders depend on the shareholders’ 
protection rules within a country. In this regards, I find that in countries with lower 
minority shareholders rights family firms tend to produce higher stock returns 
relative to those in countries with higher protection to minority shareholders. 
In this chapter I will first discuss agency costs within firms, since my 
hypotheses are based on the idea that different ownership structures carry with them 
different agency conflicts for which stock market investors have to be compensated. 
Then I will introduce the hypotheses and the methodologies used. Finally I will 
describe the main results and the “road map” through this work. 
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i. Agency Costs  
 
Agency theory is concerned with the conflicts of interest between an agent 
acting as a representative of a principal and the principal. Theoretically, it arises from 
divergent interests and asymmetric information. Ideally if both parties have the same 
interests, there is no conflict of interest and no agency problem (Jensen & Meckling, 
(1976)). However, in many instances, the two parties will have different interests and 
the agent will typically possess more or better information than the principal about 
the decision situation and/or the consequences of his actions (Ross, (1973)). 
As a result of asymmetric information, agency problems fall into two basic 
categories: adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection occurs when the 
principal accidentally contracts with an agent who is less able, committed, 
industrious, or ethical, or whose interests are less compatible than the principal 
expected. Moral hazard, on the other hand, involves actions that are in the interest of 
the agent (the manager) but are detrimental to that of the principal1. 
To control for the adverse selection problem, principals have to incur higher 
search and verification costs. To control the moral hazard problem, principals must 
incur the cost of controlling the manager using an optimal combination of incentives, 
punishments and bonding (Jensen and Meckling (1976)).  
Conceptually to solve the moral hazard problem, if information is perfect and 
costless, the principals and agents can write a complete contract that anticipates and 
provides for every eventuality (Williamson, (1975)). In reality, information is 
imperfect or costly, and a complete contract is virtually infeasible. 
When contracts are incomplete and managers possess more expertise and 
information than shareholders, they typically end up with the residual rights of 
control and have large margins to engage in self-interested behaviour that can be 
detrimental to shareholder wealth (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). 
If separation of ownership from control is the principal source of agency cost, 
Fama and Jensen (1983a) suggest that this cost is reduced in closely-held firms 
                                                 
1 For example, agents could enjoy perks or divert corporate wealth to themselves (Ross (1973), 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997)). 
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where the blockholder holds the residual claims and, therefore, has the right 
incentives to monitor and discipline the manager. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) also 
propose the presence of a blockholder as a possible solution to the classic agency 
cost. In subsequent work, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) propose an extension to heir 
argument: they argue that blockholders can abuse their dominant position and 
extract private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders creating an agency 
cost known in the literature as “agency cost of control” (Shleifer and Vishny (1997)).  
Many papers on corporate ownership have suggested that in many countries 
large and medium-sized corporations have large shareholders (La Porta, Lopez-De-
Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998, 2000), and La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer 
(1999)) and that these shareholders may be active in corporate governance2. 
However, it is fair to say that we do not yet have a complete theoretical 
understanding of the net impact of agency costs induced by the ownership structure 
given the nature of the trade-offs between the presence of a powerful blockholder and 
his incentives. Perhaps the issue can be better understood from an empirical point of 
view. This explains the proliferation of different empirical works set in different 
countries that allows for a bigger cross-sectional variability of blockholdings to see 
their impact on firm performances.  
Existing empirical literature3 has studied the impact of concentrated 
ownership on firm’s performance mostly using accounting-based measures such as 
Tobin’s Q4 and ROA.  
I take a different approach and look at market-based measures and use stock-
returns performance. In other words, if ownership structures induce higher agency 
costs are investors rewarded for these risks? Furthermore, my approach based on 
stock-return performance has three main advantages over methodologies that use 
accounting-based measures: (a) stock returns are not biased by accounting practices 
that instead have a big impact on the components of both Tobin’s Q and ROA, (b) I 
can investigate comprehensively the trade-off between risk and performance, and (c) 
                                                 
2 Kang and Shivdasani (1995), Yafeh and Yosha (1996), Shleifer and Vishny (1997). 
3 In particular, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) study used accounting profit rate to measure firm 
performance while all of the studies that followed used Tobin’s Q. Mork et al. (1988) use both profit 
rate and Tobin’s Q.  
4 Tobin (1969) 
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I can focus on the problem that the presence of a blockholder may have from the 
point of view of the minority shareholder. 
 
ii. Agency Costs and Type of Blockholders 
 
Finance literature recognizes that in widely-held corporations atomistic 
shareholders has too little of a stake either to afford the cost of closely monitoring the 
manager or to pursue non-economic objectives. Instead, in closely-held firms the 
large shareholder has more incentives to monitor the manager, so that the classic 
agency cost of control is reduced. However, the blockholder in such firms can divert 
wealth from minority shareholders, even though the probability of expropriation 
depends on the blockholders’ set of economic and non-economic incentives. 
Within the class of closely-held firms we can distinguish between different 
possible blockholders: a firm may have (a) a family blockholder (the most common 
case around the world), (b) a widely-held financial institution (such as banks, pension 
funds, or mutual funds), (c) a widely-held industrial corporation, or (d) the State.  
An important point that needs to be made is that different blockholders have 
different economic incentives and therefore should influence agency costs 
differently. In other words, we have to distinguish carefully across types of 
blockholders. Finance literature shows that only individual and family blockholders 
have significant control motivations5. Families have a long-term commitment to the 
firm, often spanning different generations. The same cannot be said to hold for most 
institutional blockholders which may be present in the ownership structure for a 
relatively short period of time. This means that a family blockholder will be very 
much interested in exerting control over the firm’s decisions and anecdotal evidence 
also shows that family blockholders are normally involved in active management and 
often use control enhancing mechanism to guarantee their control over the business6.  
                                                 
5 Tufano (1996), for example, shows that institutional investors are not active in monitoring 
management and are more likely to have incentive structures similar to atomistic shareholders. 
6 Dyck and Zingales (2001), Villalonga and Amit (2004), Barottini and Caprio (2005), and Ellul 
(2007). Barottini and Caprio (2005) argue that families are clearly oriented to maintaining control of 
the companies they found or acquire, and often resort to control-enhancing devices. Families are often 
accused of considering executive positions in the firm as a channel for providing highly remunerated 
jobs to the offspring. 
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Control motives are not the only area that distinguishes family blockholders 
from institutional ones. For example, family firms are found to follow goals such as 
business survival and independence that are not directly related with firm’s value 
maximization (at least with the concept of maximization in the short term).  
Furthermore, family blockholdings appear to be much bigger those held by 
other blockholders and existing literature argues that families normally have a highly 
undiversified portfolio of companies in which they invest. Very often, the family’s 
interests are limited to few industries, resulting in higher firm-specific risk. Widely-
held institutional blockholders instead are normally more diversified than families.  
These main differences indicate that a classification of ownership structure 
based only on the stake of the shareholder may not be sufficient to fully understand 
the blockholder dynamics. Since this paper addresses the problem of how agency 
costs affect company’s stock performance, and in closely-held firms agency costs are 
directly related to the blockholders’ control motivations, I will distinguish between 
family and non-family blockholders. Moreover, since non-family blockholders have 
economic and non-economic incentives more similar to atomistic shareholders in 
widely-held companies, it is possible to assume that potential investors in these 
companies would mostly suffer from managerial expropriation just as those who 
invest in widely-held companies.  
Hence, in order to focus on the clearest possible relationship between 
ownership structure and main agency cost, a take a step further and consider family 
firms7 versus non-family firms. 
 
iii. Hypotheses and Contribution 
 
In this work I consider that while family firms suffer from agency cost of 
control, non-family firms experience the classic agency cost. However, what is 
fundamental for my work is not the exact nature of the agency costs, but the 
magnitude and, more importantly, the likely impact that these agency costs may have 
on the firm’s risk profile and, hence, stock’s performance. In fact, we can assume 
                                                 
7 Family firms are corporations in which the founder, or descendents of his/her family (either by blood 
or through marriage), is a blockholder, either individually or as a group. 
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that what mostly matters for potential investors is not the nature of the agency cost, 
but the possible expropriation that they can suffer by investing in one company 
instead than another. Hence, I test the hypothesis that if agency cost matters and 
family firms have higher agency cost, then, they should have higher returns to 
compensate investors for taking this risk. 
With this work I contribute to the literature in various ways. First, I contribute 
to the literature that analyzes the link between ownership structure and firm’s 
performance using market-based measures rather than accounting measures. 
Moreover, using stocks’ returns, I am not only able to address the classic issues of 
this literature, but I am also able to investigate the trade-off between risk and 
performance. Analyzing this trade-off, I contribute to the literature by providing 
evidence that the presence of large blockholders- in the form of family blockholders - 
is considered riskier by investors. Third, my sample made up of small, medium and 
large firms coming from different countries with varying levels of shareholders’ 
protection regimes allow for better and more extensive tests compared to the existing 
literature. In fact, such empirical literature that studies the relationship between 
ownership and performance has mostly used samples of large companies 
incorporated in countries in which the law that protects stakeholders is effectively 
enforced (for example, U.S.A. and U.K.). However, there is evidence that the 
blockholders (especially family blockholders) are very common in companies of 
medium and small size. Furthermore, large shareholders govern by exercising their 
voting rights and their effective power within the firm depends on the degree of legal 
protection within a country (Shleifer and Vishny (1997)). Therefore, to address these 
two concerns, I consider a very large sample of companies with large, medium and 
small size and also investigate how the impact of ownership structure on stock 
returns changes across countries with different legal and protection systems.  
 
iv. Data and Methodology 
 
To investigate my research question I use two datasets. A first dataset 
(DATASET A) is composed of a total of 1,565 European firms operating in non-
financial industries from February 1992 to December 2006 for a total of 249,989 
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firm-monthly observations. For the same period of time, I use a second dataset 
(DATASET B) that contains a total of 2,048 European firms operating in non-
financial industries for a total of 252,934 firm-monthly observations. The two 
datasets are different in terms of (a) coverage of different types of firms, and (b) the 
depth of the ownership data and accounting data. Hence they allow me to undertake 
different tests and reach a number of conclusions. 
For the firms in the first dataset I have obtained monthly stock returns from 
Worldscope and information about the ownership structure from Faccio and Lang 
(2002) dataset. I collect the ownership data for firms in the second dataset manually 
from AMADEUS and collect monthly stock prices, accounting and financial 
information from Worldscope. 
To answer my research question I use an approach based on portfolio 
formation. To test my hypotheses I form various portfolios based on different 
variables all directly related to presence of the blockholder and the magnitude of 
agency costs induced by its presence.  
The econometric methodology is based on the two principal steps defined by 
Gompers et al. (2003). First, the time series of each portfolio is analyzed using a 
Fama and French two factor model regression. The intercept of my model, the so-
called “alpha”, is interpreted as the abnormal return an investor would have received 
by investing in a portfolio long in family firms (or family firms with different 
magnitude of agency cost) and short in non-family firms. Hence, the “alpha” is the 
excess return of what he would have earned passively investing in the two factors. I 
interpret the coefficients of the independent variables as measures of the exposure of 
each portfolio to the risk factors in the model.  
Using the Fama and French two factors model I am able to study the 
performance of different portfolios and can understand if family firms pay a higher 
return adjusted for risk than non-family firms.  
One important criticism to such an approach is based on the different firm 
characteristics that may exist between family and non-family firms. Hence, it is very 
important to control for firm characteristics that may be driving the difference in 
returns between family firms and non-family firms.  
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To address this potential problem, I use a standard Fama and MacBeth (1973) 
two-steps methodology using various firm characteristics (market value, book-to-
market ratio, a set of lagged returns to proxy for the momentum factor of Jegadeesh 
and Titman (1993, 1995), Dividend Yield, Leverage, Total Assets and the 
Idiosyncratic Risk, Operating Margin, and Sales on Assets). 
 
v. Main Results  
 
The main result that I find is that ownership structure matters for companies’ 
returns generating process. In other words, I find that the presence of a family 
blockholder impacts the stock returns because increases the probability of minority 
shareholders expropriation. This is consistent with a rational expectations framework 
where investors in family firms have to be compensated with higher returns for the 
higher risk they are faced with.  
Using Fama and French two factors model regression I find that from year 
1992 to year 2006, an investor would have received an abnormal return (captured by 
the “alpha”, or the intercept of the model) by investing in a portfolio long in family 
firms and short in non-family firms, in excess to what he could have earned passively 
investing in the two factors. The abnormal returns vary across the two different 
datasets but indicate the same economic outcome: an abnormal return of 0.27% per 
month (significant at 1% level) in DASATET A, and of 0.38% per month (significant 
at 1% level) in DATASET B. These abnormal performances, besides being 
statistically significant, also have economic significance. 
While the results hold for the entire dataset there are noticeable differences 
across different countries. This may be as expected since country-specific factors 
may be behind these differences. It is still true to say that the results hold for the 
majority of the countries.  
In DATASET A, I find that family firms’ stock returns are not significantly 
higher to non-family firms in Finland, France, Germany and Norway. On the other 
hand, family firms in Italy, Sweden, Switzerland and the U.K. generate higher stock 
returns relative to non-family firms. Specifically, in Italy investors replicating the 
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strategy described above would have earned an abnormal return of 0.47% per month 
(significant at the 5% level) by investing in family firms. A significant result is also 
found in Sweden, Switzerland and UK where family firms do better than non-family 
firms by 0.59% (significant at the 10% level), 0.43% (significant at the 5% level) and 
0.17% (significant at the 10% level) per month respectively. 
Using DATASET B, I find that family firms in Austria, Italy, Netherlands, 
Spain, Sweden and Switzerland also pay higher returns relative to non-family firms. 
The overperformance of family firms is 0.78% per month in Austria (significant at 
1% level), 0.47% in Italy (significant at the 1% level), 0.24% per month (significant 
at the 5% level) in Netherlands, 0.42% per month in Spain (significant at the 5% 
level), 0.60% per month in Sweden (significant at the 1% level) and 0.46% per 
month in Switzerland (significant at the 1% level).  
It is equally important to note that the impact of family ownership holds also 
after controlling for other firm characteristics using the Fama and MachBeth 
regression approach. 
To recapitulate, this work deals with both agency costs of control and the 
classic agency costs. Consistent with the efficient market hypothesis, the risk 
associated with the agency costs of control is correctly priced by the market, so that 
closely-held corporations with control motivations have higher market performance 
than widely-held firms to compensate minority shareholders for the higher risk of 
expropriation. 
 
vi. “Road Map” of This Work 
 
It would be useful to provide a sort of road map through my work and hence 
help walk the reader through understanding the research question I propose. In the 
first chapter I will analyze the agency costs problem by reviewing the major 
theoretical contributions made. First, I will describe the agency costs caused by the 
separation of ownership from control (Jensen and Mackling (1976)). Second, I will 
describe how the market can act as a monitoring mechanism over the operation of the 
managers who can become entrenched in a widely-held firm. Third, I will then 
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proceed to describe the agency costs of control which are present when a large 
shareholder is present in the ownership structure. Specifically, I will be referring to 
the contributions made by Shleifer and Vishny (1986, 1997) who show how a large 
shareholder can solve the classic agency problems but create its own problems by 
expropriation behaviour. 
In Chapter II I will review some of the most important empirical contributions 
made on the relationship between firms’ performance and ownership.  
Finally, in Chapter III I develop and explain the hypotheses of this work. I 
will describe the data used in detail, and the empirical methodology used. The 
chapter concludes with the main results I have found and the conclusions I have 
reached.
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Chapter I 
 
 
 
The Agency Cost Problem 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“An organization is the nexus of contracts, written and unwritten, 
among owners of factors of production and customers. These contracts or 
internal "rules of the game" specify the rights of each agent in the 
organization, performance criteria on which agents are evaluated, and 
the payoff functions they face. Agency problems arise because contracts 
are not costlessly written and enforced. Agency costs include the costs of 
structuring, monitoring, and bonding a set of contracts among agents 
with conflicting interests. Agency costs also include the value of output 
lost because the costs of full enforcement of contracts exceed the benefit 
(J&M 1976).” 
       Fama and Jensen (1983a) 
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The classic idea of the agency problem was developed within the theory of 
the contractual view of the firm (Coase (1937), Jensen and Meckling (1976), and 
Fama and Jensen (1983a,b)). The essence of the classic agency problem is the 
separation of ownership and control and the difficulties of setting complete contracts 
between the principal(s) (i.e. the shareholders) and the agent (i.e. the manager). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) describe the agency problem as the difficulties 
shareholders have in assuring that their funds are not expropriated or wasted in 
unattractive projects by the managers. In most general terms, the shareholders and 
the manager sign a contract that specifies what the manager does with the funds, and 
how the returns are divided between him and the owners. Ideally, the two parties 
would sign a complete contract, specifying exactly what the manager should do in all 
states of the world and how profits are to be allocated. The problem with this view is 
that it is impossible to describe and foresee all future contingencies. As a result, 
complete contracts are unfeasible. 
 
 
Figure 1 
In this graph P represents the principal while A represents the agent. The principal employs the 
manager to take care of his interest and make decision on his behalf. Both the agent and the manager 
are driven by self-interests. The manager (the agent) desires to divert firm’s cash flow to himself, 
while the owner (the principal) wants that his funds are not expropriated or wasted in unattractive 
projects. Ideally, they would sign a complete contract, which specifies exactly what the manager does 
in all states of the world, and how the profits are allocated. Unfortunately, often one party has more or 
better information than the other party, (i.e. there is asymmetric information) and the contract cannot 
be perfectly written. Source of the graph: Wikipedia. 
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When contracts are incomplete and managers possess more expertise and 
information than shareholders, they typically end up with the residual rights of 
control, giving them enormous latitude for self-interested behaviour. This can  result 
in managers taking highly inefficient actions. 
To better understand the nature of the agency cost and what kind of 
inefficient actions the manager can undertake let me briefly introduce some of the 
most common agency cost as described by Tirole (2005). Tirole illustrates four 
categories of inefficient actions: (a) insufficient effort, (b) extravagant investment, 
(c) entrenchment strategies, and (d) self-dealing behavior.  
The first category (insufficient effort) refers to the fact that managers could 
dedicate too little time and effort to their own tasks because of over commitment 
with competing activities inside and outside the firm (good examples are given by the 
literature on busy directors, among others Ferris et al. (2003), Fich (2005)). The 
second category (extravagant investment) refers to the evidence that some managers 
engage in pet projects and empire-building at the expense of shareholders8. The third 
category (entrenchment strategies) refers to the fact that top managers often take 
actions that hurt shareholders in order to keep or secure their positions. They can 
achieve this objective in several ways. First, they can invest in activities that make 
them indispensable (Shleifer and Vishny (1989)). Second, they can manipulate 
performance measures so that they “look good” when their position is threatened and, 
finally, they can resist hostile takeover and/or lobby to reduce stockholder activism. 
The fourth category (self-dealing actions or tunneling) can be quite pervasive and 
refers to all kind of acts, ranging from benign to illegal, trough which those who 
control a corporation, managers controlling blockholder or both, divert corporate 
wealth to themselves, without sharing it with the other investors. For example, 
managers could enjoy perks or/and pick their successor among their friends or 
families, etc. (Shleifer and Vishny (1997))  
This brief description of the most widely documented managers’ inefficient 
actions illustrates that it is hard for the owners to fully control the manager, even if a 
contract is set. Hence the complete separation of ownership from control is very risky 
                                                 
8 As example of extravagant investment Tirole indicates the illustration reported by Jensen (1988). 
Jensen shows that in the late 1970s during a period of high real rate of interest, high exploration cost 
and reduction in the expected oil price increase, oil industry managers spent a lot of money in 
exploration while it would have been cheaper to buy the oil directly on Wall Street. 
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(and costly) for the principal. The risks and costs of manager inefficient actions 
should when the owner is not completely estranged from the decision making 
process. In this framework, Fama and Jensen (1983a) propose that concentrated 
ownership can be one solution to the classical agency problem. In case of 
concentrated ownership, in fact, the principal hold the residual claim and, therefore, 
has advantages in monitoring and disciplining the decision-making agent. 
Concentrated ownership can solve the classical agency conflict but it can produce 
problems of its own. Shleifer and Vishny (1997), in fact, suggest that more large 
owners gain control of the corporation, more they prefer to generate private benefits 
of control that are not shared by minority shareholders. Blockholders can abuse their 
dominant position and extract private benefits at the expense of minority 
shareholders, especially when weak legal protection for minority shareholders exists 
(Bebchuk, (1994), Stiglitz, (1985)).   
The optimal solution to curb the classic agency problems between managers 
and owners is still a challenge for modern finance theory. Whereas there is no 
consensus about the ability of concentrated ownership to curb agency costs, 
empirical evidence has made it clear that the classic agency cost between manager 
and shareholders is not the only form of agency cost that a company can experience. 
Villalonga and Amit (2006), for example, suggest two types of agency costs that are 
directly related to the nature of the firm’s ownership structure:  
a. Agency Cost I: The classic agency cost between manager and atomistic 
shareholders as described by Berle and Means (1932), and Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) 
b. Agency Cost II: The agency problem between the dominant blockholder and 
minority shareholders. 
 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 1 describes the classic 
agency cost arising from the separation between ownership and control; Section 2 
describes some of the instruments to curb the classic agency cost and Section III 
introduces the agency cost of control.  
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Section 1 Diffuse Stock Ownership and The Classic Owner-Manager 
Conflict 
 
1.1 The Theoretical Evidence of The Classic Agency Cost:  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
 
The notion of diffuse stock ownership is well entrenched among economists. 
It started in 1776 with Adam Smith’s work Wealth of Nations. In 1932 another 
lawyer, Adolf Berle, along with a journalist, Gardiner Means, returned to the theme 
of diffuse stock ownership. Berle and Means (1932) argued that since the dawn of 
capitalism most production had taken place in relatively small organizations in which 
the owners were also the managers. Beginning with the nineteenth century (the 
product of the Industrial Revolution) technological change had increased the optimal 
size of many firms to the point where no individual, family, or group of managers 
would have sufficient wealth to own a controlling interest. As a result, enterprises 
faced “the dissolution of the old atom of ownership into its component parts, control 
and beneficial ownership” (Berle and Means 1932, p. 8).  
In 1976, Jensen and Meckling wrote a seminal paper about agency costs. 
Much of the focus is on the conflict between atomistic shareholders and the 
professional manager. Jensen and Meckling (J&M, henceforth) assume that 
separation of ownership from control is the principal source of firms’ agency costs. 
They argue that, all else equal, firm value should rise with increased insider 
ownership because managers are more sensitive to shareholder value when they 
themselves own a share in the company. Hence, the authors show formally how the 
allocation of shares among insiders and outsiders can influence the value of the firm.  
Since my interest is mostly on the effect that agency costs have on firm value, 
I will discuss the J&M discussion on the effect of outside equity on agency costs. 
J&M’s approach to the agency problem differs fundamentally from most of 
the existing literature up to that time. The previous literature focused almost 
exclusively on the normative aspects of the agency relationship; that is, given that 
uncertainty and imperfect monitoring exist, how to design the contracts (including 
Does Ownership Matter For Returns and Returns Volatility? 
 20
compensation incentives) between the principal and agent, so that the latter provides 
appropriate effort to maximize the principal’s welfare. J&M, rather, pass over the 
normative problems and investigate the incentives faced by each of the parties and 
the elements entering into the relationship between the manager of the firm and the 
outside equityholders.  
They define agency costs as the sum of: 
1. The monitoring expenditures by the principal, 
2. The bonding expenditures by the agent, 
3. The residual loss. 
J&M explain that the principal has to spend some money to assure that the 
agent makes optimal decisions from the principal’s point of view. Principals, in fact, 
must use an optimal combination of incentives, punishments, bonding to align 
interests and monitor agents’ action. 
In case of divergence between the agent’s decisions and the optimal ones that 
would maximize the principal’s welfare there would be an outcome defined as 
“residual loss”. This is the dollar equivalent of the reduction in welfare experienced 
by the principal.  
To analyze the effect of outside equity on agency costs they compare (case A) 
the behaviour of a manager when he owns 100 % of the residual claims of a firm 
with his behaviour when (case B) he sells off a portion of those claims to outsiders. 
In each case they assume that the manager would like to enjoy both pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary benefits. 
J&M show that when there is no separation between ownership and control 
(case A) the owner-manager will try to maximize his own utility. In such a case there 
will be no agency cost. Instead, if the owner-manager sells part of his equity claims 
(case B) and these shares are one share one vote, agency costs will be generated by 
the divergence between owner-manager interest and those of the outside 
shareholders. An example of this kind of situation can be the case of a family firm in 
which the family has appointed a family member as the company manager. 
The owner-manager will only bear a fraction of the costs of any non-
pecuniary benefits he enjoys. The agency problem becomes more serious as the 
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owner-manager’s fraction of the equity falls. That’s because when his stake in the 
firm falls his fractional claim on the outcomes falls and this will tend to encourage 
him to appropriate larger amounts of the corporate resources in the form of 
perquisites. This makes it desirable for the minority shareholders to spend more 
resources to monitor his behaviour.  
 
1.1 Model 
 
1.1.1 Model Assumptions 
 
There are two set of assumptions. The first set is composed of permanent 
assumptions, i.e. the ones that are never relaxed, and a set of temporary assumptions, 
i.e. those that are made for expositional purposes only. 
Permanent Assumptions: 
a) There is only a single manager and he is interested in owning shares of the firm, 
b) All outside equity shares are non-voting, 
c) No outside owner gains any utility from ownership in any way other than through 
its effect on his wealth or cash flows,  
d) The entrepreneur-manager’s money wages are held constant throughout the 
analysis, 
e) There is only one production-financing decision to be made by the entrepreneur, 
f) No trade credit is available, 
g) No taxes, 
h) No complex financial claims such as convertible bonds or preferred stock or 
warrants can be issued. 
Temporary assumptions: 
i) The size of the firm is fixed, 
j) No monitoring or bonding activities are possible,  
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k) No debt financing through bonds, preferred stock, or personal borrowing (secured 
or unsecured) is possible, 
l) All elements of the owner-manager’s decision problem involving portfolio 
considerations induced by the presence of uncertainty and the existence of 
diversifiable risk are ignored. 
 
1.1.2 Model Set Up 
 
1.1.2.1  The Sources of Agency Costs of Equity and Who Bears Them 
 
There are few key items. First, X = {x1, x2, . . .,xn} is the vector of quantities 
of all factors and activities within the firm from which the manager derives non-
pecuniary benefits. xi are defined such that the manager’s marginal utility (Um) is 
positive for each of them, then:   
0>∂
∂
xi
Um   xi∀         (1) 
Second, they define C(X) as the total cost in dollar that the company bears 
because of the manager deriving non-pecuniary benefits. However, since not all 
actions that the manager does to enjoy non-pecuniary benefits are harmful to the 
company a function P(X) represent the total dollar value of the productive benefit of 
X. Then B(X), the difference between P(X) and C(X), is the net dollar benefit of X to 
the firm, ignoring any effects of X on the equilibrium wage of the manager.  
B(X) = P(X) - C(X)        (2) 
Ignoring the effects of X on the manager’s utility and therefore on his 
equilibrium wage, the optimal levels of the factors and activities X are obtained when 
the marginal benefit to the firm is zero:  
0
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X
XB       (3) 
Where X* represent the optimal level of factors and activity from which the 
manager derives non-pecuniary benefits.  
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For any vector X ≥ X* (i.e., where at least one element of X is greater than its 
corresponding element of X*), a function F, equals to the difference between the net 
dollar benefit corresponding to the quantities of all factors and activities X* (B(X*)) 
and the net dollar benefit corresponding to the quantities of all factors and activities 
X (B(X)), can be set. Since X ≥ X*, we expect that F ≡  B(X*) - B(X) > 0. 
If  X ≥ X* then F ≡  B(X*) - B(X) > 0     (4) 
F simply measures the dollar cost to the firm (net of any productive effects) of 
providing the increment X*- X of the factors and activities which generate utility to 
the manager. In other words, F is the current market value of the stream of 
manager’s expenditures on non-pecuniary benefits. Then since B(X) = P(X) - C(X) 
we can re-write F as follow:  
F ≡  P(X*) - P(X) - (C(X*) - C(X))      (5) 
Assuming that V represents the firm value and given a Cartesian coordinate 
system, J&M produce the following figure: 
 
 
Figure 2-Jensen and Meckling (1976), p. 17 
On the X-axis they jot F while on the Y-axis they represent V. =V  the maximum market value of 
the cash flows generated by the firm for a given money wage for the manager when the manager’s 
consumption of non-pecuniary benefits are zero. (1-α)V = the fraction of outside equity. F = the 
maximum amount of non-pecuniary benefits that the manager is able to extract. Uj (j = 1,2,3) = 
owner’s indifference curves between wealth and non-pecuniary benefits. 
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 There are a number of important things in this figure. First, the indifference 
curves are convex because the owner-manager’s marginal rate of substitution 
between non-pecuniary benefits and wealth diminishes with increasing levels of 
benefits (i.e. they are job-specific and no substitutes are available outside the firm). 
Second, all the factors and activities within the firm which generate utility for the 
manager are at the level X*. Third, on this graph, we can distinguish line FV , that is 
analogous to the manager’s “budget constraint”. By definition V  is the maximum 
market value of the cash flows generated by the firm for a given money wage for the 
manager when the manager’s consumption of non-pecuniary benefits are zero, so at 
this point all the factors and activities within the firm which generate utility for the 
manager are at the level X*. FV  is analogous to the “budget constraint” because 
given the definition of F as the current market value of the stream of manager’s 
expenditures on non-pecuniary benefits, FV represents the constraint which a single 
owner manager faces in deciding how much non-pecuniary income he will extract 
from the firm. Since one dollar of current value of non-pecuniary benefits withdrawn 
from the firm by the manager reduce the market value of the firm by $1, by 
definition, the slope of FV is -1. Given the definition of V and F, the “budget 
constraint” changes for each possible scale of the firm (i.e., level of investment, I) 
and alternative levels of manager’s money wage, W. Given the latter information, the 
authors assume: 
1. An arbitrary and constant level of investment that has already been made, 
2. A constant manager’s money wage at the level W* (that is, zero in case 
the manager owns 100% of the firm’s claim) which represents the current 
market value of his wage contract in the optimal compensation package 
which consists of both wages, W*, and non-pecuniary benefits, F*9. Given 
F* the firm’s value is V*. In the point (F*, V*) passes the indifference 
curve U2 that represents the manager’s utility when he completely owns 
the firm.  
If the owner sells 1-α (where 0 < α < 1) shares of the firm to an outsider and 
he stays as manager, he will no longer bear the full cost of any non-pecuniary 
                                                 
9 F* is the optimal level of non-pecuniary benefit for which the value of the firm is equal to V*, then 
the cost of (1- α) shares would have been (1- α)V*. 
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benefits he consumes. In fact for every 1$ of non-pecuniary benefits he consumes it 
will cost him only α(1$), while the others are bearing (1-α)(1$).  
Suppose the owner-manager is free to choose any level of prerequisites and 
the buyers, at zero cost, were able to push the manager-owner to consume the same 
amount (F*) of prerequisites. In this case, the manager moves from his optimal point 
(D) to increase his enjoyment. In fact, at cost (-α)(1$) he tries to extract more non-
pecuniary benefits. Therefore, at this point, the buyers would like to pay less than V* 
for his share of the firm. The slope of the manager’s “budget constraint” switches 
from -1 (the cost of each dollar of non-pecuniary benefits when the manager was the 
only owner) to –α (the cost of each dollar of non-pecuniary benefits now that he has 
sold (1-α) shares), and the curve FV  becomes flatter around point D (because the 
manager can, if he wishes, have the same wealth and level of non-pecuniary 
consumption he enjoyed as full owner), and a new level of firm’s value (V1) is 
reached. The new situation is summarized in the graph by the line 11PV . 
Of course, if the owner-manager is free to choose the level of perquisites, F, 
subject only to the loss in wealth he incurs, his welfare will be maximized by 
increasing his consumption of non-pecuniary benefits. The utility function is not 
longer U2, but U1 representing a higher level of utility. Then the equilibrium point 
also moves toward the right to the point A. At this point the owner-manager would 
enjoy a level F0 of prerequisites and the value of the firm falls from V*, to V0. This is 
because, if the equity market is characterized by rational expectations, the buyer 
anticipates an increase in the managerial consumption of non-pecuniary benefits and, 
since he would not be able (at zero cost) to monitor the manager, he would like to 
pay much less than (1- α)V* (the price he would have paid  at time zero) to purchase 
his shares. In other words, the investor wants to be repaid for the risk he is bearing.  
The difference in price between the original value of the firm and the new value (the 
original value adjusted for the impossibility of exerting monitoring and bonding 
activities) represent a residual loss, i.e. the total agency costs created by the sale of 
outside equity.  Of course, because the owner-manager enjoys more private benefits 
than before, the welfare loss he incurs is less than the residual loss. Finally, the 
manager would sell only if the increment in welfare he achieved by using the cash 
amounting to (1- α)V0 was worth more to him than the difference (V*-V0). 
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1.1.2.2  Monitoring and Bonding Activities 
 
In the first analysis of the agency cost issues, J&M do not consider the 
possibility of any monitoring of the manager.  In practice, though, the buyer could be 
able to reduce the ability of the owner-manager to extract private benefits using 
different ways of control of him. Examples include, among others, auditing, formal 
control systems, budget restrictions, and incentive-based compensation schemes. 
In Figure 3 (Jensen and Meckling, (1976), p. 27) they portray the effects of 
monitoring and other control activities. 
Figures 2 and 3 are identical except for the curve BCE in fig. 3 which depicts 
a “budget constraint” derived when monitoring possibilities are taken into account.  
Without monitoring, and with outside equity of (1-α), the value of the firm 
will be V’ and non-pecuniary expenditures F’. By incurring monitoring costs, M, the 
equity holders can restrict the manager’s consumption of perquisites to amounts less 
than F’.  
When shareholders exercise monitoring over the manager that F, the current 
market value of the stream of manager’s expenditures on non-pecuniary benefits, 
becomes function of the stake that the owner-manager still posses and of the level of 
monitoring. The authors assume that F(M, α) is the maximum perquisites the 
manager can consume for alternative levels of M, where M is monitoring 
expenditures, given his ownership share α.  
J&M assume that an increase in monitoring reduces F, at a decreasing rate: 
 0 and 0 2
2
>∂
∂<∂
∂
M
F
M
F        (6) 
The outside equity holders will take into account the current value of 
expected future monitoring expenditures in determining the maximum price that they 
will pay for any given fraction of the firm’s equity. Therefore, given positive 
monitoring activity the value of the firm is given by V α V F(M, α) -M. The locus of 
these points for various levels of M and for a given level of α lie on the line BCE in 
Figure 3. The vertical difference between the V F and BCE curves is M, the current 
market value of the future monitoring expenditures. 
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Figure 3 - Jensen and Meckling, (1976), pag. 27 
The value of the firm (V) and level of non-pecuniary benefits (F) when outside equity is (1-a), U1,U2, 
U3 represent the owner’s indifference curves between wealth and non-pecuniary benefits, and BCE is 
the tradeoff constraint facing the owner when other shareholders are engaging in monitoring activities. 
 
If the outside equity holders can make these monitoring expenditures and 
thereby impose the reductions in the owner-manager’s consumption of non-pecuniary 
benefits, then the owner-manager will voluntarily enter into a contract which gives 
them the rights to restrict his consumption of non-pecuniary items to F”. He finds 
this desirable because it will cause the value of the firm to rise to V”. The entire 
increase in the value of the firm that accrues will be reflected in the owner’s wealth, 
but his welfare will be increased by less than this because he misses some non-
pecuniary benefits he previously enjoyed.  
If the equity market is competitive and makes unbiased estimates of the 
effects of monitoring expenditures on F and V, potential buyers will be indifferent 
between the following two contracts: (a) purchase of a share (1-α) of the firm at a 
total price of (1- α)V’ and no rights to monitor or control the manager’s consumption 
of perquisites, and (b) purchase of a share (1-α) of the firm at a total price of (1-α)V” 
and the right to expend resources up to an amount equal to D-C which will limit the 
owner-manager’s consumption of perquisites to F”.  
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Given contract (2), the outside shareholders would find it desirable to monitor 
to the full extent provided by their contract because it will pay them to do so. The 
owner, instead, bears the full amount of these costs as wealth reduction. J&M argue 
that the owner-manager would suffer this wealth reduction also if he was spending 
resources to guarantee10 to the outside equity holders that he would limit his activities 
of expropriating outside equity holders (“bonding costs”). J&M explain that the 
manager would incur these costs as long as the net increments in his wealth which 
they generate (by reducing the agency costs and therefore increasing the value of the 
firm) are more valuable than the perquisites given up. This means that he engages in 
bonding activities and writes contracts which allow monitoring as long as the 
marginal benefits of each are greater than their marginal cost. 
J&M analyze the agency cost like something that arises from the contractual 
nature of the owner-manager and shareholders relationship. In their paper, though, 
the manager either can be the entrepreneur or just a professional manager, but in both 
cases he has a substantial stake in the firm. In either case, the managers are more 
sensitive to shareholder value since they themselves are shareholders. In other words, 
the allocation of shares among insiders and outsiders can influence the value of the 
firm. 
 
Section 2 Agency Theory and Reputational Issues 
 
2.1 Managerial Labour Market Monitor: Fama (1980) and Holmstrom 
(1999) 
 
Jensen and Meckling’s paper is based on two important key points: (1) the 
existence of an entrepreneur (the company’s founder) who sells part of his stake, but 
still remain the controller and (2) the shareholders’ cost of monitoring (the existence 
of a contractual agreement between the parts). They suggest that to solve the agency 
                                                 
10 They could do so through “contractual guarantees to have the financial accounts audited by a public 
account, explicit bonding against malfeasance on the part of the manager, and contractual limitations 
on the manager’s decision-making power (which impose costs on the firm because they limit his 
ability to take full advantage of some profitable opportunities as well as limiting his ability to harm the 
stockholders while making himself better off)”. J&M 76, p. 29 
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cost due to the separation between the manager and the owner one way is to increases 
the stake of the manager, but principals must use an optimal combination of 
incentives, punishments and bonding actions to align interests, thus the shareholder 
incurs in monitoring costs.  
Fama (1980) looks at the problem from a different point of view. He proposes 
the existence of a managerial market reputation effect that would be sufficient to curb 
agency costs without any need of writing contracts. In other words, since the 
manager is very interested in his reputation in the managerial labour market, then the 
market itself plays a central role in monitoring the manager behaviour. 
Fama (1980) considers a situation where the manager is no longer the firm’s 
owner. The classical figure of the entrepreneur-manager disappears and this opens up 
the possibility of having a widely-held firm where ownership and control are 
separated. In Fama’s opinion, this is possible because the firm faces discipline by the 
competition on the market that forces the emergence of efficient controlling devices 
to monitor the performance of the entire company and its individual members.  
Fama’s contribution is interesting for at least two reasons: 
1. He distinguishes between the owner (the entrepreneur) and the outside 
manager, 
2. He introduces the idea that the outside manager invests his human capital 
in the firm and the benefits that he obtains by such an investment are 
likely to depend from the success or failure of the firm.  
In such cases, in fact, based on the success or failure of the firm the labour 
market will produce its own beliefs of the manager’s real ability. In other words, the 
market can discipline the manager’s behaviour. 
Holmstrom (1999) formalizes Fama’s intuition in a moral hazard framework. 
While Holmstrom agrees with Fama he points out that reputational concerns are not 
enough to police the moral hazard problems without recourse to explicit output based 
contracts. 
Holmstrom considers the following scenario: 
1. The manager operates in a competitive labour market,  
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2. The manager is paid for his service in advance of his efforts. For example, 
when shareholders hire him they do not have real knowledge of his 
abilities, but to sign the contract they base their decision on his past 
performance (the success of failure of the company he managed in the 
past). Therefore, manager’ present performance acts like information 
about future performance, then there is uncertainty about come 
characteristics of the manager. 
In the model managerial talent, η, is uncertain. The parameter η, initially, is 
considered fixed and incompletely known to both the manager and the market that 
share prior believes about η. The parameter η is normally distributed with mean m1 
and precision (the inverse of the variance) h1: ),( 11 hmN≈η . Over time the 
knowledge about η is realized through the observation of the manager’s output. At 
time t the output is given by the following technology: 
ttt ay εη ++=    ,...2,1=t          (7) 
? [ ]∞∈ ,0ta  is the manager’s labour input, 
? tε  is the white noise term, that is i.i.d.N(0, hε). 
The manager is risk neutral with utility function: 
[ ]∑∞= − −= 1 1 )(),( t ttt agcacU β       (8) 
where g (.) measures the disutility of labour (it is increasing and convex), 
while U (.,.) is the utility function and  is publicly known. at is the manager labour 
supply at time t and ct is the consumption at time t. 
 In order to decide the effort, the manager has to calculate the impact the 
present wage would have on future wages: the future wage depends from the past 
ones toward the manager’s decision rule. In such cases, the wage and the decision 
rule are determined simultaneously in equilibrium. 
 Assuming that ),...,( 1 t
t yyy =  is the history of outputs up to time t, we know 
that this information is acknowledged by the market and used as basis for wage 
payments, then, the wedge and the manager’s labour input depend on this set of 
information, then )( 1−tt yw  is the wage at time t and )(
1−t
t ya  is the manager’s labour 
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supply at time t. In a competitive market, and risk neutrality, the wage equation is 
given by the following expression: 
 [ ] [ ] )(//)( 1111 −−−− +== ttttttt yayEyyEyw η     (9) 
The manager will solve the following problem: 
 { } [ ]∑∞= −−− −1 111(.) ))(()(max t ttttta yaEgyEwt β     (10) 
 The simultaneous solution of expressions (9) and (10) give the equilibrium. 
Holmstrom’s economic intuition is that as long as the manager’s ability is 
unknown there are returns to supplying labour, because outputs will influence 
perceptions about ability. Increasing the labour supply the manager can bias the 
process of inference about his ability in his favour. In equilibrium, this can not 
happen. This is because to solve the wedge problem the market infers the ability of 
the manger observing his managerial output. Then, managerial output contains 
information on the ability of the manager (η), the effort he made ( ta ) and an error 
component ( tε ), then observing ty  is the same that observing the sequence: 
 ttt ay εη ++=        (11) 
That we can rewritten as 
 ttt ay εη +=−        (12) 
In equilibrium )( 1* −= ttt yaa , where )( 1* −tt ya  is the optimal manager labour supply, 
then 
 t
t
tt yay εη +=− − )( 1*        (13) 
And  
 t
t
tt yay εη −−= − )( 1*        (14) 
If  
)( 1* −−≡ tttt yayz        (15) 
then 
ttz εη −≡         (16) 
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In other words, in equilibrium the ability of the manager depends on the 
history of outputs up to time and eventually, observing zt the market learns about the 
manager ability, then, in equilibrium, the manager cannot bias the process of 
inference about his ability in his favour increasing the labour supply. In equilibrium, 
this can not happen. This is because to solve the wedge problem the market infers the 
ability of the manger observing his managerial output. 
In equilibrium, the market knows what effort level to expect and adjust the 
output measure (zt), so that the manager cannot fool the market. Indeed, a lower 
supply of labour will bias the inference against him, since a suboptimal level of 
labour supply will decrease the expectations on his abilities. Holmstrom notices that, 
in equilibrium, when managerial ability is still unknown to the market, then the 
manager is at the beginning of his career, this will induce the market to put more 
weight on the most recent output observations. However, when the manager’s ability 
is clearly recognized by the market, then any new information about new outputs will 
have very little impact on the market’s beliefs.  
 
2.2 The Entrenched Manager: Shleifer & Vishny (1989) 
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1989) suggest that managers are particularly keen to 
invest in projects that require their specific human capital, thereby strengthening their 
chances of keeping their jobs.  Shleifer and Vishny’s idea is in some way close to 
Fama (1980), since they consider the manager’s human capital involvement, but they 
take a different avenue since they are not concerned neither with the mechanism to 
monitor the manager nor with the “perquisites” he wishes to consume. 
Shleifer and Vishny assume that the manager has an interest in reducing the 
effectiveness of control mechanisms, such as the board of directors, the managerial 
labour market and hostile takeovers and show how manager-specific investments 
help him in reducing the threat of his replacement. They eventually conclude that to 
achieve their “goals”, managers try to make themselves precious for the firm 
“whether or not they enjoy prerequisites for their own sake”. 
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Shleifer and Vishny idea is based on two main points. First, there are 
manager-specific investments made with corporate resources and allowed to proceed 
without monitoring by the board. The board may fail to monitor because it is not 
sufficiently well informed to evaluate firm investment, or because board members 
approve of the manager’s basic corporate strategy. Once the manager has made the 
investment, the board may or may not discover that the investment was value-
decreasing. However in Shleifer and Vishny model, once the investment is made, the 
board perceives an increase in value from the investment made by the incumbent 
manager with respect to those of alternative managers. Second, any manager-specific 
investment is irreversible so there is part of the value of the assets that cannot be 
recovered by reselling them. This irreversibility makes the manager valuable to 
shareholders. Then a high degree of irreversibility (for example an investment in 
specializing plant that the incumbent is very good at operating) ensures that the 
incumbent remains valuable to shareholders even if the board later realizes that a 
manager-specific investment is not value-maximizing.  
Manager-specific investments enter the model in two ways. First, if the 
manager has a stake in the company, his own investments impact value of the firm 
and hence the manager’s wealth as a shareholder. Second, they affect the incremental 
profits from employing the current manager rather than an alternative. For simplicity, 
it is assumed that the manager does not derive utility from these investments directly. 
He chooses the investment level to increase his wealth as a shareholder, but also to 
raise the difference between the firm’s value under him and under the next best 
manager.   
To explain their economic intuition Shleifer and Vishny set up a very simple 
model.  They consider two managers, the incumbent manager and an alternative one. 
They denote by incI  the manager-specific investment the incumbent makes while altI  
is the incremental investment made by the alternative manager on the incumbent 
specific investment. 
The value of the firm under the incumbent and before his compensation is 
paid can be written as: 
 incincincinc pIIBV −≡ )(α        (17) 
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where incα is a measure of the incumbent’s ability to manage this investment, 
)( incIB  is the present value of variable profit per unit of ability (when the 
investment is incI  so that +∞→→<> inci IBBB  when 0)lim( and 0 and 0 '''' ) and 
p is the per-unit cost of investment. 
The firm’s value (before compensation) under an alternative manager is:  
)()( altincaltincaltalt IIpIIBV +−+≡ α     (18) 
where altα is a measure of the alternative manager’s ability to manage the 
investment. 
The key assumptions about the manager-specific investments are the 
following ones: 
1. Investments are irreversible, then: 
0≥altI         (19)  
They are assuming that assets can be sold off only at a price of zero or, in 
general, they can be sold off at some positive price below the price paid for them. 
Moreover, in equilibrium, 0=altI , since the incumbent manager is better at 
managing a particular line of business than the potential replacement and wants to 
invest more in that line of business than the potential replacement. 
2. Since the investment is manager-specific, the incumbent is better than his 
potential replacement at managing it:  
incα > altα         (20)  
If incα < altα  the incumbent has an incentive to invest in other areas to avoid 
replacement, perhaps by entering a new business. 
3. From making manager-specific investments the manager gains an increase 
in his compensation. 
Compensation includes all transfers from shareholders that the manager 
negotiates with the board, including direct monetary compensation, expenditures on 
perquisites, and pet projects the board accedes to while knowing they are wasteful. 
Pet projects differ from manager-specific investments in having consumption value 
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but no entrenchment value. It is assumed that manager-specific investments have no 
consumption value, but entrenchment value.  
4. The dollar cost to shareholders of any component of the wage is the same 
as the dollar benefit to the manager.  
5. The manager’s compensation is determined in negotiations with the board 
after the manager-specific investment is made. This timing formalizes the 
idea that such investments often obtain board approval before the board 
fully understands their consequences for firm value.  
 The following is the manager’s compensation function: 
[ ]altaltincaltincinc pIIIBIBfw −+−= ))(()( αα    (21) 
Then, the compensation of the manager is given by a function f of the 
difference between the firm’s profits under the incumbent and the alternative. The 
compensation does not depend on the investment cost, since by the time the board 
has evaluated whether to keep or replace the manager, but the more the firm can earn 
under the incumbent in relation to the alternative, the higher the compensation the 
incumbent can demand. The incumbent chooses incI  so that he will maximize: 
[ ]wpIIBwy incincinc −−+= )(αθ      (22) 
where θ is the manager’s fractional ownership. The manager is assumed to 
have a small stake into the firm, then θ <<1 so that the manager does not completely 
internalize the value consequences of his manager-specific investments. An 
incumbent with a high enough ownership stake might choose to sell the firm to 
someone who can run it better just to get the additional value.  In this case, incI  = 0 
and w =0.  Given equation (20), the incumbent objective function is can be written as 
follow: 
 [ ] ))(()()()1( incincincincaltinc pIIBIBfy −+−−= αθααθ   (23) 
where incincincinc pIIBV −≡ )(α  is the pre-compensation market value. The 
incumbent puts weight θ on the pre-compensation market value under his job, while 
he puts weight (1 - θ) on the difference between variable profits under himself and 
under the alternative. The manager is shown to put higher weight on variable profit 
and this means that he over-invests with respect to the pre-compensation value-
Does Ownership Matter For Returns and Returns Volatility? 
 36
maximizing level in order to distance himself from eventual replacement and raise 
his compensation.  
In conclusion, the manager-specific investments can impose two distinct costs 
on shareholders. First, holding management compensation fixed, the level and type 
of investment may not be value-maximizing. Second, even when manager-specific 
investments produce more pre-compensation value than other investments, but give 
the incumbent a large bargaining power, the board may sometimes prevent such 
investments. However, the inefficiency results from the incumbent’s inability to 
commit himself ex ante to not exploiting shareholders ex post. 
 
Section 3 Agency Cost of Control 
 
Jensen and Mackling (1976) sustained that the classic agency problem could 
be solved if the manager has a stake in the firm. In this case, the costs of deviation 
from value-maximization should decline as management ownership rises. As their 
stakes rise, managers pay a larger share of these costs and are less likely to destroy 
corporate wealth.  
Given Jensen and Mackling (1976) claims, Fama and Jensen (1983a) propose 
that concentrated ownership can be one solution to the classical agency problem. In 
case of concentrated ownership, in fact, the principal hold the residual claim and, 
therefore, has advantages in monitoring and disciplining the decision-making agent. 
In 1986 Shleifer and Vishny11 analyzed the problem of how the presence of a 
large shareholder changes “corporation’s life.” Their speculation started from a very 
simple research question: “who will monitor managers and look for ways to better 
the firm?” The answer at this question seemed to them obvious: a blockholder. This 
kind of investor, in fact, hardly will be disinterested in the firm’s destiny and welfare. 
The blockholder, in fact, owns the most significant stake and will bear the highest 
cost in case of inefficient managerial actions, thus, he will be more likely to collect 
information and monitor the management, thereby avoiding the traditional free rider 
                                                 
11 Shleifer and Vishny (1986b). 
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problem12. Shleifer and Vishny also suggest that the blockholder should also have 
enough voting rights to put pressure on the management in some cases, or perhaps 
even to get rid of the management through a proxy fight13 or a takeover.  
Empirical evidence has somehow sustained Shleifer and Vishny theoretical 
idea showing that presence of a blockholder can produce some good for the firms 
(there is evidence that suggest a better performance of closely-held firm with respect 
to widely-held ones14), but part of this on-going research has also demonstrated that 
blockholders can develop opportunistic behaviour and exploit minority shareholders 
diverting wealth from them. 
Thus, if the effect of concentrated shares came out like a theoretical solution 
to the classic agency cost, very soon scholars began to discover that the presence of 
large shareholder was much more that accidental and that many top managers and/or 
directors of many well known public corporations had a conspicuous percentage of 
shares. Studying the role of the blockholder, it suddenly appeared clear that the 
theoretical benefits he could have brought where largely offset form a new kind of 
agency cost, what the literature in general call: agency cost of control. In other 
words, like in the case of the manager in a widely-held firm, a large shareholder 
could ignore the maximization of the firm’s value (the value for all shareholders) and 
try to do what better for himself and extract private benefits of control. 
 
3.1 Evidence of Agency Cost of Control and Controlling Blockholders 
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) in their survey on corporate governance15 suggest 
that concentrated ownership is one of the most common instruments used to give 
                                                 
12 Free riders are actors who consume more than their fair share of a resource, or pay less than a fair 
share of the costs of its production. The free rider problem study how to prevent free riding from 
taking place, or at least limit its negative effects.  
13 A proxy fight strategy may accompany a hostile takeover. It occurs when the acquiring company 
attempts to convince shareholders to use their proxy votes to install new management that is open to 
the takeover. 
14 Empirical support for the existence of shared benefits comes from several sources. First, blockholders or their 
representatives usually serve as directors and officers, which puts them in the position to influence management 
decisions directly. Second, there is evidence that formations of blocks are associated with abnormal stock price 
increases (see, for instance, Mikkelson and Ruback [1985]). Third, there is also evidence that the trades of large 
blocks are associated with abnormal stock price increases (Barclay and Holderness 1991, 1992). 
15 Corporate governance deals with the ways in which investors in a corporation assure try to curb the 
strength of expropriation by either the manager or the main blockholder. 
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power to the investors and curb the agency cost due to separation between ownership 
and control. They summarize the previous literature on concentrated ownership and 
explain that around the world concentrated ownership is more the norm that the 
exception. 
In the United States, where the law restricts concentrated ownership and 
exercise of control by institutions such as banks and mutual funds, ownership is not 
completely dispersed and one of the most diffuse large shareholders are families 
(Eisenberg (1976), Demsetz (1983), Shleifer and Vishny (1986b)).In Continental 
Europe the presence of large shareholders is even more evident.  
In Germany, large commercial banks often control over a quarter of the votes 
in major companies, and also have smaller but significant cash flow stakes as direct 
shareholders or creditors (Franks and Mayer (1994), OECD (1995)).About 80 % of 
the large German companies have nonbank large shareholder (Gorton and Schmid 
(1996)) while in smaller companies, the norm is family control through majority 
ownership or pyramids16 that allow the ultimate owners to control the assets with the 
least amount of capital (Franks and Mayer (1994), Barca (1995)). In France, 
concentrated ownership through cross-ownership is also very common (OECD 
(1995)). In Italy, Finland, and Sweden (as well as Latin America, East Asia, and 
Africa), corporations typically have controlling owners, who are often founders or 
their offspring.  
In Europe the only exception to the rule of concentrated ownership seems to 
be the United Kingdom where dispersed ownership by diversified shareholders is the 
most diffuse form of ownership (Black and Coffee (1994)). 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) also provide evidence that, , as suggested by 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986b), all around the world large shareholders are active in 
corporate governance curbing the classic agency cost; however their role is not 
costless to minority shareholders.  
Large shareholders, in fact, may have interests that do not coincide with the 
one of minority shareholders or other agents, such as employees and managers. Then, 
if they use their dominant position only to represent their own interests they can 
                                                                                                                                          
 
16 Through a pyramid the owner controls 51 percent of a company, which in turn controls 51 percent 
of its subsidiaries and so on. 
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divert resources and pursuit personal (nonprofit-maximizing) objectives. The threat 
of expropriation increases when the large shareholders own equity with superior 
voting rights, i.e. they have control rights in excess to their cash flow rights. In this 
case, in fact, large investors have not only a strong preference, but also the ability to 
divert resource. For example, they could impose the decision not to pay cash as 
dividends to all investors, but pay themselves special dividends; they could decide 
for targeted share repurchases or exploiting other business relationships with other 
companies they control. 
To expropriate minority shareholders, then, the large shareholders does not 
really need a large stake, instead he need to have strong preferences in pursuing his 
own interest and voting rights over and above his cash-flow rights.  
La Porta, et al. (1998, 2000) emphasize that outside the United States, 
particularly in countries with poor shareholder protection, shareholders with control 
rights in excess to their cash-flow rights are common also in large firms. If a 
blcokholder has voting rights over and above its cash flow rights, he is able to 
impose his decision over the company, but bears a lower cost if he undertakes 
inefficient action to enjoy private benefits. Bebchuk et al. (1999) explain this with a 
very simple exercise based on the investment choice of a controlling blockholder. 
They demonstrate that, as the fraction of the firm’s equity cash-flow rights held by 
the controlling shareholder declines, he can externalize progressively more of the 
costs of his moral hazard and, as a consequence, the agency cost increases. In other 
words a blockholder that has a voting rights in excess to his cash flow rights has 
more interest in extracting agency cost of control since he only bears the marginal 
cost of it while enjoys all the benefits.  
Formally, let suppose that the blockholder is also the manager of the 
company, a case that is not completely unrealistic especially when the controlling 
blockholder is a family. The blockholder-manager can decide between 2 projects: (a) 
Project X that will produce a total value VX, which includes cash flow SX, available 
to all shareholders, and private benefits of control BX, available only to the firm’s 
controller; (b) Project Y will produce a total value of VY, which includes the 
analogous terms SY and BY. Project Y give less private opportunities to the 
controller, that is, that: BX > BY.  
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If the controller wasn’t the one enjoying the private benefit B, from project X 
he would have gotten α (VX - BX), where (VX - BX) represents the value that 
project X will produce for the firm at net of the private benefit extracted from the 
controller (BX) and α is the cash flow stake of the controlling blockholder. However, 
along to the benefits he receive from the net value of the project, the controller is also 
enjoying the private benefit, then the total value he will get from the project is: 
α (VX - BX) + BX.        (23) 
Applying the same steps to Project Y, we can conclude that, the total value 
that the controller would get from investing in this project is given by: 
α (VY - BY) + BY        (24) 
where α is the cash flow stake of the controlling blockholder, (VY - BY) is 
the value that project Y will produce for the firm at net of the private benefit 
extracted from the controller (BY). If the controller has strong preferences for private 
benefit of control and BX > BY, we can conclude that the controller will choose 
Project X on Project Y, if and only if: 
α (VX - BX) + BX > α (VY - BY) + BY     (25) 
Thus, depending on α, the controller might choose the project with the lower 
value V but the larger private benefits of control B and, as α declines, the difference 
between VY and VX will pale in importance, in the controller's eyes, relative to the 
difference in the private benefits of control.  
If Bebchuk et al. (1999) shows that the preference for private benefit is 
inversely proportional to the stake that the controlling owner posses, assuming that 
he has enough voting rights to endorse his decisions, the central point of this 
discussion is that the blockholder must have control motivations. If the blockholder is 
interested in the company just as an investment in its portfolio and does not actively 
participate into it, then (a) his presence does not curb the classic agency cost, since it 
is not the stake of the blockhodler, but the control he has over the manager that 
matters, and (b) he is unlikely to extract private benefit of control. 
The categories of blockholders are simply to summarize, but the analysis of 
blockholders’ control motivation directly refer to their economic and non-economic 
incentive structure. A firm may have as blockholder (a) an individual, for example a 
family blockholder, (b) a widely-held financial institution (such as a bank, pension 
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fund, or mutual fund), or (c) a widely-held industrial corporation. Scholars show that 
only individual and family blockholders have real control motivations while 
institutional blockholders normally have incentive structures similar to atomistic 
shareholders. Tufano (1996), for example, shows that institutional investors are not 
active in monitoring management and are more likely to have incentive structures 
similar to atomistic shareholders. There is instead empirical evidence demonstrating 
that families have a long-term commitment to the firm, often spanning different 
generations. This means that a family blockholder will be very much interested in 
exerting control over the firm’s decisions and anecdotal evidence also shows that 
family blockholders are normally involved in active management and often use 
control enhancing mechanism to guarantee their control over the business.17 
Moreover, families are found to be one of the most common blockholder around the 
world (La Porta, et al. (1998, 2000)) either in countries with low minority 
shareholders protection (such as Italy) or countries where the law strongly protects 
these investors (such as USA).Family blockhodlers are very often directly involved 
in the management,  
Hence, as the separation between ownership and control in case of classic 
agency cost, control motivations are the key issue to understand the threat of 
minority expropriation by blockholder; the economic and non-economic incentive 
structure of family firms clearly indicate that they are the most likely to suffer from 
agency cost of control. However, investors in closely-held corporations with a 
blockholder such as institutions are more likely to suffer from the consequences of 
the classic agency cost since, as in widely-held firms, no shareholders has enough 
incentives (in this case non-economic incentives) to monitor the manager. Anyhow, a 
clear conclusion one the benefits and harm of concentrated ownership is still far from 
being reached. 
In conclusion, since Jensen and Mackling’ paper in 1976 research on the 
classic agency cost has increased dramatically both from a theoretical and empirical 
prospective. While the theory has proposed various ways to curb the classic agency 
cost and increase shareholders’ wealth there is little evidence that concentrated 
                                                 
17 Dyck and Zingales (2001), Villalonga and Amit (2004), Barottini and Caprio (2005), and Ellul 
(2007). Barottini and Caprio (2005) argue that families are clearly oriented to maintaining control of 
the companies they found or acquire, and often resort to control-enhancing devices. Families are often 
accused of considering executive positions in the firm as a channel for providing highly remunerated 
jobs to the offspring. 
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ownership in the management hands is really an advantage for shareholder. However, 
there is increasing evidence that the presence of a blockholder curbs the classic 
agency cost, but create a new agency cost.  
If the real interest for investor is the maximization of their wealth, then the 
only way to understand if concentrated ownership curbs the classic agency cost and 
which is the effect on minority shareholder wealth in companies with agency cost of 
control is an empirical issue that finance literature has not failed in analysing.  
The next chapter of this work illustrates the most important empirical 
evidence on the relationship between concentrated ownership and firm’ value in 
closely-held corporation and in closely-held corporations where the blockholders has 
clear control motivations.  
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Chapter II 
 
 
 
Ownership Structure and Performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that there is a positive relation between 
concentrated managerial ownership and firm’s value. As the managers’ stake rises 
managers are less likely to squander corporate wealth18. Since Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), the relation between ownership structure and firm’s value has received 
significant attention, especially in the last decade. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and more recently La Porta et al. (1998, 2000) 
show that around the world the managers frequently have a part in the ownership 
structure and that blockholder are also very common. However, while theoretical 
models suggest what benefits we should expect from this non-complete separation of 
ownership and control, there is no consensus on the impact that this has on firm’s 
value.  
Analyzing existing theoretical literature, non-complete separation can lead to 
two opposing effects: 
                                                 
18 Morck et al. (1988) label this idea of Jensen and Meckling (1976) as convergence-of-interest 
hypothesis, market value increases with management ownership. 
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a. Positive effect: Concentrated ownership should have a positive effect in 
reducing the agency cost arising from the manager’s opportunistic behaviour.  
b. Negative effect: Concentrated ownership would create agency costs of control 
that would lead to minority expropriation.   
From an empirical point of view then we would expect one of the following results: 
i. If the positive effect offsets the negative one, there is a positive relationship 
between concentrated ownership and firm performance measures. 
ii. Vice versa, if the negative effect offsets the positive one, there is a negative 
relationship between concentrated ownership and firm performance measure. 
iii. No effect. The presence of a blockholder does not really have an effect on firm 
valuation. 
Existing empirical literature19 has studied the impact of the concentrated 
ownership on firm’s value mostly using accounting-based measure of firm’s 
performance: Tobin’s Q20, accounting profit rate and ROA.  
Tobin’s Q compares the value of a company given by financial markets with 
the value of a company's assets. It is calculated by dividing the market value of 
firm’s assets by the replacement cost of its assets. In other words, the Tobin’s Q 
focuses on what the firm’s is worth today relative to what it would cost to replace it 
today.  Tobin’ Q is a forward-looking measure of performance, but there are some 
issues with the way it is calculated.  
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) argue that the numerator of Tobin’ Q, the 
market value of the firm, partly reflects the value investors assign to a firm’s 
intangible assets, however the denominator of Tobin’ Q, the estimated replacement 
cost of the firm’s tangible assets, does not include investments the firm has made in 
intangible assets. Hence, the firm’s future revenue it is treated as if it can be 
generated from investments made only in tangible capital and this distorts 
performance comparisons of firms that rely in differing degrees on intangible capital 
(Telser (1969); Weiss (1969); Demsetz (1979)). Problems are also related to the way 
                                                 
19 In particular, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) study used accounting profit rate to measure firm 
performance while all of the studies that followed used Tobin’s Q. Mork et al. (1988) use both profit 
rate and Tobin’s Q.  
20 Tobin (1969) 
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replacement cost of tangible capital (denominator of Tobin’s Q) is calculated. 
Finally, the idea behind the Tobin’s Q is that in the long run the ratio of market price 
to replacement cost tends toward 1, but the evidence is that this ratio can differ 
significantly from 1 from very long period of time. 
Accounting profit rates are measures of the relative profitability of an 
investment21. They are intended to measure how efficiently a firm uses its assets. 
ROA is one of the profitability measures. ROA (or Return on Asset), which measures 
profitability for all contributors of capital, is defined as earnings before interest and 
taxes divided by total assets or as net income on total assets.  
Measures of profitability, such as ROA and profit rate, are subject to 
accounting artefact problems. Profitability rate are based on accounting earning that 
are affected by several convention regarding the valuation of assets such as 
inventory, and by the way some expenditure are recognized over time (as 
depreciation expenses). In addition to this to these accounting issues, as the firm 
makes its way through the business cycle, its earning will rise above or fall below the 
trend line that that might accurately reflects sustainable economic earning. Economic 
earnings are the sustainable cash flow that can be paid out to stakeholders without 
impairing the productive capacity of the firm. 
The problems related to the use of accounting-based measures of 
performance, then, suggest that other measures of performance might be more 
appropriate to investigate if ownership structure matters for performance.  
In this work instead of accounting based performance I use stock-returns 
performance. While existing empirical literature has largely studied accounting-based 
performance, not much has been done on stock-returns performances. As far as I 
know, only Fahlenbrach (2003) and Corstjens et al. (2006) have used stock-return 
performance to investigate if there are significant differences between family and 
non-family firms. 
According with the efficient market hypothesis, financial markets process all 
the relevant information about securities quickly and efficiently, so that the required 
price usually reflects all the information available to investors at any point in time. 
Therefore, the security price that prevails at any time should be an unbiased 
                                                 
21 Mork et al. (1988) use as profit rate the ratio of the firm's net cash flows (less the inflation adjusted 
value of depredation) divided the replacement cost of the firm's tangible assets 
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reflection of all current information, including the risk involved in owning that 
security. Hence, in an efficient market, the expected returns implicit in the current 
price of a stock should reflect its risk. Using stock return, then, I am not only able to 
understand if ownership matters for performance, but studying the trade-off between 
risk and performance I am also able to conclude that if ownership structure matters 
for returns this is due to the fact that certain ownership structures are is riskier than 
others.  
Finally, another concern about sample selection arise when analysis the 
results of the existing empirical literature. In these studies, in fact, scholar mostly use 
large company in countries in which the law that protects stakeholders is effectively 
enforced (for example, USA and UK). However, there is evidence that the 
blockholders (especially family blockholders) are very common in company of 
medium and small size; besides, large shareholders govern by exercising their voting 
rights and their power depends on the degree of legal protection (Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997)). Therefore, the results may vary when considering different law systems. To 
address these two concerns, I consider a very large sample of companies with large, 
medium and small size and also study how the impact of ownership structure on 
stock returns changes across countries with different law systems. 
In this chapter I will describe what existing literature has found on the 
empirical relationship between agency costs and firm accounting measures of 
performance. I will start by describing some empirical evidence that shows that the 
classic agency conflicts between managers and shareholders lead to a loss in value 
that can be reduced if the manager accumulates enough shares. The paper I will 
present mostly study the impact of the presence of an owner-manager and use as 
measure of performance the Tobin’s Q.  
Second, I will review another strand of the literature showing evidence how 
agency costs of control impact firm’s performance. In this latter case the focus shifts 
away from the manager and his conflict with shareholders towards the blockholder 
and his conflicts with other financial stakeholders, such as minority shareholders and 
bondholders. The driving factor here is the blockholder’s involvement in the firm 
ownership and management.  
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Section 1 Firm’s Performance and Insider Ownership  
 
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988a) were among the first to address the 
relationship between inside ownership and firm value. They measure inside 
ownership as the sum of all the shares owned by all members of the management, 
and use it to test what they call “the convergence-of-interest hypothesis” and the 
“entrancement hypothesis” 22.   
Their first hypothesis comes directly from the discussion of Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). According with this hypothesis, firm value is expected to increase 
as the managerial stake rises. This positive effect is, however, tempered by the 
managerial entrenchment that may happen in such cases.  
When test the “entrancement hypothesis” they do not expect a clear result 
(either positive or negative) because entrenchment is not just a consequence of voting 
power. For example, some managers, by virtue of their relationship with the firm 
(they can be the firm’s founders) can be entrenched but have relatively small 
ownership stakes. Moreover, managers in firms with a large outside shareholder or 
an active group of outside directors may face high level of monitoring and in this 
case the negative effects from entrenchment are minimized even if managers have 
high ownership stakes. Then it is possible that more managerial ownership allows 
deeper entrenchment, but the result on the firm performance is not obvious. 
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny examine a sample of 371 Fortune 500 firms. For 
which they have ownership information only for the year 1980. They measure the 
firm’s performance using Tobin’s Q (and run additional checks the profit rate23), 
while the firm concentrated ownership is captured by managerial holding24. They 
                                                 
22 Shleifer and Vishny (1989) 
23 They mostly test this accounting measure of performance to be able to confront their research with 
the one of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) that finds no relationship between the rate of profit and the 
concentration of shares held by the management. The profit rate is defined as the ratio of the firm's net 
cash flows less the inflation-adjusted value of depreciation to the previously defined replacement cost 
of its capital stock, The profit rate is the relative profitability of an investment project, of a capitalist 
enterprise, or of the capitalist economy as a whole and it is similar to the concept of the rate of return 
on investment. 
24 Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) criticize Morck et al. (1988) choice of the firm ownership measure. 
They argue that to measure concentrated ownership considering managerial holding suggests that all 
shareholders that are involved in the company’s management have a common interest, but this is very 
far from being true. A board member, for example, may have a position on the board because he has, 
or represents someone who has, large holdings of the company’s stock. Board members like this one 
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find that Tobin’s Q tends to increase as managerial stock ownership increases to 5%. 
Firm value, then, decreases (the effect is very small) as managerial stock ownership 
increases from 5% to 25%. Finally, firm value tends to increase very slightly as 
managerial ownership increases beyond 25%.  
 
 
Figure 1. Morck et al. (1988), p. 301 
This figure shows the relationship between board ownership and Tobin’s Q implied by the piecewise 
linear ordinary least squares regression of 1980 Tobin’s Q on board ownership and other firms 
characteristics for 371 Fortune 500 firms  
 
The first two breakpoints are statistically significant. The breakpoint of 25% 
is marginally significant in some specifications and insignificant in others. The same 
results are also found with ownership of the firm’s top officers and by its outside 
directors. 
Figure 1 above (Fig.1; Morck et al. (1988), p. 301) shows clearly the pattern. 
They interpret this finding as saying that the convergence-of-interests effect operates 
throughout the whole range of ownership, while the conditions necessary for 
entrenchment (voting power, control of the board of directors, status as a founder, 
etc.) are significantly correlated with increasing managerial ownership beyond 5%. 
However, they conclude that these conditions are not much different for firms with 
greater than 25% board ownership than they are for those with 20-25% ownership. 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) take a similar approach used by Morck, Shleifer, and 
                                                                                                                                          
do not have interests identical to those of professional management. More likely, their interests are 
more closely aligned with those of outside investors. 
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Vishny (1988a) and examining a large sample of New York Stock Exchange (and 
American Stock Exchange) listed firms. The primary hypothesis they investigated is 
that the value of the firm is a function of the distribution of equity ownership among 
corporate insiders (i.e., officers and directors), individual atomistic shareholders, 
block shareholders, and institutional investors. They define as inside ownership as 
the amount of shares owned by officers and members of the board of directors. To 
define blockholders and their ownership stakes they use Value Line Investment 
Survey25 for the years 1976 and 1986.  
McConnell and Servaes find that Tobin’s Q tends to increase until reaches 40 
to 50 %, followed by a gradual decline as ownership increases further. This is clear in 
the following figure (McConnell and Servaes (1990), p. 604) where on the y-axis 
there is the Tobin’s Q and on the x-axis there is the insider ownership. 
They find a strong positive relation between Tobin’s Q and the fraction of 
shares held by institutional investors and no significant relationship between Tobin’s 
Q and either the presence of an “outside” blockholder26 or the percentage of stock 
owned by such shareholders. Moreover, their results confirm Morck, Shleifer, and 
Vishny’s findings only for inside ownership between 0 and 5%.  
Kole (1995) tries to reconcile the findings of Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1988a) with those of McConnell and Servaes (1990). She examines the 
performance-ownership relation for a sample composed of 95% of the firms studied 
by Morck, Shleifer and Vishny.  
Kole examines a sample of large firms for which ownership data are available 
from different data sets: CDE (Corporate Data Exchange), corporate proxy statement, 
and Value Line. First, she considers the sample of Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1988) and finds a total of 363 out of 371 firms for which ownership data are 
available from Value Line Investment Survey from October 1980 through March 
1981. Of these 363 firms she ends up with a sample of 352 firms for which she has 
complete data from all three ownership dataset. Replicating the regressions of Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny for each of the three data sources, she finds that the signs on the 
                                                 
25 . Value Line gathers this information from annual corporate proxy statements, public disclosures, 
and Forms 3 and 4 filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on insider trading. 
Value Line defines corporate insiders to include officers and members of the board of directors. 
26 Holderssen (2003) arguments that the authors are unclear on what constitutes an outside 
blockholder. Is it a blockholder who is not an officer, or is it a blockholder who is neither an officer 
nor a director? 
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three breakpoints are the same for all three data sources: positive for ownership from 
0% to 5%, negative for 5% to 25%, and positive beyond 25%.  
 
 
Figure 4 - McConnell and Servaes (1990), p. 604  
This figure shows the relationship between Tobin’s Q and insider ownership. 
 
Looking at Table 4 (Kole (1995), p. 427) reported above we can notice that 
the results for the ownership coefficient are quite different among them and mostly 
not significant. Among the three datasets (Sub-sample I) all coefficients are not 
significant for an ownership stake beyond 25%. Moreover, for a stake ranging from 
5% to 25% only the coefficient for proxy and CDE are significant. Finally, in the 
range between 0% and 5%, Value Line is insignificant. Still, Kole’s interpretation of 
these results is that all the three datasets are able to discover the existence of a non-
monotonic relationship between Tobin’s Q (firm value) and concentrated ownership. 
The data, then, are not driving the different results found by Morck, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1988a) and McConnell and Servaes (1990). However, the difference can be 
explained in terms of sample size: McConnell and Servaes (1990) use more then 
1000 firms while Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988a) only 371. 
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Table 1 - Kole (1995), p. 427: Coefficient Estimates 
 
So far I have presented evidence of a positive relation between firm 
performance and concentrated ownership. Other strands of the literature actually 
propose an opposite point of view and find different results. 
This is the case of Mehran (1995) who investigates the structure of 
managerial compensation, and also analyze if the executive compensation matter in 
the context of the firm’s ownership structure He uses compensation data for 153 
randomly-selected manufacturing firms (small as well as large firms) from 1979 to 
1980.  
The percentage of equity held by managers is measured as the sum of their 
direct share ownership and their stock options outstanding plus share ownership by 
their immediate families. The percentage of equity held by all outside blockholders is 
measured using the sum of the percentages of equity held by individual investors, 
institutional investors, and corporations who own at least 5% of the common stock of 
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the company27. Outside directors are considered as the members of the board who are 
neither top executives nor retired executives nor former executives of the company 
nor relatives of the CEO.  
Mehran finds no significant relationship between firm performance (both 
Tobin’s Q and return on assets (ROA)) and outside directors’ stock holdings. Second, 
he also finds no significant relationship between firm performance and blockholders’ 
holdings, or between firm performance and the outside blockholdings of a variety of 
investors (individual, institutional, corporate).  
The first result of Mehran clearly contrasts with the finding of Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1988). The author clarifies that Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1988) use a sample of large firms only and this could explain the difference in 
results since it is known that the percentage of outside directors increases with firm 
size. In addition, he also explains that outside directors’ equity ownership is normally 
not significant enough to give them an incentive to monitor the firm.  
The studies I have reviewed so far are all cross sectional researches. 
Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) argue that “these studies do not address the 
endogeneity problem that confronts the use of managerial ownership as an 
explanatory variable, a problem noted early by Jensen and Warner (1988, p. 13)”. 
Hence, Himmelberg et al. (1999) use a different approach to study the 
relationship between firm value and inside ownership: panel data to test for the 
endogeneity of managerial ownership. Following Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Kole 
(1995), they argue that managerial ownership is endogenous, and support the idea 
that both ownership and performance are determined by similar (observed and 
unobserved) variables in the firm’s contracting environment.  
In a sample of 60028 randomly selected Compustat firms over the 1982-92 
period, they find that changes in managerial ownership do not to affect firm 
performance. 
Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) mostly extend the cross-sectional 
results of Demsetz and Lehn (1985). The latter investigate the relationship between 
                                                 
27 He chooses 5% (as many researchers do) because this ownership level triggers mandatory public 
filing under SEC regulation. 
28 The number of firms shrinks to only 330 in 1992, so the panel is systematically less random over 
time. 
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firm value and inside ownership and test whether diffuse ownership structures 
adversely affect corporate performance. They find no significant relation in the linear 
regressions they estimate using accounting profit rate as measure of performance.  
In their study Demsetz and Lehn also provide some evidence on the 
endogeneity of the firm structure suggesting that the ownership structure can be 
affected by four forces:  
(a) Value-maximizing size of the firm. If a firm wants to be successful in a 
market, it needs to achieve a competitive size. Then the larger is the size the larger 
are the firm's resources and, generally, the greater is the market value of a given 
fraction of ownership.  
(b) Potential profit coming from exercising more effective control (they call 
this control potential). This is the wealth gain achievable through more effective 
monitoring of managerial performance by the firm's owners. Given that the 
monitoring from the labour market and the market for control is not costless, this 
force has an impact on the ownership structure.  
(c) Systematic regulation. Systematic regulation restricts the options available 
to owners, and imposes constraints on the scope and impact of shareholders’ 
decisions thus reducing control potential. Regulation also provides some subsidized 
monitoring and disciplining of the management of regulated firms. These effects of 
regulation should reduce ownership concentration. 
(d) Amenity potential of firms. The term “amenity potential”, refers to non-
pecuniary private benefits of control or the utility to the founder that does not come 
at the expense of profits. For example, a founder may derive pleasure from having 
his child run the company that bears the family name.  
On a sample of 511 firms from major sectors of the U.S. economy, they also 
regress an measure performance on the fraction of shares owned by the top 5 and top 
20 shareholders (and a set of control variables), in which ownership structure is 
treated as an endogenous outcome29. When they study the relationship between firm 
value and ownership concentration, they do not find any significant relationship 
between ownership concentration and accounting profit rate.  
                                                 
29 An endogenous variable is a factor in a causal model or causal system whose value is determined by 
the states of other variables in the system. 
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In 2001, Demsetz and Villalonga find additional evidence suggesting further 
the endogeneity of ownership structure. They examine the roles played by two 
aspects of ownership structure: (a) the fraction of shares owned by the five largest 
shareholding interests, and (b) the fraction of shares owned by management. They 
model these as endogenous using a two-stage least square estimator and find no 
relationship between firm value and inside ownership. 
 
Section 2 Family-Blockholders, Agency Cost and Performance 
 
Family-owned firms are generally identified by existing literature as 
corporations where the founder, or descendents of his/her family (either by blood or 
through marriage), is a blockholder, either individually or as a group (for example, 
through a trust or a foundation). Evidence from existing literature, such as La Porta et 
al. (1998, 2000), shows that family firms are very pervasive in many countries, even 
in the US, and have a long-term commitment to the firm, often spanning different 
generations. Their long-term commitment creates a situation where the family’s 
reputation (and, in many cases, its national and international prestige) is very much 
related to the firm’s performance. This means that a family blockholder will be very 
much interested in exerting control over the firm’s decisions. Beyond monitoring and 
control advantages, James (1999) posits that families have longer investment 
horizons. 
 
2.1 Family Firms’ Agency Costs30 
 
Traditionally, researchers have assumed that owner-managed firms will have 
either zero or insignificant classic agency costs (Jensen & Meckling (1976); Fama & 
Jensen (1983); Ang, Cole, & Lin (2000)). Chrisman et al. (2004) suggest that there is 
a tendency to extend this last conclusion to family firms because the family 
blockholder is expected to be either in direct control of management or closely 
                                                 
30 For a complete review see Chrisman et al. (2004). 
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control the manager. Moreover, Stewart (2003) suggests that family members are 
altruistic toward each other as a result of moral obligations so that altruism could 
mitigate some agency costs (Wu, (2001)). Unfortunately, though, altruism can also 
lead to other agency costs, for example, free riding by family members, as in the 
“Samaritan’s dilemma”31 (Bruce and Waldman, 1990), and entrenchment of 
ineffective managers32 (Morck et al. (1988) and Morck & Yeung (2003)).  
Two recent articles (Schulze et al., 2001; Schulze, Lubatkin, and Dino, 2003) 
claim that family relationships make it more difficult to resolve certain kinds of 
conflicts. Since nepotism does exist (Ewing, 1965) and families find it difficult to 
replace ineffective family members (Handler & Kram, 1988), it is hard to deny that 
family involvement has the potential to lower firm performance. However, a large 
part of the more recent literature on family firms’ performance suggests that family 
firms overperform non family firms when considering accounting-based measures. 
This is at least true in a number of countries. Thus, it is reasonable to argue that the 
nature of agency costs of family firms and the impact on firm performance deserves 
more careful consideration. 
According to some scholars (Becker (1974); Parsons (1986); Eisenhardt 
(1989); Daily & Dollinger (1992)), family firms should be less expose or exempt 
from problems of agency. However, many scholars disagree with this conclusion.  
Sharma, Chrisman, & Chua, (1997) suggest that families are not always 
composed of individuals sharing the same goals. As a result, some family firms may 
be particularly vulnerable to agency problems. Bergstrom (1989) concludes that we 
are more likely to observe children shirking than working and this is consistent with 
some of the most recent finance literature that shows that in family firms the 
presence of a founder-CEO is associated with higher firms’ performance while a 
descendant-CEO has a negative impact33.  
Family firms also face different challenges relative to non-family firms 
because of their tendency to enjoy private benefits and self-dealing actions (Litz 
                                                 
31 Parents are faced with a Samaritan’s dilemma when their actions give beneficiaries incentive to take 
actions or make decisions that may ultimately harm the parents’ own welfare. Zellweger (2006) 
suggest that this problem is associated with the exercise (or lack) of self-control by the principal. Self-
control problems arise whenever parties to a contract have both the incentive and the ability to take 
actions that “harm themselves and those around them” (Jensen, 1994). 
32 Beyond a certain point managers’ ownership can reduce the effectiveness of corporate governance 
mechanisms. 
33 Villalonga and Amit (2006) 
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(1997); Schulze et al. (2001)). La Porta et al. (1999, p. 510) see this characteristic as 
particularly troublesome and argue that family enterprises are uniquely predisposed 
to internal dysfunction. Schulze et al. (2001) suggest that parents’ altruism will lead 
them to be generous to their children even when the latter free ride and lack the 
competence and/or intention to exploit the firm’s potential growth. Schulze et al. 
(2003) also note that altruism may bias perceptions of parent-CEOs regarding the 
performance of family agents and may make it more difficult to punish poor 
performance, particularly when such punishment has spillover effects on family 
relationships outside the business arena.  
 
2.2  Family Firm Performance 
 
Recent empirical evidence suggests that founding-family ownership is 
associated with superior firm performance when compared to widely-held 
companies, both in terms of accounting performance and market valuation (Anderson 
and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Barontini and Caprio, 2005; 
Fahlenbrach (2003)).  
In US, Anderson and Reeb (2003) find that families have better performance 
using profitability-based measures of firm performance (ROA). Villalonga and Amit 
(2006) using Tobin’s Q34 to measure the performance, find that family ownership 
creates value only when the founder serves as the CEO of the family firm or as its 
Chairman with a hired CEO. Instead, when descendants serve as CEOs, firm value is 
destroyed. Besides, Fahlenbrach (2003) finds that firms run by their founders display 
abnormal market returns relative to the Fama-French (1993) factor model augmented 
by Carhart’s (1997) momentum factor.  
In European countries some interesting evidence is provided by Barontini and 
Caprio (2005) and Corstjens et al. (2006). Barontini and Caprio (2005) find that, 
even after controlling for control enhancing mechanisms and management 
involvement, family firms are better than non-family ones when descendants limit 
themselves to the role of non-executive directors, and are not worse than non-family 
firms when a descendant takes the helm. Corstjens et al. (2006)using a four factors 
                                                 
34 The ratio of the firm’s market value to the replacement cost of its assets 
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model (as Fahlenbrach (2003)) investigates whether there are significant differences 
between family and non-family firms in France, Germany, UK and US. Interestingly, 
they find that in France family firms are riskier and perform better than non-family 
firms, while in Germany, UK and US there is not significant difference in 
performance between family and non-family firms. 
Here follows a review of two fundamentals papers: Anderson and Reeb 
(2003) and Villalonga and Amit (2006). Both papers are common references for the 
literature on family firms’ performance and their findings have opened a debate that 
has inspired new research and new interest in family firms.  
 
2.2.1 Anderson and Reeb (2003) 
 
Anderson and Reeb (2003), using accounting and market measures of firm 
performance, compare family and non-family firms. After controlling for industry 
and firm characteristics, they suggest that firms with continued founding-family 
presence exhibit significantly better accounting and market performance than non-
family firms.  
To define a family firm, they use the fractional equity ownership of the 
founding family and (or) the presence of family members on the board of directors to 
identify family firms35. Non-family firms are those firms without family ownership 
or family presence on the board of directors. 
They manually collect data from corporate proxy statements on board 
structure, CEO characteristics, independent blockholdings, and family attributes for 
403 S&P 500 firms36 from 1992 to 1999 yielding 2,713 firm-years observations. 
Their measures of firm performance are Tobin’s Q and ROA (measured using either 
                                                 
35 However, while the identification of family’s members is not too difficult for young firms, it 
becomes harder for older firms that already had crossed different generations. In this latter case, in 
fact, very often the family expands to include distant relatives such as second or third cousins whose 
last names may no longer be the same. To resolve these descendant issues they examine corporate 
histories for each firm in their sample (Histories are from Gale Business Resources, Hoovers, and 
from individual companies). 
36 They exclude banks and public utilities due to the difficulty in calculating Tobin’s Q for banks and 
because government regulations potentially affect firm performance. 
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EBITDA or Net Income)37, 38. Panel B of Table II (Anderson and Reeb (2003), p.29) 
presents the univariate. analysis between family and non-family firms. In this Table 
they present evidence that in the U.S.:  
 
 
Table 2 - Anderson and Reeb (2003), p.29: Panel B of Table II  
 
1. Family firms are smaller than non-family firms.  
2. Among family firms 45% of the CEOs are family members and 55% are 
outsiders or “hired-hands.”  
                                                 
37 . Tobin’s Q and Return On Assets (ROA) are their performance measures. Tobin’s Q (Q) is the 
market value of total assets divided by the replacement cost of assets. Return on assets (ROA) is 
computed in two ways. In one approach, they use net income scaled by the book value of total assets. 
In the second approach, they use earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization 
(EBITDA) divided by the book value of total assets. 
38 They introduce several control variables into their analysis to control for industry and firm 
characteristics. Firm size is the natural log of the book value of total assets. Growth opportunities are 
measured as the ratio of research and development expenses to total sales. Firm risk is the standard 
deviation of monthly stock returns for the prior 60 months. They control for debt in the capital 
structure by dividing long-term debt by total assets. Firm age is measured as the natural log of the 
number of years since the firm’s inception. Because corporate governance mechanisms can also 
influence firm performance and may affect family control, they include proxies for various 
governance devices. They use annual corporate proxy statements to collect data on the size and 
composition of the board of directors. They also incorporate a CEO compensation measure into the 
analysis because of the relation between executive pay and firm performance. Their measure, CEO 
Equity Based Pay, is defined as equity based pay (new options) divided by the sum of equity based 
pay, salary, and annual bonus. Compensation data comes from S&P’s and COMPUSTAT. 
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3. Family firms have a higher performance relative to non-family firms in 
terms of ROA. 
Using Tobin’s Q, as the performance measure, they find that family firms 
have significantly (but very slightly) greater valuations than non-family firms.  
To better understand the univariate results and control for the many other 
variables that influence firm performance, Anderson and Reeb also produce a 
multivariate analysis. The results of these regressions are in Table III (with 
accounting measures of performance) and Table IV (with market-based 
performance). 
 
Table 3 - Anderson and Reeb (2003), p.31: Table III 
 
Table III, here reported as Table3, shows the results using accounting 
performance. The coefficient estimated for the presence of a family is positive and 
significant (both statistically and economically) when using either EBITDA or Net 
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Income when calculating ROA. Based on ROA, family firms appear to return 6.65 % 
more relative to non-family firms39. 
Table IV (reproduced below) shows additional results that provide further 
support to those found using ROA. Column 1 reports the results of the regression 
with Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable and the family firm binary variable on the 
right-hand side. The coefficient estimate for the family firm indicator is positive and 
significant at the 1% level. This result is economically significant and suggests that 
Tobin’s Q in family firms is 10.0 % higher than in non-family firms40. 
 
 
Table 4 - Anderson and Reeb (2003), p.32: Table IV 
 
                                                 
39 They calculate this as: Return = coefficient estimate/average ROA = 0.010/.1505 = 0.0665. 
Similarly, for ROA based on net income, the differential is: .007/.0516 = 0.1357. They also repeat the 
analysis using return on equity (ROE) as the performance measure and find similar results. 
40 They calculate this as the coefficient estimate of family firms (0.142) divided by the average 
Tobin’s Q for the sample (1.415). 
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Finally, following Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) and McConnell and 
Servaes (1990), Anderson and Reeb test the hypothesis that the relation between 
equity ownership structure and firm performance may be non-linear. To do so they 
include family ownership and the square of family ownership as continuous variables 
(McConnell and Servaes (1990)). They conclude from the analysis41 that the relation 
between family holdings and performance is not uniform over the entire range of 
family ownership; firm performance is increasing until families own about one-third 
of the firm’s outstanding equity. Beyond this level, performance begins to decline but 
is still better, on average, than non-family firms.  
How we can expect, all the analysis that investigate the relationship between 
the presence of a family and performance suffer from endogeneity problems. In fact, 
because it is not clear if the presence of the family explains the likely higher 
performance or it is the better performance that keeps the family from leaving the 
business. Of course this problem does not only concern Anderson and Reeb’ paper, 
but it is a common issue for all scholars that work in this field. To get rid of this 
concern, many researchers run some additional checks using, in many cases 
Instrumental Variables (IV). Anderson and Reeb for example use an Instrumental 
Variable 2stage least square approach42. The estimates they got are consistent with 
prior OLS results, suggesting that family firms are superior performers relative to 
non-family firms. However, they do not completely eliminate the possibility that 
families are more likely to exit firms with poor future performance; implying that the 
better performance observed in family firms is potentially due to both family 
foresight and reduced managerial agency costs.  
 
2.2.2  Villalonga and Amit (2006) 
 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) study if family firms trade at a premium or at a 
discount with respect to non-family firms and suggest that to fully understand the 
relationship between family ownership and performance it is important to consider  
three important aspects of family firms: ownership, control, and management. 
                                                 
41 Table V, Anderson and Reeb (2003), p. 33. 
42 Table VI, Anderson and Reeb (2003), p. 34 
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Using data from the proxy filings of all Fortune 500 firms between 1994 and 
2000 for a total of 2,808 firm-years43, they find that family ownership only creates 
value for all firm’s shareholders when the founder is still active in the firm either as 
CEO or as Chairman with a hired CEO. 
In Villalonga and Amit (2006) family firms are identified as those whose 
founder or a member of the family by either blood or marriage is an officer, a 
director, or the owner of at least 5% of the firm’s equity, individually or as a group. 
They also focus on the firm founder defined as individual responsible for the firm’s 
early growth and development44.  
As measure of corporate performance they use the firm’s market-to-book 
value as a proxy for Tobin’s Q, and use the market value of common equity plus the 
book value of preferred stock and debt as a proxy for the firm’s market value45. They 
also measure the market risk (beta), idiosyncratic risk, and ROA. 
In Table II they provide the unvariate analysis showing that family firms 
outperform non-family firms when using Tobin’s Q. At the same time, they find that 
family firms are riskier both in terms of idiosyncratic and market risk. All the 
differences are statistically significant.  
                                                 
43 Their data collection process involves two distinct phases. In Phase I, they build a database at the 
individual shareholder level which covers, for each firm-year in the sample, all of its insiders (officers 
and/or directors), blockholders (owners of five percent or more of the firm’s equity), and the five 
largest institutional shareholders.  They compile our Phase I data set from four sources: proxy 
statements for detailed information about blockholder and insider ownership, and about the firm’s 
voting and board structures; Spectrum data on institutional holdings; Hoover’s, corporate websites, 
and web searches about company histories and family relationships; and various SEC filings, to clarify 
the identity of ultimate owners whenever firms are controlled through intermediate corporations or 
“pyramids.” This data set comprises 52,787 shareholder firm-year observations. Phase II of their data 
collection process centers on aggregating our shareholder-level database from Phase I into firm-years, 
and obtaining data on a broad range of firm characteristics from three other sources: Compustat, 
CRSP, and the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), which provides data on governance 
provisions in charters, bylaws, and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings. This 
aggregation results in 2,808 firm-year observations from 508 different firms. 
44 There is an interesting bite of how they did work: In Kellogg, the largest individual shareholder is 
Gorge Gund III, as a result of his father George Gund II’s sale for stock of one of his companies to 
Kellogg in 1927. In addition, George III’s brother Gordon is a director. Yet the Kellogg family, 
through the W.G. Kellogg foundation, owns about three times as many shares as does the Gund 
family. We therefore consider the Kelloggs, and not the Gunds, as the controlling family. 
45 For firms with a single class of shares, the market value of common equity is the product of the 
share price at fiscal year-end times the number of common shares outstanding. They obtain both items 
from Compustat. For firms with multiple classes of tradable shares, the procedure is the same for each 
class of stock and only requires adding the market value of all classes (Zingales, 1995, Nenova, 2003). 
For firms with multiple share classes, including at least one class that is not publicly traded, we 
multiply the total shares outstanding of all classes by the share price of the tradable shares to estimate 
the market value of common equity. 
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Table 5 - Villalonga and Amit (2006) p. 35 Table II 
 
In Table III they present the results from multivariate analysis of value 
regressed on different measures of family ownership, control, and management. In 
columns (1) and (2), Tobin’s Q is used as the dependent variable and use year and 
Fama-French industry dummies to control for time and industry effects. In columns 
(3) and (4), they control for these two effects by using industry adjusted Q46 as the 
dependent variable while dropping the industry and year dummies. 
In columns (1) and (3) family ownership is measured by a family firm dummy 
and family control by a dummy that indicates the presence of control-enhancing 
mechanisms such as multiple share classes, pyramids, cross-holdings, or voting 
agreements47. In columns (2) and (4), Villalonga and Amit use continuous measures 
of both family ownership and control. The measure of family ownership is the 
percentage of shares of all classes held by the family as a group. The measure of 
                                                 
46 Industry-adjusted Q is the difference between the firm’s Q and the asset-weighted average of the 
imputed Q’s of its segments, where a segment’s imputed Q is the industry average Q, and Q is 
measured as before. 
47 Following La Porta et al. (1999) and Bebchuk et al. (2000), Villaonga and Amit assume that the use 
of these mechanisms reflects the family’s ability to extract private benefits of control 
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family control (in excess of ownership) is the percentage of votes owned by the 
family in excess of the percentage of shares it owns.  
 
 
Table 6 - Villalonga and Amit (2006) p. 36 Table III 
 
Columns (1) and (3) in Table III confirm the univariate differences in Q 
reported in Table II. The coefficient of the family firm dummy is 0.26 in the Tobin’s 
Q regression, 0.25 in the industry-adjusted Q regression, and it is statistically 
significant in both. Control-enhancing mechanisms have a negative and significant 
effect on Q (-0.21). This finding suggests that family firm shareholders pay a price 
for the family’s appropriation of private benefits. In other word, since large 
shareholders, such as family firms, govern by exercising their voting rights what 
really matters is the amount of voting rights they obtain through control enhancing 
mechanism. Hence the use of control enhancing mechanisms exacerbates the agency 
cost problem; however, this is negatively reflected in the company’s performance so 
that the family pays a price for it since the family has right to a share of the firm’s 
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performance proportional to its cash flow rights. The effect of control-enhancing 
mechanisms on industry-adjusted Q is also negative but not significant. 
Columns (2) and (4) provide further investigation of the value effects of 
family ownership and control. Villalonga and Amit find a positive and significant 
coefficient of family ownership that is identical for both industry-adjusted and 
unadjusted Q (0.66). However, ion both regressions, the coefficient on the excess 
vote-holdings variable is negative and significant (-0.12). These findings suggest 
that, despite the costs associated with the family’s excess of control, the family 
ownership is beneficial for minority shareholders. In other words, minority 
shareholders in family firms are better off than they would have been in a non-family 
firm. However, family management, as measured by the presence of a family CEO, 
has no significant effect on value.  
The last step of the Villalonga and Amit study an investigation of which 
agency cost has more impact on family firm. To analyse this issue the authors 
distinguish between two kinds of agency problems: 
c. Agency Cost I. The classic agency cost between manager and 
atomistic shareholders. 
d. Agency Cost II. The agency problem between the dominant 
blockholder and the minority shareholders.   
In this paper, among many interests, Villaonga and Amit are also trying to 
understand which agency cost dominates in different contests. Hence, to break down 
the agency cost issue, Villaonga and Amit exploit the interaction between family 
control and family CEO dummies. Assuming that a family CEO eliminates the 
conflict between owners and managers they suggest that in family firms there is the 
absence of Agency Problem I. Further, Villaonga and Amit assume that the use that 
families do of mechanisms that enhance their voting power over and above their 
equity ownership stake proxies for the divergence of interests between large (family) 
and small (non-family) shareholders. This is referred to as Agency Problem II. 
Interaction the two dummies Villalonga and Amit break the sample in four 
firm-types:  
• Type I: Family firms with control-enhancing mechanisms and a family CEO. 
These firms may have Agency Problem II, but not Agency Problem I. 
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• Type II: Family firms with control-enhancing mechanisms but no family CEO. 
These firms may have both agency problems. 
• Type III: Family firms with a family CEO but no control-enhancing mechanisms. 
These firms do not have either agency problem  
• Type IV: Non-family firms, which may have Agency Problem I, but not Agency 
Problem II  
Applying the latter classification their sample, Villaonga and Amit have 260 
Type I family firms, 262 Type II family firms, 271 Type III family firms, and 1,767 
non-family (Type IV firms). There are also 248 family firms that, like the non-family 
firms, have neither control-enhancing mechanisms nor a family CEO. For each group 
and among them Villalonga and Amit provide the results for a difference in mean test 
mean on the Tobin’s Q. The results are shown in Table IV. 
This analysis suggest that the absence of agency problem is linked with the 
better firm performance and the difference in performance between the latter group 
and any other group is statistically significant different from zero. Similar results are 
obtained also using as measure of performance industry adjusted Tobin’s Q. 
Villalonga and Amit also find that family management adds value as long as 
the founder serves as the CEO of the family firm, or as its Chairman with a non-
family CEO. Firm value is destroyed when descendants of the founder serve as 
CEOs. 
Concluding with their own words: “Family firms whose CEO is a member of 
the family, and which have no control-enhancing mechanisms in place (Type III 
firms), enjoy the highest performance”. 
It is important to notice, though, that Villalonga and Amit study suffer from 
some due to sample selection problems. This is because “the firms in (their) sample 
are among the largest in the world, are listed on an exchange in a country with a 
high degree of shareholder protection, are frequent investment targets for index 
funds, and are generally old and thus more difficult to maintain under family 
control”. 
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Table 7 - Villalonga and Amit(2006), p. 37 
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Chapter III 
 
 
Hypotheses, Data and Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This Chapter is organized as follows: Section 1 explains the hypotheses 
development; Section 2 describes the two datasets used in the analysis. Section 3 
proposes summary statistics. Section 4 describes the methodology used to form 
portfolios and the econometric models used to test the hypotheses. Section 5 
describes the main results. Section 6 concludes. 
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Section 1 Hypotheses Development 
 
In this work I consider the impact that the firm’s ownership structure has on 
the firms’ returns and risk. As explained in the Introduction, Chapter I and Chapter 
II, the economic driving force of such an impact should be generated by the agency 
costs arising from the presence of a blockholder. In a rational expectations 
framework, if such agency costs arise from the presence of a blockholder, investors 
will only consider holding such firms in their portfolios if they are adequately 
compensated for the additional risk.  
My research question can be answered by comparing the return generating 
process of closely-held firms relative to those of widely-held firms. While the latter 
are not difficult to recognize, the former are harder to identify properly because 
blockholders can come in different classes. While the most pervasive internationally 
are family blockholders, we also see institutional blockholders (both widely-held 
institutions and closely-held ones). In this research project I will capture the presence 
of a powerful blockholder by identifying family blockholders. In other words, I will 
focus on two main ownership structures: family firms and non-family firms. 
The reason behind my decision is explained by agency costs and the type of 
blockholder that can significantly influence such costs. Below I will argue that family 
firms are different to other firms owned by non-family blockholders. I argue that 
different types of blockholders have different incentives to (a) monitor management, 
and (b) extract private benefits from small shareholders. Let us consider the 
extraction of private benefits which causes agency costs of control. Any private 
benefits extracted by a widely-held financial institution, such as a mutual fund, etc 
are likely to be divided among several final owners, resulting in heavy dilution of 
such benefits. Dilution is not likely to be a problem for a family blockholder and 
hence we expect families to have more pronounced incentives to extract private 
benefits at the expense of other stakeholders. This makes family-owned firms 
different compared to other firms owned by blockholders. The same can be said for 
monitoring. Many institutional blockholders may lack the incentive to monitor 
management either because their ownership stake is low or because they have a high 
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turnover rate (leading to a relatively short term presence of such blockholders in the 
firm’s ownership structure). 
In what follows I will review the family blockholders’ salient features that are 
relevant for my analysis and, at the same time, will address the question: what is so 
special about the founding family? I want to address this question in order to justify 
fully my choice of using family blockholders for my analysis.  
Recent empirical literature on family firms indicates both positive and 
negative aspects of having a family as main blockholder. Families tend to have an 
inter-generational presence in the firm and, by definition, they have a long-term 
investment horizon that privileges value maximization over the long term rather than 
the very short term (James (1999)). This is one important feature that distinguishes 
family blockholders from (a) the average institutional blockholder, and (b) widely-
held firms. There are various important effects arising form this characteristic. First, 
family blockholders are either in management or have a very high incentive to 
monitor management. It is not difficult to see how this may curb the classic agency 
conflict between managers and owners (Demsetz (1993), Demsetz and Lehn (1985)). 
Moreover, their long term presence in the company allows strong relationship with 
financial markets. The latter is important because reputation-building is possible with 
family blockholders especially for family blockholders that are financially-
constrained. In such cases, family firms would have to resort to external finance 
repeatedly and hence the family blockholder has an incentive to build reputations. 
Besides, while some literature48 suggests that the presence of a large shareholder can 
be detrimental to efficiency because of adverse effects on employees’ incentives, 
Andersen and Reeb (2003) and Lee (2006) state that family firms are able to cultivate 
employment stability and employees loyalty more than non-family firms.  
Besides the positive aspects that family blockholders may have, one has also 
to consider the possible negative aspects that may counterbalance the positive effects 
of family blockholders. Specifically, family blockholders may follow specific goals 
that are not always consistent with profit maximization. 
If, as postulated by Ward (1997) and Spremann (2002), business survival and 
independence goals are the most important for this kind of corporations, family firms 
                                                 
48 Shleifer and Vishny (1997); Schmidt (1996); Cremer (1995) among others. 
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may prefer survival rather than growth and value maximization. Once survival 
becomes a priority then taking on excessive risk should not be one of the founding 
family’s objectives. This behavior should have an influence on the firm’s investment 
policies because high risk projects may be turned down in favor of low risk ones 
even if the former have higher future payoffs. Family inclination to risk avoidance is 
documented by De Angelo and De Angelo (2000) and Anderson and Reeb (2004). 
This should not be the case of institutional blockholders since these investors are 
interested in maximizing short-term profitability.  
The other important feature of family blockholders is their powerful and 
dominating presence in the firms that can lead them to abuse their dominant position 
to exchange profits for private rents (Fama and Jensen (1983)) and special dividends 
(De Angelo and De Angelo (2000)). They can also engage in asset substitution as 
observed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) or engage in stealing or tunneling of the 
firm’s resources. Recent empirical studies49 show that ownership concentration and 
unification of ownership and management in family firms creates agency costs 
because of management entrenchment issues that motivate family members in 
expropriating interests of minority shareholders (Morck et al. (2003)).  
If one also adds the fact that the founding family is very often highly 
undiversified and thus may be affected adversely by the firm’s idiosyncratic risk 
(Maug (1998)) – something that should also keep the firm from taking excessive risk 
– and that the family’s reputation is very much linked with the firm’s reputation and 
success, then it is not unreasonable to argue that the family’s incentives might be 
very far from the one of other investors, resulting in higher possibilities of 
expropriation of minority shareholders50. 
Which side of family presence mostly impact firm’s risk and performance is 
an empirical issue, especially so since there is no theoretical finding that can be used 
to generate precise hypotheses. Then, my empirical design will take an agnostic view 
of the presence of family blockholders and I will just assume that whether this effect 
is – on a net basis – positive or negative should have an impact on the return 
generating process. Specifically, if a family blockholder is more harmful to 
                                                 
49 See Shea (2007) for an overview.  
50 Bebchuk, 1994, Stiglitz (1985), Shleifer and Vishny (1997). Empirically, the ability of a family to 
extract private benefits not shared with minority shareholders is documented also by Dyck and 
Zingales (2004).  
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(minority) shareholders than the lack of control over the management in non-family 
firms it should show up on returns demanded by investors.  
It can be reasonable assumed that the ownership structure that suffer higher 
agency costs is the one in which there is the higher risk of expropriation for potential 
investors. According to the Efficient Market Hypothesis we know that there is a 
trade-off between risk and returns: higher risk must be associated with higher returns. 
Using the returns generated by family firms and non-family firms, it is possible to 
investigate this trade-off and conclude that the ownership structure in which a 
potential investor would suffer higher risk of expropriation is the one that must pay 
the higher return.  
Hypothesis 1: if agency costs matter and family firms have higher agency 
costs relative to non-family firms, then, they have to compensate investors with 
higher stock returns. 
One important point that must be considered to fully investigate the proposed 
hypothesis is the way family blockholders are disciplined and monitored by country-
wide governance systems. These can restrict the blockholders’ behavior and avoid 
their expropriation of cash flows at the expense of other stakeholders.  
 
 
Figure 5. Agency Cost and Internal Corporate Governance in Family Firms 
 
The level of corporate governance becomes central when considering mechanisms 
that can be in place to avoid expropriation and abuse of the blockholder’s dominant 
position. Specifically for my research, I will ask how families are disciplined and 
monitored in order to avoid private benefits consumption and understand how 
finance-providers protect themselves from such behavior. Existing evidence shows 
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that the ultimate impact of a large shareholder is likely to depend on both the type of 
internal and external governance. 51 For example, Claessens et al. (2002) interpreting 
the results found on the impact of large blockholders on firm valuation in East Asian 
countries, state that “the degree to which certain ownership and control structures are 
associated with entrenchment discounts likely depends on economy-specific 
circumstances.” Lins (2003) finds that the way blockholders impact firm valuation is 
significantly influenced by the type of shareholder protection rules in each country. 
Lins state that “one interpretation of these results is that external shareholder 
protection mechanisms play a role in restraining managerial agency costs...” 
In closely-held corporations corporate governance mechanisms should mostly 
discipline the large shareholder to prevent and limit any tunnelling, risk-shifting or 
other types of expropriation or consumption of private benefits. On one hand, in 
companies such as family firms the role of the main blockholder might reduces the 
effectiveness of internal corporate governance. Family blockholders, in fact, are very 
unlikely to restrict their actions through high quality internal corporate governance. 
For example, there is evidence that founding families are used to be reluctant to 
retain a fair proportion of independent directors on their boards52 and normally use 
control enhancing mechanisms to obtain voting rights over and above cash-flow 
rights. On the other hand, the role of the market and the legal system cannot be 
neutralized by the blockholder.  
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) explain that since large shareholders govern by 
exercising their voting rights, their power depends on the degree of legal protection 
in the country: “majority owners can dictate the decisions of the company only if the 
law allows them to do so”. Thus, the ability of family blockholders to exacerbate 
agency cost depends on how market discipline is exercised. This, in turn, will 
determine how much power a family can exert within the firm and to what extent the 
family itself is monitored by the financial market.  
Where capital market institutions are effective in their disciplinary role and 
minority shareholders’ protection rules are in place and effective, we would expect 
that the large blockholder has less possibility to extract private benefits. For example, 
                                                 
51 See Claessens et al. (2000), Durnev and Kim (2005), Lins (2003), Stulz (2005), Weinstein and 
Yafeh (1998), amongst many others. 
52 Anderson and Reeb (2003); Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2004); Hiller and McColgan (2004); 
De Holan and Sanz (2006), Bartholomeuz and Tanewski (2006). 
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in order to get external finance the blockholder might decide to commit to higher 
quality governance as a way to show unambiguous commitment to avoid 
expropriation at the cost of minority shareholders or bondholders. 
But what happens when minority shareholders’ protection rules are not 
enforced? In this case it is possible that the presence of a family in the ownership 
may end up increasing the total agency cost bore by minority shareholders. In this 
kind of legal environment we can expect that it is easier for blockholders to 
expropriate minority shareholders, or to extract private benefits to the detriment of 
the other stakeholders. If we consider the role of the capital market as a possible 
mechanism that mitigates expropriation, then investors will still invest in family 
firms. However, in order to do so they will ask for higher returns on the stocks of 
these companies as compensation for the risk of expropriation. 
Hypothesis 2: there is a negative relationship between the enforcement of the 
law to protect minority shareholders from expropriation and the returns of family 
firms. 
As shareholder rights become stronger the risk of minority shareholders’ 
expropriation decreases; hence, in countries in which minority protection rules are 
effectively enforced family firms pay lower returns than in countries where minority 
shareholders are less protected against expropriation. 
 
Section 2 Data  
 
To test my hypotheses I will be using two distinct datasets of European firms, 
each with its own advantages and constraints. The first dataset is composed of a total 
of 1,565 European firms operating in different industries (except in the financial 
industry) spanning the period from January 1992 to December 2006 for a total of 
249,989 firm-monthly observations. I will henceforth refer to this as DATASET A.  
The second dataset contains a total of 2,048 European firms operating in 
different industries (except in the financial industry) and spans the same period of 
time (1992-2006) for a total of 252,934 firm-monthly observations. I will henceforth 
refer to this as DATASET B.  
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In what follows I will describe the two datasets, the way I constructed them 
and their advantages and costs that should be borne in mind when devising the 
empirical methodology. 
 
2.1  Datasets 
 
2.1.1 DATASET A 
 
Dataset A is constructed from different sources. First, I started by using the 
dataset of Faccio and Lang (2002)53 that contains ultimate ownership information for 
5,232 firms, mostly large and medium sized publicly-listed European companies 
from 13 countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom) over the period 
1996 to 1999. Ultimate ownership data is collected for all owners that hold at least 
10% of a company's stock.  
Second, I have proceeded to collect monthly prices for firms in the Faccio and 
Lang dataset from Worldscope over the period 1992 – 2006. It should be noted that 
price information on Worldscope seem to be sparse before 1992 and this feature has 
determined by starting date point. Even so, price data for a significant number of 
firms may be sparse or intermittent even after 1992. The first screen that I have 
applied for the Worldscope data is that firms in my dataset should have a full and 
complete series of price information for every month from January 1992 until 
December 2006. With this screen in mind, I have been able to download monthly 
prices for 1,730 companies in 13 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and 
U.K.54. I also applied another screen in order to have a balanced dataset, where I have 
an adequate number of family and non-family firms in each country. For each 
country I imposed that I should have at 10 firms that can be identified as family 
firms. This has led me to drop data from Austria, Belgium, Ireland and Spain. 
                                                 
53 The dataset can be found in the following website: http: //jfe.rochester.edu/data.htm 
54 I also have financial data for companies in Portugal, but, at least for now, I have excluded this 
country from my basic dataset because the value factor is not available from French’s website. 
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Third, I have then proceeded to obtain information on market returns in every 
country for every month over the period 1992 – 2006. Together with this data, I also 
required data on the Fama and French factors. I have obtained this data from Kenneth 
French’s website55. I have downloaded the data on Fama and French factors for every 
country (with the exception of Portugal, for which there is no data on the Fama and 
French factors) for every month from January 1992 until December 2006. 
To recapitulate, DATASET A consists of 1,565 European firms from 8 
European countries (Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland 
and U.K.) as shown in panel A of Table 2.  
It is important to notice that I ended up with a total of only 1,565 companies, 
compared to the starting number of 5,232 firms in the Faccio and Lang dataset. The 
difference in number can be explained by the various screens I have applied and 
which I have explained above. There is one additional screen that I have applied to 
be consistent with the previous literature56, i.e. I deleted financial firms (SIC code 
between 6000 and 6900 and firms classified as “Financial” by Faccio and Lang 
(2002)). There are 1,114 of such firms, leaving me with a total of 4,118 companies.  
Faccio and Lang (2002) have collected ownership data using different 
sources. The major sources are the national Stock Exchange ownership files over 
1996 and 1999. They collect information on the ownership stake of blockholders 
using two cut-off points: (i) 10% cut-off point and (ii) 20% cut-off point. They also 
provide information about the largest blockholder’s cash flow and control rights and 
for family firms also indicate if the family is in active management or not.  
One important issue that needs to be highlighted is the fact that Faccio and 
Lang (2002) collect ownership information at one point in time between 1996 and 
1999. This means that a firm is identified as a family firm or otherwise based on that 
single observation collected by Faccio and Lang. This may be thought as being a 
potential problem for my analysis since I will be looking over a period of time 
spanning 1992 to 2006. In other words, by using the Faccio and Lang ownership data 
I will be assuming that the ownership structure is stable through time. In fact, 
existing literature has shown that this time-invariance of ownership should not create 
                                                 
55 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html#International 
56 Among others Barottini and Caprio (2006) 
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significant problems (Claesseans et al. (2002)) since it is well-known that ownership 
is sticky over a relatively short period of time like the one we use. 
I investigate further the assumption of ownership stability to make sure that I 
does not bias in any way my results. The only possible methodology is using the 
ownership data of AMADEUS, a dataset for more than 5 million European private 
and public companies. The advantage of AMADEUS is that it provides ownership 
data on a yearly basis. The constraint is that ownership data starts only from 2002. As 
suggested by Ellul (2007), I look at the stability of ownership across the period 1996 
to 1999, for which I have data from Faccio and Lang, and 2002 to 2006, for which 
period I collect data from AMADEUS. As found by Ellul (2007) I also find stability 
of ownership across the two datasets and the two periods, confirming the time-
invariance of ownership. Given this finding, there should not be any significant bias 
in the way I identify family firms on my results.  
 
2.1.2 DATASET B 
 
Dataset A is constructed on the basis of the Faccio and Lang dataset which, 
while providing depth of ownership data, has one important constraint: it provides 
data mainly for medium and large firms. Given that family firms are likely to be 
small, such a dataset may under-represent family firms. Because of this reason, I 
proceeded to construct a new dataset of all the firms listed in each country, and hence 
I have data for all firms whether they are small, medium and large. I expect that 
family firms will be more fairly represented in this dataset. Given the depth ad width 
of such a dataset I have focused 8 European countries: firms from Austria, France, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. One can reasonable 
say that this dataset is still a work-in-progress and incomplete but it contains enough 
information that should allow me to run various tests that can be considered as either 
extensions from the ones I run on DATASET A or as robustness checks. The number 
of firms in DATASET B and their country of origin are shown in panel A of Table 
17. One important characteristic that I would like to highlight is that the number of 
firms in DATASET B for the 8 countries is much larger. In fact,, while DATASET A 
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has data for 1,565  firms, DATASET B has 2,048 firms for these 8 countries57. This 
should allow for a larger cross-sectional difference across types of firms considered 
in my analysis.  
To construct DATASET B I follow these steps. First, I download all the 
companies listed on Worldscope as publicly listed in the 8 countries mentioned 
above. For each company, I get the information about its industry. Consistent with 
the literature, I keep only firms that are not in the financial industry (the equivalent of 
SIC code between 6000 and 6900). Following this, I look at the status of each firm 
since Worldscope gives information on whether the company is “Dead” (meaning it 
went into bankruptcy) or “Delisted” (meaning that the company was delisted either 
because of an action from the company itself or from the stock exchange on which it 
was listed). To be consistent with the existing literature, I have removed these 
companies from my dataset.  
Following these two screens, I have then proceeded to obtain monthly price 
for each of the firms in my dataset. When doing so, I have applied another screen to 
keep only firms for which I have at least 60 monthly observations. In other words, 
firms with less than 5 years of data are not kept in the dataset. This leaves me with 
2,048  firms in my dataset. 
Following the completion of the final dataset I get data on financial and 
accounting variables that will provide me with the firm characteristics. I collect data 
on annual sales, operating income, total assets, market capitalization and dividend 
yield. These characteristics are obtained on an annual basis for the period 1992 to 
2006. 
I then proceed to obtain ownership information from AMADEUS. The main 
constraint that this dataset provides is that ownership data is only provided starting 
from 2002. I collect all ownership information from 2002 until 2006, specifically 
whether a firm has a family blockholder or not, and whether the family blockholder 
has an active role in the firm’s management. At this stage I capture the ownership 
and management variables with a dummy variable as explained below. Given that I 
can only collect ownership data from 2002 I will have to assume that the ownership 
                                                 
57 Moreover, in both datasets I have information for: France, Germany, Italy, Sweden and Switzerland. 
However, while in DATASET A for these countries I only have a total of 236, 179, 40, 35 and 36 
companies; in DATASET B for the same countries I have a much higher number of companies: 428 in 
France, 464 in Germany, 261 in Italy, 262 in Sweden and 250 in Switzerland. 
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structure in 2002 will be the same for the period spanning from 1992 to 2001. Hence, 
I will assume the time-invariance of the ownership before 2002. Again, this is not 
likely to be a significant issue for two reasons. First, existing literature and my tests 
on the stability of ownership for DATASET A show that there is high ownership 
stability across time. Second, since for the tests using DATASET B I will be using a 
dummy variable to distinguish a family firm from a non-family firm this should 
reduce even further any bias. This is because while family blockholders may change 
their ownership stae across time, it is quite rare for a family blockholder to sell out 
completely. In other words, it is very hard for a firm to pass from being a family firm 
to non-family firm. 
Having said this, I would like to point out two additional issues for 
DATASET B. While Faccio and Lang ownership information used for my first 
dataset provides complete and detailed information on the entire ownership structure 
of a company, using AMADEUS I only collect (so far) information on whether a 
company is a family firm or not and if the family is involved in the management. 
Hence, so far I do not have information on the difference between the family 
blockholder’s cash flow rights and voting rights (the so called wedge). I also do not 
have information on ownership concentration and the presence of other blockholders 
in the ownership structure.  
A second difference with the information provided by Faccio and Lang 
(2002) arises from the use of cut-off points to define family firms. Faccio and Lang 
collect information on the ownership stake of blockholders using two cut-off points: 
(i) 10% cut-off point and (ii) 20% cut-off point. AMADEUS, instead, provides 
information about the nature of the ultimate blockholder regardless of the ownership 
stake. Hence, in DATASET B I will be defining a family firm if a family blockholder 
is present in the ownership structure regardless of the size of its stake. In this way, I 
will be closer to the definition used by Anderson et al. (2003) and Villalonga and 
Amit (2006). 
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2.2 Main Variables 
 
 I will next describe the variables used in my analysis, starting with the 
ownership definition. 
 
2.2.1 Ownership Classification  
 
I define a family firm as a company in which the founder, or descendents of 
his/her family (either by blood or through marriage), is a blockholder, either 
individually or as a group. This definition is the one that has been most widely used 
in the literature so far. The application of such a definition has changed mostly in the 
application of any possible cut-off point for the family blockholder’s ownership 
stake. For example, while Anderson et al. (2003) and Villalonga and Amit (2006) do 
not set any cut-off point in the family stake, others, like Faccio and Lang, have 
applied a 10% or a 5% cut-off.  
To define a family firm Faccio and Lang use a very similar definition, but 
whenever they are not able to find the ultimate owner of an unlisted firm they have 
classified it as family. Then, as they explain58, in their dataset a firm is defined as 
family either if it is a family (including an individual) or if it is a firm that is unlisted 
on any stock exchange59. Although, this methodology will may not be a significant 
issue, I decided to use a conservative approach only using Faccio and Lang definition 
at 10% cut-off point. Instead, since Amadeus dataset does not provide any cut-off 
stake, in DATASET B a firms is family owned also if the family blockholder has 
more or less than 10% stake. 
In the rest of this analysis to indicate the presence of a family in the 
ownership of a corporation following Anderson et al. (2003) and Villalonga and 
Amit (2006), I use a dummy variable. In DATASET A this dummy variable takes the 
value of 1 if the company is identified as family from Faccio and Lang and zero 
otherwise, while in DATASET B it takes the value of 1 if the company is identified 
as family in Amadeus dataset and zero otherwise. 
                                                 
58 Faccio and Lang (2002) p. 373. 
59 A similar approach has been used by Claessens et al. (2000) 
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The definition of a family firm, though, it is not the only issue involved in this 
discussion. There is, in fact, an ongoing debate about what really drives the 
incentives and behaviour of a family blockholder. It is not clear if it is family’s 
ownership that matters or any managerial role that the family has or the control of 
voting rights in excess of its cash flow right. 
Unfortunately, the use of a dummy variable to capture the ownership structure 
has the disadvantage of not considering that the ability of a family blockholder to 
expropriate minority shareholders can depend on his control motivations (and hence 
a function of the blockholder voting stake). The dummy variable approach though 
can introduce important bias that, in DATASET A, I try to correct using the family’s 
ownership stake and voting rights (ownership of shares outstanding in percentage) as 
alternative ways of defining a family’s presence and its impact on the agency cost. I 
use these measures because it is reasonable to expect that the larger is the family’s 
stake the clearer is its incentive structure.  
Moreover, existing literature has also indicated that the participation of a 
family member in the management can have both positive and negative effects on the 
risks borne by minority shareholder. To address this issue I will also consider the 
famly’s presence in the firm management, irrespective of the actual stake of its 
ownership. To implement this approach, in both datasets, I will use a dummy 
variable that takes value of one if a family member is in active management and zero 
otherwise. 
 
2.2.2 Internal and External Corporate Governance 
 
A major component of my research is the impact of internal and external 
corporate governance mechanism on the agency conflicts within a firm generated by 
the presence of a powerful blockholder. Hence, I will need measures of both types of 
corporate governance. 
Family firms have been identified as the most active of all types of 
blockholders and have interest in keeping their dominant position. It is very unlikely 
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that a family blockholder should restrict his actions by committing to high standards 
of internal governance.  
Nevertheless, all else equal, we would expect that when the family is not the 
only blockholder with a significant stake, the presence of other blockholders could 
reduce the ability of the family to weaken the internal corporate governance. In 
DATASET A I have enough depth in the data that allows me to see whether the 
family blockholder is on his own or not. I capture the presence of a controlling 
blockholder that is alone by using a dummy variable equal to one if the company has 
a controlling shareholder alone and zero otherwise. Following the definition of 
Faccio and Land (2002), a controlling shareholder is said to be “alone” if no other 
owner controls at least 10% of the voting rights.  
Moreover, Villalonga and Amit (2006) claim that, in family firms, the use of 
mechanisms that enhance the voting power of the controlling blockholder can be an 
indicator of agency cost of control. The use of control enhancing mechanisms can 
also be considered as an indication of weak corporate governance. Hence, I also 
employ a dummy variable that indicates the use of control enhancing mechanisms. 
Faccio and Lang provide data on different types of control enhancing mechanisms 
used by European companies: dual class shares, pyramids, holding through multiple 
control chains, cross-holding, etc.60. I use a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 
if a company has any type control enhancing mechanisms in place.  
Also central to my work is the analysis of how ownership structures impact 
risk and performance across countries. While the use of control enhancing 
mechanisms and the presence of a controlling shareholder can be used as proxy of 
weak internal governance, measures of external governance help correct for country 
specifics biases due to legislative differences.  
To address the impact from external (country) governance and to account for 
different minority protection laws across countries I use the Anti Self-Dealing Index 
proposed by Djankov et al. (2006). 
The original version of the Anti Self-Dealing Index (the Anti-Director Index 
Rights) was proposed by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) and measures the strength of 
minority shareholders’ protection against self-dealing by the controlling shareholder. 
                                                 
60 See Table I for an explanation of these variables. 
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The Anti Self-Dealing Index improves the original Anti-Director Rights relying on 
the same basic dimensions of corporate law, but defining them with more precision 
because it captures both law and its enforcement. 
The Anti Self-Dealing Index addresses the ways in which the law deals with 
corporate self-dealing (or tunnelling) and covers the following six areas: (1) vote by 
mail; (2) obstacles to the actual exercise of the right to vote (i.e., the requirement that 
shares be deposited before the shareholders’ meeting); (3) minority representation on 
the Board of Directors through cumulative voting or proportional representation; (4) 
an oppressed minority mechanism to seek redress in case of expropriation; (5) pre-
emptive rights to subscribe to new securities issued by the company; and (6) right to 
call a special shareholder meeting.  
To create this index the authors simulate a hypothetical self-dealing 
transaction between two firms controlled by the same person and measure the 
difficulties that the controlling shareholder must face in order to accomplish this 
transaction. The more obstacles to these kinds of transactions in place within a 
country the higher is the Anti Self-Dealing Index. The Index takes a value from zero 
to one: a value of zero in countries with the least minority shareholders’ protection 
and a value of 1 when the law strongly protects them. 
I also use the Block Premium Variable as reported in Djankov et al. (2006). 
The premium paid for control in corporate control transactions is widely interpreted 
as a measure of the private benefits of control, which are higher in countries with 
weaker investor protection laws (Grossman and Hart 1988, Nenova 2003, Dyck and 
Zingales 2004). 
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Section 3 Descriptive Statistics 
 
In what follows I will provide and discuss the descriptive statistics for 
DATASET A (in Section 3.1) and for DATASET B (in section 3.2)  
 
3.1 Descriptive Statistics: DATASET A 
 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for DATASET A.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Panel A describes the country of origin and the number of observations per 
country. Panel B shows descriptive statistics for firm level characteristics, ownership 
measures and country level variables. Panel C shows, for each country, the 
descriptive statistics for the market return and value premium for each country. 
The mean stock returns is 0.83% per month with a median of zero. The 
average beta corrected for thin trading is roughly 0.30 and a median value of 0. 25. 
Using the definition of family firms (based on family ownership, irrespective of the 
ownership size) I find that 29% of the firms in this sample have a family in their 
ownership structure and 68.6% of such firms have a family member involved in 
active management. I also find that 30% of these family firms use control enhancing 
mechanisms to keep control. The average wedge is 1.76, meaning that for each cash 
flow right the blockholder has 1.76 voting rights. The median of wedge is 1. Finally, 
50% of the overall sample is composed of companies with a controlling blockholder 
that is alone. For these companies, there is no discipline being exercised on the 
family blockholder from other institutional blockholders.  
Panels B1 and B2 show that family firms have on average higher monthly 
stock returns (0.92%) relative to non-family firms (0.80%), and the beta (corrected 
for thin trading) is on average higher in non-family firms (0.32) relative to 0.28 in 
family firms. Both family firms and non-family firms use control enhancing 
mechanisms that entitle the blockholder to obtain voting rights over and above his 
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cash flow rights. These mechanisms include dual share classes with differential 
voting rights, pyramids, cross-holdings, and holding through multiple chains. 
However, families make significantly less frequent use of these mechanisms than do 
other large shareholders in non-family firms (31% versus 43%, respectively). Family 
firms’ voting rights in excess of cash flow rights average 1.21 for all firms. In non-
family firms the large shareholders own on average voting rights in excess of cash 
flow rights equal to 2.05, with a median equal to 1. Finally, among family firms 58% 
of all family blockholders are alone, hence are not subject to the discipline of any 
other blockholder. Among non-family firms 47% of all companies are owned by a 
blockholder alone. 
The fact that family firms appear to make less use of control enhancing 
mechanisms and have on average lower wedge than non-family firms might depend 
on the definition of non-family firms, In fact, in the group of non-family firms there 
is a large number of firms that are either owned by a blockholder or are controlled 
through cross-holding61. The most represented ultimate blockholder are: institutional 
blockholders (14%) and unlisted company (42%). However, also if only 10% of all 
non-family firms is owned by the State or through cross-holding, these companies are 
the one for which the ultimate owners has the large number of voting rights in excess 
to his cash flow rights. The average wedge in these last two groups is equal to 6.61 
and 9.98 respectively and this highly impacts the mean on the overall sample. 
Removing these two types of shareholders from the sample, in fact, the mean wedge 
in the set of non-family firms becomes 1.50. Given the variety of type of owners 
among family firms the definition of non-family firms also biases the overall results 
of this analysis in favour of rejecting the main hypotheses.  
As argued before, institutional blockholders have been shown to be (largely) 
inactive in monitoring the management and are more likely to have incentive 
structures similar to atomistic shareholders62. Using this definition, all companies 
with institutional blockholder are considered free from agency costs of control. 
However, there is evidence that many ultimate owners classified as unlisted company 
are simply family blockholders. Since it is impossible to measure the agency cost in a 
                                                 
61 Cross-holdings: The firm Y is controlled by another firm, that is controlled by Y, or directly 
controls at least x% of its own stocks. Miscellaneous: Charities, voting trusts, employees, 
cooperatives, or minority foreign investors 
62 Tufano (1996) 
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company and we can only study the presence or the absence of agency cost observing 
the nature of ultimate owner and the use he makes of different instruments to keep 
control, it is not clear that all non-family firms are free from agency cost of control 
and this negatively impact the results of this research.  
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for each country in the dataset.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Finally, both for the entire dataset and each country, Table 4 shows the results 
from a difference in means test between family and non-family firms for the main 
variables of interest.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
For the sake of brevity, in this section I will only describe results for the 
entire sample. 
From Table 4, we can notice that in the overall dataset, family firms have 
significantly higher average stock return than non-family firms, but use less control 
enhancing mechanisms and have lower wedge. Family firms have higher mean 
monthly stock returns than non-family firms in Italy (1.03% versus 0.52% monthly), 
Sweden (1.98% versus 1.43% monthly), Switzerland (1.18% per month versus 
0.70%) and U.K. (0.88% versus 0.73% monthly), while the difference in 
performance is not statistically different in Finland, France, Germany and Norway.  
In many countries non-family have significantly more wedge (voting rights in 
excess to cash flow rights) than family firms. Non-family firms have higher wedge 
than non-family firms in Finland (1.74 versus 1.17, respectively), France (1.24 versus 
1, respectively), Germany (2.18 versus 1.27, respectively), Norway (5.86 versus 1.17, 
respectively), Sweden (2.96 versus 1.41, respectively) and U.K. (1.77 versus 1.08¸ 
respectively). Instead, family firms have higher wedge than non-family firms 
Switzerland (3.50 versus 1.40, respectively) while there is not difference in Italy. 
Analysing the median of wedge, I find that both family firms and non family firms 
have a median wedge equal to 1in France, Germany, Norway and U.K., however, this 
median is statistically different between groups only in France and U.K. In Finland 
the median of wedge for family firms is 1.25 while it is 1 for non-family firms. In 
Italy family firms have a median wedge of 1.07 and this is 1 for non-family firms. In 
Sweden instead family firms have a median wedge equal to 1 and non-family firms 
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have a median wedge equal to 0.70. In all countries, though, the median is not 
statistically difference between groups. Finally, In Switzerland family firms have 
median wedge equal to 2.27 while non-family firms have a median wedge of 1 and 
the difference is statistically significant.63 
However, both in Italy and Switzerland among non-family firms there is a 
significantly higher number of companies with a controlling blockholder alone, while 
in France, Germany and the U.K. family firms have the highest (and significant) 
number of controlling owners alone. 
 
3.2 Descriptive Statistics: DATASET B 
 
Table 15 provides descriptive statistics for the DATASET B. 
[Insert Table 15 here] 
Panel A describes the country of origin and the number of observations per 
country. Panel B shows descriptive statistics for firm level characteristics for family 
firms and non-family firms. Panel C shows descriptive statistics for each country. 
Panel B and Panel C also provide the result of the difference-in-means test between 
the stock returns of family and non-family firms. 
Panel B shows that in the overall dataset family firms have on average higher 
(and statistically significant) monthly stock returns (0.92%) with respect to non-
family firms (0.66%).The median of the monthly stock returns is equal to 0 for 
family firms and equal to 0.60 for non-family firms.. Beta corrected for thin trading 
is 0.65 in family firms and 0.71 in non-family firms. The median of beta for family 
firms is 0.65 while it is 0.54 for non-family firms. The median Operating Margin for 
both family firms and non-family is 0.05, while the average is for both negative. 
Family firms have an average Book-to-Market ratio of 0.54, while for non-family 
firms this averages 0.76. The median is 0.51 and 0.62 respectively. Market value (the 
natural logarithm of the market capitalization) is on average around 12.86 in non-
family firms, while its average in family firms is around12.16. The median of Market 
value is respectively equal to 6.13 and 5.54. The average Leverage is 0.24 in non-
                                                 
63 Results for the Wilcoxon rank-sum test are not shown in any table, but are available upon request. 
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family firms and 0.38 in family firms while the median is respectively equal to 0.10 
and 0.07.. Total assets (the natural logarithm of total assets) averages 13.59 in non-
family firms and 12.26 in family firms, the median is equal to 4.85 in non-family 
firms and 1.60 in family firms. Net sales over assets are 0.95% in non-family firms 
and 0.91 in family firms, the median is respectively equal to 0.88 and 0.81. .Finally, 
the average Dividend Yield is 0.003 for non-family firms and 0.034 for family firms 
and the median is 0.015 and 0.012 respectively. 
 
Section 4 Methodology 
 
From an asset pricing point of view, one possible approach that can be used is 
investigating whether the ownership structure is a pricing factor. As intriguing this 
idea may be, it faces a very difficult obstacle that precludes me from applying it in 
practice. This is because for a factor to be considered as a pricing factor or not 
requires time-variance, i.e. the factor should change through time. If those changes 
do influence returns then one considers that factor as crucial in the pricing kernel. 
When considering ownership structure this is not possible, or is very difficult because 
of the ownership stickiness through time. For example, if one were to form portfolios 
based on ownership characteristics for this to be considered as a pricing factor one 
would need transition between portfolios. This is extremely slow when we consider 
ownership structures. In other words, events where the firm changes ownership status 
are rare and firms are seldom subject to ownership "uncertainty".  
Hence, given the structure of my dataset where the presence of a family in the 
ownership structure is indicated by a dummy variable that does not change through 
time, it would be inappropriate to see the ownership structure as delivering 
uncertainty risk. In other words, I cannot investigate whether the ownership structure 
is a pricing factor – from an asset pricing point of view - given the time-invariance of 
ownership. 
Hence, it is reasonable to argue that it is possible that firms are rather 
influenced by the (time-invariant) effects related to the presence of a controlling 
blockholder and investigate whether this is true or not. In other words, given the 
many differences between family firms and non-family firms that may be induced by 
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the presence of a family blockholder it is possible that some characteristics of family 
behaviour positively or negatively impact the risk of other (minority) shareholders. In 
a rational world, this should in turn impact firms’ stock returns.  
To investigate this issue, I follow the most recent literature started by the 
seminal paper of Gompers et al. (2003) where they investigate the impact of 
corporate governance, i.e. distinguish between companies with strong and weak 
corporate governance. Like Gompers et al. (2003) I will develop a methodology 
based on portfolio sorting. 
I will focus mostly on the performance of family firms with respect to non-
family firms and build portfolios to test this. However, wherever possible I want to 
analyze the multi-dimensional influences of the presence of the family blockholder 
and to do so I will create portfolios based on other characteristics rather than simply 
the ownership structure. In particular, I study the impact of the family manager and 
the interaction between family ownership, its control and family management. For 
each portfolio I will create I will always study its performance using a performance 
attribution regression and when possible I also try to understand if other firm 
characteristics (besides ownership) have any impact on the results using a Fama and 
MachBeth regression approach.  
The two datasets I use in this work do not allow me to undertake the same 
analysis on both of them. For DATASET A I have complete information on the 
ownership structure, but no information on other firm characteristics. For DATASET 
B I only know if the main blockholder is a family or not and if it is involved in the 
management. One advantage of DATASET B is that it contains complete 
information on the firm characteristics.  
Hence, on the DATASET A I extensively study the relationship between 
various portfolios of family firms constructed by combining the information on the 
ownership structure. Using DATASET B, instead I mostly study portfolios of family 
firms and non-family firms, but I also analyze if family ownership is still significant 
after controlling for other firms characteristics. This means that the set of results I 
obtain for each dataset should be viewed together rather than just individually. 
This section is organized as follows: section 4.1 explains the portfolios 
formation methodology, while section 4.2 explains the econometric methodology. 
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4.1 Portfolio Formation  
 
One approach that can be used to address my research question is portfolio 
formation where portfolios are formed from stocks with the characteristic that should 
be entering the pricing kernel. In my case, this is the ownership structure. I form 
various portfolios to test my hypotheses.  
The first portfolio formation exercise is based on the presence of a family 
blockholder in the ownership structure. As explained in the previous section, I 
indicate the presence of a family in the ownership of a corporation using a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the company is identified as family from Faccio 
and Lang (2002) and zero otherwise64. Using this dummy variable for each country 
and for each month I create two portfolios: the first one composed only of family 
firms and the second one only composed of non-family corporations. the framework 
used here has the underlying assumption that family firms have a different magnitude 
of agency costs (considering both agency costs of control and the classic agency 
costs) relative to non-family firms. 
Following the first portfolio exercise, I proceed to analyze the role of the 
family in the management and its impact on agency costs. Following Villalonga and 
Amit (2006) I assume that family with a family manager should not suffer from the 
classic agency cost while family firms with a professional manager experience the 
classic conflict between the manager and the shareholders. Using the dummy 
variable indicating the presence of the family manager I create portfolios long in 
family firms with a family manager and short in non-family firms. However, in this 
case, I also want to consider the possibility that if a family is actively involved in the 
management the manager completely shares the family economic and non-economic 
incentives and would be keen to enforce familiar decision for the good of the family 
only. Hence, the presence of a family in the management curbs the classic agency 
cost, but might increase the risk of minority expropriation.  
Finally, I complete my analysis by using a third methodology whereby I form 
portfolios that distinguish family firms with respect to the possible magnitude of  
                                                 
64 This is also consistent with the approach of Anderson et al. (2003) and Villalonga and Amit (2006). 
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agency costs of control. In other words, I assume that the higher the interest that the 
blockholder shows in controlling the companies the higher the risk of expropriation 
against minority shareholders will be. To investigate this issue, I will analyze a 
number of factors that, cumulatively, should provide a measure of the family 
blockholders’ incentive to generate agency costs.  
To reach this objective, I will use an interaction of different variables that can 
show (individually) the incentives of the family blockholder as follows: (a) the 
dummy variable indicating the presence of a family in the ownership, (b) the dummy 
indicating the use of control enhancing mechanisms, and (c) the dummy that measure 
if the blockholder is a controlling blockholder alone or not. Following this procedure, 
I create the following groups of family firms: 
Group A: Family firms in which the family is not a controlling blockholder 
alone and does not use control enhancing mechanisms as a way to keep control.  
Group B: Family firms in which either the family is a controlling blockholder 
alone or it uses control enhancing mechanisms to keep control. 
Group C: Family firms in which the family is a controlling blockholder alone 
and it uses control enhancing mechanisms as way to keep control.  
The ownership structure of group A indicates that the family may have low 
interest in keeping control over the company. That is because, first, it does not use 
control enhancing mechanisms so it should not have voting rights over and above its 
cash flow rights to enforce its decisions over the company; and, second, the family is 
not the only blockholder with a substantial stake. The latter implies that some form of 
monitoring could take place from other blockholders present in the firm. 
Consequently, for this group while I do not exclude the possibility that the family 
still has some ways to divert resources from minority shareholders, I expect that the 
there is a low probability that minority shareholders will suffer expropriation. Hence, 
I indicate this group as one where family firms have NO agency costs of control.   
In Group B I expect that the family blockholder has a higher probability of 
generating agency costs of control relative to family firms in Group A. This is so 
because the blockholder has higher probability of extracting private benefits at 
expenses of minority shareholder because (a) either he is alone, so no other 
blockholder has enough stake to exercise any monitoring, or (b) the family 
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blockholder has enough voting rights in excess to its cash flow rights indicating that 
he can impose his control over the company. Thus, in this group I reckon a higher 
risk of minority shareholders’ expropriation than in Group A. Accordingly, I expect 
that the family firms in Group B to have LOW agency costs of control. 
Group C, finally, is composed of family firms where the family blockholder is 
a controlling blockholder alone and have controlling enhancing mechanisms in place 
to have much bigger voting power than its cash flow rights. Obviously, in this group 
the chances that the blockholder expropriates minority shareholder increases 
significantly with respect to both Group A and Group B. Accordingly, I indicate this 
group of family firms as a group with HIGH control level of agency cost of control. 
To recapitulate, I expect family firms in Group A to have no agency costs of 
control, those in Group B should have low agency costs of control and those in 
Group C should have the highest agency costs of control. 
Given these three groups, I try to understand the interaction between classic 
agency costs and agency costs of control and to study which agency cost has more 
impact on family firms’ risk and performance. In this analysis I closely follow what 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) did, but I improve their study by including different 
magnitude of agency cost of control in family firms.  
Villalonga and Amit (2006) refer to the classic agency cost as Agency Cost I, 
and to the agency cost of control as Agency Cost II. To study the relationship 
between classic agency cost and agency cost of control they exploit the interaction 
between the family control and family manager dummies. They argue that a family 
manager eliminates the conflict between owners and managers, while the use of 
control enhancing mechanisms increase the blockholder’s voting power over and 
above his equity ownership stake an should proxy for the divergence of interests 
between large (family) and small (non-family) shareholders. Using the interaction 
between these two variables, they break up their sample of U.S. firms in four firm-
types:  
Type I: Family firms with control-enhancing mechanisms and a family 
manager. These firms may have Agency Problem II, but not Agency Problem I. 
Type II: Family firms with control-enhancing mechanisms but no family 
manager. These firms may have both agency problems. 
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Type III: Family firms with a family manager but no control-enhancing 
mechanisms. These firms do not have any of the agency problems mentioned. 
Type IV: Non-family firms, which may have Agency Cost I, but not Agency 
Cost II.  
Following the same steps of Villalonga and Amit I use the dummy variable 
indicating the presence of a family manager to divide the groups of family firms with 
different magnitudes of agency costs by looking at the (a) presence of a family 
manager, (b) the use of control-enhancing mechanisms, and (c) the presence of the 
family blockholder alone (i.e. without the presence of any other blockholder in the 
ownership structure).Thus, I create six firm- types of companies as shown in the 
figure below:. 
 
  Agency Cost Of Control 
  NO LOW HIGH 
NO Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Classic 
Agency Cost
 
YES Type 4 Type 5 Type 6 
 
Figure 2: Family Firms Groups Based On Level Of Agency Cost Of Control And Classis Agency 
Cost. 
 
Type 1: Family firms with no control-enhancing mechanisms, family 
management, and the family blockholder is not the only blockholder in the ownership 
structure. These firms might have NO Agency Problem II, but not Agency Problem I. 
Type 2: Family firms with either control-enhancing mechanisms or with the 
absence of any other blockholder in the ownership and a family manager. These 
firms might have LOW Agency Problem II, but not Agency Problem I. 
Type 3: Family firms with both control-enhancing mechanisms and with the 
absence of any other blockholder in the ownership and a family manager. These 
firms might have HIGH Agency Problem II, but not Agency Problem I. 
Type 4: Family firms with no control-enhancing mechanisms, the family 
blockholder is not the only blockholder in the ownership structure and no family 
manager. These firms might have NO Agency Problem II, but Agency Problem I. 
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Type 5: Family firms with either control-enhancing mechanisms or with the 
absence of any other blockholder in the ownership and no family manager. These 
firms might have LOW Agency Problem II and Agency Problem I. 
Type 6: Family firms with both control-enhancing mechanisms and with the 
absence of any other blockholder in the ownership and no family manager. These 
firms might have HIGH Agency Problem II and Agency Problem I. 
After the formation of these six groups, I first compare family firms among 
them to understand the different impact that agency costs have across family firms. 
Then I study how each of these six groups perform relative to non-family firms. 
Finally, I analyze the interaction between the classic agency costs and agency costs 
of control regardless of the magnitude of the agency costs. In this analysis I indicate 
the two different types of agency costs by referring to the distintion made by 
Villalonga and Amit (2006). Henceforth I will be referring to Agency Cost I as ACI 
and to Agency Cost II as ACII. 
Finally, I use the Anti Self-dealing Index to study how the impact of the 
ownership structure changes in countries with different shareholders protection laws. 
In both datasets I use the index as independent variable in country fixed effect panel 
models. However, when using DATASET A I also use the Anti Self-dealing Index to 
split the entire dataset in two sub-samples as explained below. 
 
 
Country 
 
 
Anti Self-dealing Index 
 
 
Block Premium 
 
Austria 0.21 0.38 
Finland 0.46 0.01 
France 0.38 0.01 
Germany 0.28 0.11 
Italy 0.42 0.16 
Netherlands 0.20 0.03 
Norway 0.42 0.01 
Spain 0.37 0.02 
Sweden 0.33 0.03 
Switzerland 0.27 0.07 
U.K. 0.95 0 
 
Figure 3.Anti Self- Dealing Index and Block Premium In Each Country. 
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Figure 3 above shows the values that the Anti Self-dealing Index takes in each 
country in my datasets. Looking at the values of the Index for the countries in 
DATASET A, it is clear that all Continental European countries are clustered close to 
each other while the U.K. distinguishes itself scoring 0.95 which is way above all 
others countries. Hence, I introduce a dummy variable equal to 1 for the U.K. and 
zero otherwise and split the entire dataset in two sub-samples Continental Europe 
(i.e. countries with low Anti Self-dealing Index) and the U.K. (i.e. country with high 
Self Dealing Index). 
In each legal system, I study the performance of the groups of family 
described in the previous sub-section.  
 While in DATASET B I do not have enough information to go deeper in the 
investigation of the interaction between management and control, I do this analysis 
using the data collected in DATASET A. In DATASET A, I first distinguish between 
family firms with different level of control motivation and then I study the impact of 
the family manager. 
 
4.2 Econometric Methodology 
 
I analyze the time series of each portfolio that is formed as explained above 
by using a Fama and French factor model regression. With this factor model, I test 
the result of an equal-weighted strategy that in each country (or legal system), and for 
each month from February 1992 to December 2006, goes long in family firms (or 
family firms with different levels of agency costs of control) and short in non-family 
firms.  
The intercept coefficient in this type of regression – the so-called “alpha” – is 
interpreted as the abnormal return that an investor investing in one or the other 
portfolio receives by not passively investing in the model factors exclusively. The 
coefficients of the independent variables, instead, measure the exposure to the risk 
factors. To complete the analysis I also study the market risk (beta) and risk adjusted 
performance of each portfolio using Sharpe ratio and Treynor ratio portfolio’s 
performance measures.  
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On DATASET B, then, using raw data, I run a Fama and MacBeth (1973) 
type regression to analyse if the ownership structure is still significant after 
controlling for other firm characteristics. This methodology is used both as a 
robustness check and also to understand what other factors besides the ownership 
structure might be driving the difference in return between family and non-family 
firms.  
In this section I first introduce the Fama and Fench two factors model, then, 
in Section 4.2.2 I discuss on the Fama and MacBeth methodology. In Section 4.2.3 I 
explain how I calculate the market risk for each company. Section 4.2.4 illustrates 
the alternative measures of the risk adjusted performance: Sharpe Ratio and Treynor 
Ratio. 
 
4.2.1 Performance Attribution Regression: Fama and French Two Factors 
Model 
 
Existing literature in asset pricing has identified several characteristics that 
can be proposed as factors that can explain differences in firms’ realized returns. 
There is considerable evidence that shows that the cross-sectional pattern of stock 
returns can be explained by characteristics such as size, leverage, past returns, 
dividend yield, earning-to-price ratios, and book-to-market ratios65. This evidence 
can be referred to as factor models which has developed after Ross (1976) paper on 
the Arbitrage Pricing Theory. In a series of papers, Fama and French (1992a, b, 
1993b, 1996) examine several factors simultaneously and provide evidence that, with 
the exception of the momentum factor of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 1995), the 
cross sectional variation in expected returns associated with these non-risk 
characteristics can be captured by just two factors: (a) size (market capitalization), 
and (b) the book-to-market ratio. Moreover they document that once these factors are 
taken into consideration, Beta which is the measure of market risk and used by the 
                                                 
65 Banz (1981) documented size anomalies; Bhandari (1988) documented leverage effect; Jegadeesh 
and Titman (1993) and DeBondt and Thaler (1985) documented past returns effect; Basu (1983) 
documented the earning-to-price ratio; Stattman (1980) and Rosemberg, reid, and Lanstein (1985) 
documented book-to-market effect. 
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CAPM as the measure of risk, explains almost none of the cross-sectional dispersion 
in expected returns.  
To construct the size premium factor (the so called Small Minus Big, or 
SMB),Fama and French use data from every year from 1963 to 1990 and group all 
stocks traded on the NYSE, Amex and Nasdaq into deciles based either on their 
market capitalization. They then measure the average returns of each portfolio in 
each decile over the next year. The average return over this sample period of the 
smallest stock size decile is 0.74 percent per month higher than the average return of 
the largest decile. When they repeat the exercise using the book-to-market ratio to 
rank securities (the so-called, high minus low or HML) and then form portfolios they 
find that the average return of the highest book-to-market ratio decile (made up of 
“value” stocks) is 1.53 percent per month higher than the average return in the lowest 
book-to-market ratio (made up of “growth” stocks). These differences are much 
higher than can be explained through differences in beta between the two portfolios. 
These findings have been received with mixed reactions over the years. Part 
of the finance literature has perceived them as “anomalies” with respect to the classic 
parading of rationality that states that high performance must be associated with 
higher risks. In this view, the factors proposed by Fama and French can be viewed as 
anomalies if they are not risk factors. It has to be said that there is a widespread and 
ongoing debate on whether these factors are really risk factors or not.  
Fama and French (1993) suggest that book-to-market and size are proxies for 
distress. They also propose that distressed firms may be more sensitive to certain 
business cycle factors, like changes in credit conditions, compared to firms that are 
financially less vulnerable. In addition, the duration of high growth firms’ earnings 
should be somewhat longer than the duration of low growth firms; therefore, term 
structure shifts should affect the two groups of firms differently. Therefore, they use 
(Fama and French (1992a, b, 1993b, 1996)) the firm size and book-to-market effects 
within a three factor model in which the factors are returns on the market portfolio, 
and on two zero net-investment portfolios. One portfolio is long in high book-to-
market securities and short in low book-to-market securities (the HML factor). The 
other portfolio is long in small firms and short in large firms (SMB). 
The findings of the literature on factor models in general, and those of Fama 
and French, have not gone unquestioned. One criticism to these findings is that they 
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may be due to data mining. For example, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994), 
and Haugen (1995) argue that the size and book-to-market equity effects are due to 
investor overreaction rather then compensation for risk bearing. They argue that 
investors systematically overreact to recent corporate news, unrealistically 
extrapolating high or low growth into the future. This, in turn, leads to underpricing 
of value (small market capitalization, high book-to-market equity stocks) and 
overpricing of growth (large, low book-to-market) stocks. Daniel and Titman (1997) 
find that firm characteristics (i.e. size and boo-to-market) explain returns better than 
factor loadings from Fama and French model and conclude that there is no return 
premium associated with any of the three factors identified by Fama and French 
(1993), suggesting that the high return related to these portfolios cannot be viewed as 
compensation factor risk.  
Although I recognize that there is an ongoing debate about whether Fama and 
French’ factors are proxies for risk I will not be taking positions in this debate. 
Instead I will follow the empirical methodology used by existing literature that 
investigates whether corporate governance impact firms ‘performance and risk. In 
this case, I will follow Gompers et al (2003) and use the Fama and French model to 
analyze the performance of various portfolios sorted on ownership structure. In other 
words, the intercept of my model, the so-called “alpha”, is interpreted as the 
abnormal return an investor would have received by investing in a portfolio long in 
family firms (or family firms with different magnitude of agency cost) and short in 
non-family firms in excess to what he could have earned passively investing in the 
two factors from year 1992 to year 2006. 
However, in this work I do not apply the classic version of Fama and French 
regression model where they use the three factor model, but instead I use their two 
factor model (Fama and French (1998)). The two factor model is different from their 
more popular and widely-used three-factor model because it lacks the size factor. 
There is a reason that explains the absence of the size factor from the model for 
international stocks. Fama and French (1998) extend their three factors model to a 
global context and provide evidence that the two factor model, with the market factor 
and the book-to-market factor, essentially explains international stock returns better 
than the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). In other words, I will apply the two 
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factor model where the size factor is dropped because it has been shown that it does 
not contribute significantly to the analysis. 
The international two factors model is estimated by the following equation:  
tetHMLtRMRFtR +++= 21 ββα       (1) 
where Rt is the excess return in month t, RMRFt is the month t value-weighted 
market return minus the risk-free rate, and HMLt (high minus low) is the month t 
returns on the zero-investment factor-mimicking portfolios designed to capture the 
book-to-market effect. 
To recapitulate Fama and French show that the two factors model explains 
very well the returns at the country level. The same result is obtained under the 
assumption of integrated market. Besides the finding of Fama and French, there are 
other reasons that clearly indicate the same outcome. There is evidence that the size 
premium effect has been decreasing over the last ten years so much so that Gompers 
and Metrick (2001) argue that this is due to demand pressure for large stock resulting 
from the growth of institutional investors. Such investors may prefer larger stocks 
rather than small stocks, especially since their high turnover requires high stock 
liquidity something that is easier to find for large stocks. 
 
4.2.2 Fama and MacBeth Methodology 
 
Using the Fama and French two factors model I am able to study the 
performance of different portfolios and can understand if family firms pay a higher 
return adjusted for risk than non-family firms. One important criticism to such an 
approach is based on the different firm characteristics that may exist between family 
and non-family firms. Hence, it is very important to control for firm characteristics 
that may be driving the difference in returns between family firms and non-family 
firms. The way I address this issue is through the use of the standard Fama and 
MacBeth (1973) approach.  
Although the first time the Fama and MacBeth (1973) methodology as 
developed in relation to the CAPM, the procedure itself has now become standard in 
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the field of asset pricing and goes beyond the objectives for which it was first 
developed. Indeed, Fama and MacBeth (1973) interpreted the CAPM as a basic 
linear relationship between stock returns and market betas which should completely 
explain the cross-section of returns. In order to test the CAPM, Fama and MacBeth 
implemented a two-step regression methodology that survived and went on to 
become a standard methodology in the field 
In line with existing literature, I will use this two-step methodology and for 
each month in the sample period from February 1992 to December 2006 I estimate 
the following relationship: 
rit = at + bt Xi + ct Zit + eit         (2) 
where, rit are the raw returns for firm i in month t, Xi is a vector of ownership 
and agency cost related variables and Zit is a vector of firm characteristics.  
As element of Xi I include either dummy variable that indicates the presence 
of a family in the ownership structure or a dummy variable indicating if the family is 
involved in the management. 
As elements of Z, following Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998) I 
include the Market Value, the natural logarithm of the market capitalization in local 
currency at the end of month t-1 and the Book-to-Market ratio as proxies for the size 
and value effect (Fama and French (1993)), three variables for returns over the month 
-3 to -2, -6 to -4 and -12 to -7 prior to the month of the analysis. 
Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998) suggest that all variables 
involving the price level are lagged in order to preclude the possibility of a linear 
combination of the lagged return variables. They also include three momentum 
factors to exclude the returns during the immediate prior month in order to avoid any 
spurious association between the prior month return and the current month return 
caused by thin trading or bid-ask spread effects. In other words, the three return 
lagged variables should proxy for the momentum factor of Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993, 1995). 
Following Gompers et al. (2003) among the independent variable I also add 
Dividend Yield in the prior fiscal year. Finally, following Corstjens et al. (2006) I use 
Leverage, defined as long-term debt divided by total assets, Total Assets and the 
Idiosyncratic Risk, calculated as the standard error of the market model. In this 
Does Ownership Matter For Returns and Returns Volatility? 
 101
market model the firm’s monthly returns are regressed on the market monthly returns  
in each country and betas are corrected for thin trading. Finally, I also use Operating 
Margin, defined as operating income over net sales at the end of the previous year, 
and Sales on Assets at the end of the previous year. 
 
4.2.3 Market Risk and Thin Trading Correction 
 
One way I use to investigate the riskiness of family firms and non-family 
firms is measuring their market risk (exposure to the market factor as measured by 
beta). However, given the characteristics of the stocks in my dataset, beta is very 
likely to be affected by thin trading biases, so that a correction is needed.  
The presence of thin trading in my datasets is not difficult to notice since such 
a problem seems to be pervasive. In DATASET A I find that  30% of the total 
monthly stock return are zeros66. These zero returns can be explained in two ways: 
they are either the product of low trading volume that does not change the price level, 
or the price level does not change even if high volumes are transacted. Given that 
most of the firms in my datasets are either medium-sized or small firms, I tend to 
think that the most reasonable explanation for this big cluster of returns around zero 
is low trading volume. 
It is important to notice that in markets that suffer from thin trading the beta 
estimates may be highly unstable due to the tendency of the estimates to drift towards 
the mean. In other words, betas are negatively biased. The literature on thin trading in 
markets distinguishes between stocks on the quality of trading that they exhibit. 
Fowler et al. (1981) distinguish: (1) fat stocks, i.e. stocks that are always traded on 
the last day of each month (in this case the price is regarded as correct); (2) moderate 
stocks, i.e. stocks that have at least one observation per month, but the price is not 
necessarily correct; (3) infrequent stocks, i.e. stocks that have at least one month with 
no trade on record. 
Given these three types of stocks, a reasonable way to correct for the bias due 
to thin trading is required. Dimson and Marsh (1983) state that the best method is a 
                                                 
66 In DATASET B I have that only 2% of all monthly stock returns is equal to zero. 
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trade-to-trade approach for which the betas are calculated using the following 
equation 
jtMtjtjtjt ERR ++= βα         (3) 
Betas then are divided by 1 plus the matrix of the trading infrequency for each 
security calculated using the information on transactions. 
jtI
jt
jt += 1
ˆ
ˆ1
β
β          (4) 
Where jt1βˆ  is the corrected beta for security j during period t, jtβˆ beta 
estimated with OLS from equation (3) for security j during period p and jtI  is the 
matrix of the trading infrequency of security j during period t. The matrix of the 
trading infrequency is independent of the security returns and is simply given by:  
∑
+−=
−=
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Ttp
jpjt LMinTI
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1 )1,(        (5) 
where Ljp is the age (in fractions of a month) of the last marked price for 
security j at the end of month p. 
However, when the full information on the trading transactions is not 
available Dimson and Marsh (1983) suggests using the methodology proposed by 
Scholes and William (1977). 
Since I do not have full information on the trading matrix of each stock, in 
order to correct for thin trading, I assume that all stocks in my dataset are “moderate” 
stocks and will follow the methodology of Scholes and William (1977). To correct 
the betas, I first perform the following three regressions for each individual stock (j): 
(a) CAPM using the lag of monthly market observation: 
jtMtjjjt ERR 1111 −−−− ++= βα         (6) 
(b) CAPM using the current monthly market observation: 
jtMtjjjt ERR 000 ++= βα        (7) 
(c) CAPM using the lead of each month market observation: 
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jtMtjjjt ERR 1111 +−++ ++= βα        (8) 
 
Second, a consistent estimator of βj can be obtained from the following 
relationship: 
I
jjj
j ρ
βββ
β
21
101ˆ
+
+++−=        (9) 
Where jβˆ  is the adjusted beta, j1−β is beta estimated using equation (6), j0β  
is beta estimated using equation (7), and j1+β  is beta estimated using equation (8), 
while Iρ is the first order serial correlation for the market proxy calculated as follow: 
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Unfortunately, as has been indicated by existing literature, Scholes and 
William (1977) correction does not work for stocks that suffer from infrequent 
trading. Infrequent trading is highly correlated with the size of a company and small 
companies are the most likely to suffer from such a problem. Concerns about beta 
and the total risk apply all along this research since most family firms have smaller 
market capitalization and suffer from infrequent trading. In fact the thin trading 
problem is likely to affect the results in each country since for each of them I have a 
group of small size companies that have a high probability of trading infrequently. 
Moreover, since covariance risk is one of the components of the total risk, the total 
risk of a company is also affected by thin trading. Then, it is very likely that some of 
the betas will still be biased. However, this correction procedure that is used should, 
at least, generate better estimates for moderate and fat stocks.  
 
4.2.4 Other Measures of Risk Adjusted Performance 
 
The Fama and French two factors model already gives me a measure of risk 
adjusted abnormal return and the sensitivity of each portfolio to market and value 
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factors. As robustness checks, I will also use the additional measures known as the 
Sharpe ratio and Treynor ratio. 
The Sharpe measure of portfolio performance is as follows: 
i
i
i
RfRS σ
−=         (11) 
While the Treynor ratio is given by:  
 
i
i
i
RfRT β
−=         (12) 
In these two ratios iR  is the average rate of return for portfolio I during a specified 
time period, Rf is the average rate of return on risk-free assets during the same time 
period, iσ  is the standard deviation of the rate of return for portfolio during the time 
period and iβ  is the systematic risk of the portfolio (that in my case is corrected for 
thin trading as explained in the previous sub-section). 
Since in both ratios the numerator is the risk premium and the denominator is 
a measure of risk, the total expression indicates the portfolio’s risk premium return 
per unit of risk.  However, while the Sharpe ratio gives us the risk premium per unit 
of total risk (systematic and non-systematic risk), the Treynor ratio implicitly 
assumes a completely diversified portfolio, which means that systematic risk is the 
relevant measure of risk.  
For a completely diversified portfolio, one without any unsystematic risk, the 
two measures give identical ranking because the total variance of the completely 
diversified portfolio is its systematic variance. Alternatively, a poorly diversified 
portfolio could have a high ranking on the base of Treynor ratio, but a much lower 
ranking on the basis of Sharpe measure of performance. Any difference in risk would 
come directly from differences in diversification.   
These measures then provide complementary yet different information and I 
use them both along with the performance attribution regression. 
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Section 5 Results 
 
 I now proceed to describe the results obtained from the various 
methodologies using both DATASET A and DATASET B. 
 
5.1 Results from DATASET A 
 
5.1.1 Family Firms versus Non-Family Firms 
 
I start by investigating the stock returns of family firms and non-family firms 
using the portfolio formation approach. The results are summarized in Table 5. For 
(a) the entire sample, and (b) each country I report the two factor model regression 
for an equal-weighted investment in two different portfolios: the first composed only 
of family firms, and the second composed only of non-family firms. In the same table 
I also show the results of an investment strategy that, in the entire sample and in each 
country goes long in family firms and short in non-family firms. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Analyzing the entire dataset, I find that family firms have statistically 
significantly higher returns compared to non-family firms. Family firms outperform 
non-family firms by 0.27% per month (significant at 1% level). This result is also 
economically significant.  
While the results hold for the entire dataset there are noticeable differences 
across different countries. This may be as expected since country-specific factors 
may be behind these differences. 
I find no significantly different abnormal returns between family and non-
family firms in Finland, France, Germany and Norway while I find such abnormal 
performance in Italy, Sweden, Switzerland and the U.K.. In Italy family firms have 
an abnormal return of 0.47% per month (significant at the 5% level). A significant 
result is also found in Sweden, Switzerland and the U.K. where family firms do 
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better by 0.59% (significant at the 10% level), 0.43% (significant at the 5% level) 
and 0.17% (significant at the 10% level) per month respectively. 
These results for the entire sample provide the first evidence consistent with 
the hypotheses that family firms should generate higher stock returns. Looking at the 
results for Finland, France, Germany and Norway, it should be noted that in these 
countries family firms do not underperform non-family firms.  
Table 5 also shows the results for the Fama and French two factor model 
applied to (a) a portfolio composed exclusively of family firms, and (b) a portfolio 
composed exclusively of non-family firms. In all countries family firms show a 
significantly different than zero abnormal return. The same applies to non-family 
firms with the exception of Italy. 
Using the performance attribution regression I am also able to derive some 
conclusions about the risk profiles of firms and I will be interpreting the coefficients 
of the market and value factors as measures of the risk exposures. This is an 
important analysis because different types of ownership structures may be exposed to 
the risk factors differently and this may be ultimately driving the return generating 
process. 
Table 5 shows that family and non-family firms have significantly different 
risk exposures. In the overall dataset both types of firms are significantly positively 
exposed to the value factor. One interesting result, consistent with most of the 
findings of Fama and French factor models, they do not show any exposure to the 
market premium.  
In each country, both types of firms also display a different level of sensitivity 
with respect to the value factor and market premium. Family firms in France, Italy, 
Norway and Switzerland show exposures to the value factor (measured by the 
coefficient of the HML factor). Family firms seem to be more exposed to the value 
factor in all countries except in Finland, Norway and Sweden. The difference, 
however, is not significant. More important is the result that family firms are not 
exposed to the market risk differently than non-family firms. The only exception to 
this result is constituted by family firms in France. 
Taken together, these results are important because they indicate that the 
overperformance of family firms cannot be explained by the way family and non-
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family are exposed to the market risk and value premium factors. The risk exposures 
in themselves are the outcomes of the different choices made by the firms. The 
results shown so far do not indicate that these different choices are leading to 
different exposures to risks, at least not to the market risk and value factor. 
Obviously, family firms may be exposed to different risk factors – such as the size 
factor – compared to non-family firms. I will come back to this issue when 
investigating the results from DATASET B. 
To complete the analysis on the risk profile I also investigate other measures 
of risk adjusted performance, as captured by the Sharpe and Treynor ratios. These 
results can be considered as robustness checks for the previous tests using portfolio 
formation. 
The question that I will be asking is central to asset pricing: do family firms 
produce higher risk-adjusted returns or merely higher returns (non-risk adjusted)? 
This is an important question because is very much related to the issues of market 
efficiency. If markets are pricing correctly family firms, then we should expect that 
the higher returns we see are compensation for higher risks. In other words, while 
family firms should generate higher absolute returns they should not generate higher 
risk-adjusted returns. 
One important issue that should be mentioned at this stage is that both ratios 
are influenced by the thin trading problem I have mentioned before. Both beta and 
measures of total risk are negatively biased due to the low volume of trading of 
medium and small size companies, which is especially true for family firms..  
Tables 6 and 7 show the results of the difference in means test for the Sharpe 
Ratio, Beta (corrected for thin trading), and Treynor Ratio67 between family and non-
family firms. I measure each of the risk-adjusted performance measures for a 
portfolio composed of family firms and a portfolio composed of non-family firms. 
Table 6 shows the results for the entire data set while Table 7 shows the result for 
each country. 
[Insert Tables 6 and 7 here] 
                                                 
67 See Section 4.2.3 for more details on these ratios. 
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Table 6 shows that the difference in the Treynor Ratio and Sharpe Ratio 
between family and non-family firms is not statistically significant. Moreover, the 
difference in the means test for the beta is not statistically significant. 
Table 7 shows the results for the Sharpe and Treynor ratios in each country. 
The difference in means for both the Sharpe Ratio and Treynor Ratio between family 
and non-family firms is never statistically significant, confirming that the higher 
performance of family firms is due to compensation for higher risk.  
These two results – the one for the entire sample and the one for each country 
– is central to the analysis. These shows that once family and non-family firms make 
their own decisions and choices (in which industry they should be, the level of 
business risk, capital structure etc.) then the market appears to be pricing these firms 
correctly on average. Hence, the superior performance of family firms is due entirely 
to higher risks that they may be facing. 
Table 7 also shows that the difference in means test for the systematic risk 
also shows that family firms in Finland, France, Germany and Norway have betas 
that are not significantly higher than the ones of non-family firms. However, in Italy, 
Sweden and Switzerland family firms have significantly higher betas, confirming that 
the difference in performance may be due to the fact that the former are 
compensating minority investor for higher risk.  
In conclusion, the findings from these robustness checks do support the idea 
that in countries where family firms overperform non-family firms they do so as pure 
compensation for higher risks these companies face. 
 
5.1.2 Robustness Checks 
 
In this section I undertake additional tests to investigate further which 
characteristics of the family blockholder may be driving the results I have shown so 
far.. Specifically, I will be looking not just at the presence of a family blockholder 
but also its control rights, and its presence in the firm’s management. To do so, I will 
first investigate how the interaction between family ownership, control and family 
management impacts stock returns. Second, I will investigate how the overall level of 
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agency costs in family firms influence the results as illustrated in Section 4.1. 
Finally, I will then look at institutional blockholders and investigate whether their 
impact on stock returns is different than the impact generated by family blockholders. 
 
5.1.2.1 Family Ownership, Control and Stock Returns 
 
Table 8 shows the results of a panel data regression over the period 1992 – 
2006 where the dependent variable is the monthly stock return. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
In column (1), I analyze how family ownership and use of control enhancing 
mechanisms impact stock returns. It is expected that the expropriation of minority 
shareholders is directly related to family control. The use of control enhancing 
mechanism, then, should have a positive effect on agency costs of control, since the 
higher the level of control the easier it should be for the blockholder to dictate and 
impose his own decisions on the company.  
As expected family ownership has a positive and significant effect on stock 
returns. Interestingly, the use of control enhancing mechanisms has a negative impact 
but the effect is not statistically significant. A similar result is shown in column (4) 
where instead of using a dummy variable approach I consider the family’s control 
stake (in %) together with the ratio between voting rights and cash-flow rights  
(ownership of shares outstanding in percentage). These are alternative ways of 
defining a family’s presence and its impact on the agency costs. In this column the 
family control variable has a positive and significant coefficient, while wedge has a 
positive effect, but it is not significant. 
In column (2) I study the impact of family presence and the effect of a 
blockholder alone. The intuition here is that when the blockholder is alone (he is the 
only blockholder with at least 10% ownership stake), it is unlikely that other 
blockholders will exercise any control or discipline over the family blockholder. In 
this case, the family blockholder can more easily expropriate other shareholders. 
Thus I expected the coefficient of this variable to have a positive sign. Once again, 
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while the presence of a family blockholder has positive and significant effect, the 
presence of a blockholder alone has a negative and not significant effect.  
The previous results, then, indicate that the presence of a family blockholder 
matters more than the level of control and independence it has. To further investigate 
this issue, I look at the impact of (a) family ownership, (b) the use of control 
enhancing mechanisms, and (c) the presence of a blockholder alone together in 
column (3). The result is confirmed. The effect of a family blockholder is positive 
and significant while both the coefficients of the other variables are negative but not 
significant.  
In conclusion, I expected that the level of expropriation depends on the 
control that the family has on the company and on the independence that the 
blockholder has within the company. The results show that the presence of a family 
blockholder (through its incentives and behavior) in itself may determine the level of 
agency costs and the resulting impact on stock returns. Hence, the presence of the 
family blockholder subsumes the level of control that the family is supposed to 
exercises on the company. In other words, the presence of a family is associated by 
the market with higher risks of expropriation, regardless of the level of control. This 
may in turn mean that it is extremely difficult for a family blockholder to remove the 
perception that it is a likely candidate that expropriates. This may call for very strong 
internal governance mechanisms that can provide discipline. 
Finally, using the Anti Self-Dealing Index I study how the legal system in 
each country impacts the results. I expect that the higher the level of minority 
shareholders protection the lower is the impact of the family presence and control on 
stock returns because agency costs induced by the behavior of the family blockholder 
will be lower. The law and its enforcement should reduce the ability of the 
controlling blockholder to expropriate minority shareholders. Hence, I expect that the 
coefficient of the Anti Self-Dealing Index to carry a negative sign. 
The results are reported in columns (5), (6), (7) in Table 8. In all columns the 
signs of the coefficient of the family presence and Anti Self-Dealing Index are as 
expected. In column (7), in which I have (a) family presence, (b) use of control 
enhancing mechanisms, (c) presence of a blockholder alone, and (d) Anti Self-
Dealing Index, I find that the family presence’s influence is positive and significant. 
The variables measuring control and independence of the blockholder have no 
Does Ownership Matter For Returns and Returns Volatility? 
 111
statistically significant impacts. Finally, the Anti Self-Dealing Index has a negative 
(and significant) impact on stock returns confirming my hypothesis that the higher is 
the level of protection the lower is the risk of expropriation (then lower is the return 
required by the market).  
Table 9 investigates the relationship between family ownership, family 
management and control.  
[Insert Table 9 here] 
The role of a family manager can have two alternative impacts on the total 
agency costs. First, the presence of the family manager eliminates the separation 
between ownership and control, reducing the classic agency costs. Second, the family 
manager shares completely the family’s economic and non-economic objectives and 
would be keen to enforce its decisions. Hence, the presence of a family manager 
could also increase the risk of minority shareholders expropriation. If the negative 
impact on the agency cost of control overshadows the positive impact from the 
classic agency costs, the presence of the family manager should lead to higher returns 
to compensate investors for higher risks.  
Moreover, since the level of expropriation might depend on the control that 
the family exercises on the company, I also expect that the dummy indicating the use 
of control enhancing mechanisms and the dummy variable indicating the presence of 
a controlling blockholder alone should both have positive signs. 
Column (1) of Table 9 shows that the presence of a family manager has a 
significant and positive impact on stock returns, confirming that the market prices in 
the higher probability that with a family manager expropriation may be more 
possible. In column (2) I study how family management, the use of control enhancing 
mechanisms and the blockholder’s independence impact returns. I find that while the 
dummy indicating the presence of the family manager remains positive and 
significant, the coefficients of the other variables are negative and insignificant. As in 
the previous analysis, then, these results indicate that it is the presence of the family 
manager and not the level of family control and independence that counts for the 
market. Moreover these results support the conclusion that the involvement of the 
family manager tends to either exacerbate or be seen by the market as exacerbating 
Does Ownership Matter For Returns and Returns Volatility? 
 112
the agency costs of control which, in this case, may be higher than the classic agency 
costs.  
Finally, I also investigate the impact of the minority shareholder protection 
(measured by the Anti Self-Dealing Index) on stock returns along with family 
management and control. Column (4) in Table 9 shows that the legal system has, as 
expected, a negative impact on the stock return. 
 
5.1.2.2 Agency Costs of Control in Family Firms  
 
In this section I will analyze the interaction between family ownership, family 
management and control focusing on family firms only. Moreover, in order to 
consider the differences between legal systems, I will split the sample in two sub-
samples based on the level of (minority) shareholder protection: U.K (which is the 
country with high minority shareholders protection), and Continental Europe 
(countries with low minority shareholders protection). 
Table 10 shows a test for the difference in raw stock market performance of 
family firms with different levels of agency costs constructed as described in Section 
4.1. Panel A in Table 10 shows the results for U.K. firms, while Panel B shows the 
results for countries with low minority shareholder protection. 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
Table 10 Panel A shows that in the U.K., for any level of agency costs of 
control, family firms with a family manager have statistically higher returns than 
family firms that have a professional manager. Family firms with low agency costs of 
control have the highest average performance (1.13%), closely followed by family 
firms with high agency costs of control (1.08%) and family firms with no agency 
costs (0.97%). Interestingly, the lowest performance is given by family firms that 
only suffer from the classic agency cost (0.45%). 
Table 10 Panel B shows that in countries in which the law does not 
effectively protect minority shareholders, regardless of the level of agency cost of 
control, family firms with no classic agency costs do not perform better than family 
firms with classic agency costs. Analyzing the performance of each group, the one 
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with the highest monthly average return is constituted by family firms with no 
agency cost of control and no classic agency costs (1.17%). Firms with high agency 
costs of control and classic agency costs have an average monthly performance of 
1.09% closely followed by firms that do not have agency costs of control and suffer 
from classic agency costs (1.01%). Finally, the lowest monthly performance is given 
by firms with low agency costs of control and classic agency costs (0.83%). 
These results indicate that where minority shareholders are highly protected 
by the law, i.e. the U.K., the presence of a family manager is a key issue to 
understand family firms’ performance. This does not seem to be so important in 
countries with low minority protection.  
To complete the analysis I also show the results for measures of risk-adjusted 
performance. Table 11 shows the results of the test of the difference in means for the 
Sharpe Ratio and Treynor Ratio between portfolios made up of family with different 
levels of agency costs is. Table 11 Panel A shows the results for family firms in U.K. 
while Panel B shows the results for countries with low minority shareholders 
protection. 
[Insert Table 11 here] 
In both legal systems the results show that the difference in performance is 
completely explained by the risk profile of family firms. In the U.K. the difference in 
means for the Treynor is not significant for any group, while the difference in Sharpe 
Ratio is significant only for family firms with no and high agency costs of control. 
However, the magnitude of the effect is extremely low and not economically 
significant. In countries with low minority shareholder protection the result is even 
clearer: neither the Sharpe Ratio nor the Treynor Ratio is statistically different 
between family and non-family firms. 
To further investigate the results in Table 10 I analyze portfolios of family 
firms using the performance attribution regression methodology. The results are 
shown in Table 12. 
[Insert Table 12 here] 
Table 12 shows the main results of a Fama and French model regression that 
controls for market and value risk factors for equal weighted portfolios of family 
firms. I have analyzed many different portfolios than the ones reported in the table. 
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For the sake of brevity, I only report the results for which the intercept of the model 
is statistically significant different than zero. The results for the portfolios not 
reported here are available upon request. 
First, Panel A of Table 12 shows that in U.K. family firms with agency costs 
of control perform better than family firms with no agency costs of control (1.80% 
per month and significantly different from zero at 5% level). Second, family firms 
with both agency costs of control generate higher returns than family firms with only 
classic agency costs (1.15% per month and significant at 1% level). Finally, family 
firms with a family manager do statistically better than family firms with a 
professional manager (0.49% per month and significant at 1%). This results show the 
importance of the family presence in the active management in UK. Family 
managers, in fact, seem to reduce the total agency cost. 
Table 12 Panel B shows that even in countries with weak minority 
shareholder protection family firms with agency costs of control have higher returns 
than firms with no agency costs of control (1.90% per month, significant at 1% 
level). A positive abnormal return is also generated by family firms with agency cost 
of control and no classic agency cost (1.04% monthly significant at 10%). Finally, 
family firms with both agency costs outperform family firms with only the classic 
agency cost (0.87% per month significant at 1% level). 
This multivariate analysis shows that even in Continental Europe the level of 
agency cost of control does not make any significant difference on the results when 
distinguishing between high and low level of agency cost. However, here the 
presence of a family manager seems to exacerbate, instead that reducing, the total 
impact of agency costs. 
 
5.1.2.3 Type of Ownership and Stock Returns 
 
The research question is whether ownership structures impact risk and the 
return generating process. To do so, up to now I have focused on the difference 
between family firms and non-family firms. I have so far assumed that institutional 
blockholders have incentive structures similar to atomistic shareholders. Thus, 
closely-held corporations with an institutional blockholder are assumed to only suffer 
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from the classic agency cost. Moreover, I assume that the presence of a family 
blockholder might exacerbate the agency costs of control in family firms and 
increases the risk of minority expropriation.  
In this section I investigate whether it is reasonable to consider that family 
blockholders have a different impact on returns relative to non-family blockholders, 
specifically institutional blockholders. Hence, I want to relax the assumption about 
institutional blockholders and study if their presence has any impact on stock returns. 
If institutional blockholders behave in the same way as family blockholders, 
then the presence of an institutional blockholder should increase the probability of 
minority shareholders expropriation. In such a case, I would then expect their 
presence to have a positive impact on the firm’s stock returns. 
Table 13 shows the results from a panel data regression over the period 1992 
– 2006 where the dependent variable is the monthly stock return. In column (1) and 
(2) I study the individual effect of a family blockholder and an institutional 
blockholder, respectively. 
[Insert Table 13 here] 
The first finding of Table 13 is that the presence of a family blockholder has 
the expected positive (and statistically significant) effect on stock returns. Instead, 
the presence of a blockholder has a negative and significant impact.  
Interpreting this result is not an easy task and should be left for future 
research. Normally institutional blockholder are “chasing alphas”, especially if they 
are widely-held. Hence one would expect that such blockholders would invest in 
stocks that outperform. These results, however, indicate otherwise at least for the 
types of institutional blockholders in the sample. One possible interpretation of this 
result is that the presence of an institutional blockholder may curb the risk of 
expropriation if the institutional blockholder is large enough to undertake some 
monitoring of the manager. In which case, such firms are generating lower absolute 
performance that is compatible with lower agency risks. 
The Faccio and Lang (2002) dataset distinguishes between institutional 
blockholders and “unlisted companies” as ultimate owners. While the authors do not 
say anything specific on the difference between the two groups, one possible way to 
understand the difference between these two is that while the former seem to be 
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widely-held institutions the latter are closely-held institutions. Hence, I also study if 
the presence of “unlisted companies” as ultimate owner has any effect on stock 
returns. This is done in order to capture a bigger number of institutional 
blockholders. In column (3) I find that similar to institutional blockholders, the 
presence of an unlisted company is also associated with lower return. 
Finally, column (4) shows the collective impact of the three different 
ownership structures on stock returns. This column shows that the presence of family 
blockholder still has a positive, and statistically significant, impact on stock returns 
while both the presence of an institutional blockholder and an unlisted company has a 
negative and statistical significant impact.  
To complete the analysis I also use the performance attribution methodology, 
as illustrated in Section 4, in this case. From this analysis I expect that if family firms 
have higher agency costs than closely-held firms with either an institutional 
blockholder or an unlisted company as ultimate owner, then they should generate 
higher returns to compensate minority shareholder for this expropriation. 
Table 14 reports the results from a Fama and French two factors model 
regression. 
[Insert Table 14 here] 
The Table shows the results for an equal-weighted investment in two different 
portfolios: the first composed only of family firms and the second composed only of 
closely-held firms with either an institutional blockholder or an unlisted company as 
ultimate owner.  
As expected, I find that family firms generate higher returns than closely-held 
firms with either an institutional blockholder or an unlisted company as the ultimate 
owner. The abnormal return, measured by the intercept (the “alpha”) of the model, is 
equal to 0.33% per month and is statistically significant at 1% level.  
 
5.2 Results from DATASET B 
 
I now proceed to discuss results from further tests I have done using 
DATASET B. 
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5.2.1 Family versus Non Family Firms  
 
In this section I investigate the stock returns of family firms and non-family 
firms shown in Table 16. For each country I report the two factor model regression 
for an equal-weighted investment in two different portfolios, the first composed only 
of family firms and the second composed only of non-family firms. The Table also 
shows the results of an investment strategy that goes long in family firms and short in 
non-family firms. I apply this approach both to the entire sample and the country 
level. 
[Insert Table 16 here] 
In the overall sample I find that family firms outperform non-family firms by 
0.38% each month (significant at 1% level). Consistent with the results from 
DATASET A, there are no significantly different monthly abnormal returns between 
family and non-family firms in France and Germany. However, in this dataset, I find 
that in all other countries (Austria, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and 
Switzerland) family firms have abnormal returns. In Austria family firms have an 
abnormal return of 0.78% per month (significant at 1% level) and in Italy an 
abnormal return of 0.47% per month (significant at the 1% level). A significant result 
is also found in Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland where family firms 
outperform by 0.24% (significant at the 5% level), 0.42% (significant at the 5% 
level), 0.60% (significant at the 1% level) and 0.46% (significant at the 1% level) per 
month respectively.  
The second finding in Table 16 is that family and non-family firms have some 
differences in risk exposures. I find that for family firms the exposure to the value 
factor (measured by the coefficient of the HML factor) is significant overall and also 
in Austria, Italy, and Switzerland. Among these countries the exposure of family 
firms to the value factor is negative and significant in Austria (at 10% level of 
significance) while positive and significant in Italy and Switzerland (at 5% level of 
significance).  
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Non-family firms have significant exposure to the value factor in the overall 
sample and in France, Italy and Switzerland. French non-family firms show the lower 
exposure to the value factor (at 5% level of significance). Only in Austria both family 
firms and non-family firms are significantly exposed to the market premium. In 
Germany only family firms are exposed to the market premium. The exposure to the 
market premium is not statistically significant for both family and non-family firms 
in any other country. 
However, there seems to be no statistically significant difference in the 
exposure of family and non-family firms to the market risk and the value factor. This 
result is consistent with the one I obtained in DATASET A. When reviewing the 
results in DATASET A, I stated that while the two types of firms may not have 
different exposures to these two risk factors, they may be exposed to different risks 
not considered so far. I will now proceed to investigate this possibility. 
To address the possibility that the difference in performance is driven by 
industry effects I also analyze the industry adjusted stock return of portfolios long in 
family firms and short in non-family firms. This analysis is important because the 
higher performance of family firms might be due to the choice of the industry in 
which family firms invest. In other words family firms might be clustered in more 
lucrative industries due to a strategic decision made by the family blockholder.  
To address this issue, I again use the performance attribution regression 
methodology and report the two factors model regression for an equal-weighted 
investment in a portfolio that goes long in family firms and short in non-family firms 
over the sample period. In this case, the return generated by each stock is adjusted for 
the appropriate industry average returns in each month. Hence, I will be using 
industry-adjusted returns for this analysis. The results are shown in Table 17. 
[Insert Table 17 here] 
Table 17 shows that this investment strategy would have earned to an investor 
a positive abnormal return of 0.28% per month in the overall sample. This is both 
statistically and economically significant. This result holds in all countries in 
DATASET B, except for France. Interesting, the results are also significant in 
Germany, where after adjusting for industry effect, family firms overperform non-
family firms by 0.30% per month (significant at 1% level). Hence using an industry-
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adjusted returns methodology provides us with strong evidence that family firms 
outperform non-family firms. 
One more possibility is that the difference in returns is driven by other firms’ 
characteristics, and not ownership. This view would hold that the firm owners make 
strategic decisions on many firm characteristics – such as its size, capital structure, 
etc – and it is these, and not ownership per se, that will influence returns.  
I address this issue using the methodology proposed by Gompers et al. 
(2003). I use a Fama and MacBeth regression approach to control for the following 
(a) firm characteristics, (b) value, (c) size factor, and (d) momentum factors. The 
following are the firm characteristics I use: (a) Dividend Yield, (b) Operating 
Margin, (c) Leverage, (d) Total Assets, (e) Sales to Assets, and (f) Idiosyncratic Risk. 
I use both raw and industry adjusted stock returns and I show the results in Table 18. 
[Insert Table 18 here] 
Table 18 shows that even after controlling for all these variables I still find 
that the family blockholder has a significant and positive impact on returns. This 
confirms that the results we have obtained so far from different methodologies 
cannot be explained by different firm characteristics across family and non-family 
firms. 
One possible concern is given by the differences in the legal systems across 
the countries in this dataset. I address this issue in Table 19 where I consider country-
specific measures of legal protection. 
In Table 19 I show the results of a panel data regression over the period 1992 
– 2006 where the dependent variable is the monthly industry-adjusted stock return. In 
this table I control for the same characteristics and factors used in the Fama and 
MacBeth regression above and shown in Table 18. 
[Insert Table 19 here] 
In columns (4) and (7) I have (a) family presence, (b) Anti Self-Dealing 
Index, (c) Block Premium, and (d) an interaction term between family presence and 
the Anti Self-Dealing Index. In column (4) I use as controlling variables only the 
firm characteristics, while in column (7) I also control for lagged returns variables (as 
proxy for the momentum factor) and the idiosyncratic risk. 
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If my argument on control motivation holds, then I should expect the 
coefficient estimate of the family variable and the Block Premium to be positive. The 
blockholder’s control motivations should be more important in countries in which 
they can sell their blockholding at a premium. Hence, the higher the block premium, 
the higher the probability of expropriation should be. I expect, instead, that the 
coefficient estimate for the Anti Self-Dealing Index should be negative because as 
minority shareholders’ rights become stronger the lower is the risk of minority 
shareholders expropriation and the lower the stock returns should be.  
Finally, I look at the impact generated by the two sets of variables together: 
(a) Family Presence, and (b) Family Presence interacted with the Anti Self-Dealing 
Index. Using this interaction I can analyze how, if at all, the family blockholder’s 
impact on stock returns changes through different minority shareholder rights 
environments. I expect that the higher the level of minority shareholders’ protection 
the lower the impact of a family blockholder should be. Hence I expect this 
interaction to have a negative sign. 
After controlling for firms’ characteristics in column (4), I find that the 
presence of a family blockholder has a positive effect on firms’ stock market 
performance, consistent with what I have found earlier. The Anti Self-Dealing index 
has a positive sign but it is not significant. However, the interaction term between the 
family presence and the Anti Self-Dealing Index is negative, meaning that the better 
the investors’ protection regime the less will the family’s presence impact on stock 
returns.  
Moreover, I also find the sign of the coefficient for the block premium 
variable in column (4) as positive, as was expected. In equation (7) I find similar 
results, the only difference is that after controlling for idiosyncratic risk and past 
returns the block premium variable looses its significance. 
To complete the analysis I also consider the effect of the family manager and 
analyze portfolios of family firms with family managers versus portfolios of non-
family firms. The results are shown in Table 20.  
[Insert Table 20 here] 
I find that in the sample period family firms with a family manger outperform 
non-family firms in all countries, except France and Netherlands. Interestingly while 
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in all the previous analysis that used raw stock returns in Germany I have never 
found any effect of family ownership on stock returns, here I find that family firms 
with a family manger overperform non-family firms by 0.76% per month (significant 
at 1% level). The results hold also when adjusting for industry effects. 
 
Section 6 Conclusions 
 
I started my work by posing a simple question: do ownership structures 
influence stocks’ return generating process? The answer I have reached is a yes! 
To investigate my research question I compared the return generating process 
of closely-held firms with a family blockholder relative to those of widely-held firms 
and closely-held firm with a non-family blockholder. The main result that I find is 
that ownership structure matters for companies’ returns generating process. In other 
words, I find that the presence of a family blockholder impacts the stock returns 
because increases the probability of minority shareholders expropriation. This is 
consistent with a rational expectations framework where investors in family firms 
have to be compensated with higher returns for the higher risk they are faced with. 
Using Fama and French two factors model regression I find that from year 
1992 to year 2006, an investor would have received an abnormal return (captured by 
the “alpha”, or the intercept of the model) by investing in a portfolio long in family 
firms and short in non-family firms, in excess to what he could have earned passively 
investing in the two factors. The abnormal returns vary across the two different 
datasets but indicate the same economic outcome: an abnormal return of 0.27% per 
month (significant at 1% level) in DASATET A, and of 0.38% per month (significant 
at 1% level) in DATASET B. These abnormal performances, besides being 
statistically significant, also have economic significance.  
While the results hold for the entire dataset there are noticeable differences 
across different countries. This may be as expected since country-specific factors 
may be behind these differences. It is still true to say that the results hold for the 
majority of the countries. 
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In DATASET A, I find that family firms’ stock returns are not significantly 
higher to non-family firms in Finland, France, Germany and Norway. On the other 
hand, family firms in Italy, Sweden, Switzerland and the U.K. generate higher stock 
returns relative to non-family firms. Specifically, in Italy investors replicating the 
strategy described above would have earned an abnormal return of 0.47% per month 
(significant at the 5% level) by investing in family firms. A significant result is also 
found in Sweden, Switzerland and the U.K. where family firms do better than non-
family firms by 0.59% (significant at the 10% level), 0.43% (significant at the 5% 
level) and 0.17% (significant at the 10% level) per month respectively. 
Using DATASET B, I find that family firms in Austria, Italy, Netherlands, 
Spain, Sweden and Switzerland also pay higher returns relative to non-family firms. 
The overperformance of family firms is 0.78% per month in Austria (significant at 
1% level), 0.47% in Italy (significant at the 1% level), 0.24% per month (significant 
at the 5% level) in Netherlands, 0.42% per month in Spain (significant at the 5% 
level), 0.60% per month in Sweden (significant at the 1% level) and 0.46% per 
month in Switzerland (significant at the 1% level).  
It is equally important to note that the impact of family ownership holds also 
after controlling for other firm characteristics using the Fama and MachBeth 
regression approach either with raw stock returns or industry adjusted returns. 
To recapitulate, this work deals with both agency costs of control and the 
classic agency costs. Consistent with the efficient market hypothesis, the risk 
associated with the agency costs of control is correctly priced by the market, so that 
closely-held corporations with control motivations have higher market performance 
than widely-held firms to compensate minority shareholders for the higher risk of 
expropriation. 
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Table 1: Variable Definitions 
This table defines the variables used in the analysis. I obtain monthly prices and accounting 
information from Worldscope, while ownership information comes either from Faccio and 
Lang (2002) or AMADEUS dataset. Kenneth French’s website provides the monthly data 
about market returns and the value premium factor for each country over the period 1992 -
2006. 
 
 
 
Firm-Level Characteristics 
Company Stock 
Returns 
(Monthly) 
 
This is the monthly stock returns obtained from monthly prices collected 
at the beginning of each month from February 1992 to December 2006. 
Beta 
(adjusted for 
thin trading) 
 
Estimates from market model in which the firm’s monthly returns are 
regressed on the market monthly returns (data obtained from Kenneth 
French’s web site) in each country. The adjustment for thin trading is 
applied following Scholes and Williams (1977).  
Market Value 
 
The natural logarithm of the market capitalization in the local currency at 
the end of month t-1. 
Book-to-Market 
Ratio 
 
The natural logarithm of the ratio of book value of common stocks to 
market value of common stocks for the previous year. 
Operating 
Margin 
 
Operating Income over Net Sales at year t-1. 
Return_2_3 
 
The natural logarithm of the cumulative returns over the two months 
ending at the beginning of the previous month. 
Return_4_6 
 
The natural logarithm of the cumulative returns over the three months 
ending three months previously.  
Return_7_12 
 
The natural logarithm of the cumulative returns over the 6 months ending 
6 months previously. 
Dividend Yield 
 
The dividend per share as percentage of the share price for the previous 
year. 
Sales/Total 
Asset 
 
Net Sales divided by Total Assets at the end of the previous year. 
Leverage 
 
Long Term Debt divided by Total Assets.  
Total Asset 
 
Natural logarithm of Total Assets. 
Idiosyncratic 
Risk 
 
Standard error of the market model in which the firm’s monthly returns 
are regressed on the market monthly returns. 
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Firm Ownership Measure 
Family 
Dummy 
 
Equals one if the founding family owns shares in the firm, zero otherwise. 
In DATASET A this dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the company 
is identified as family owned in Faccio and Lang dataset and zero 
otherwise. In DATASET B it takes the value of 1 if the company is 
identified as family owned in AMADEUS dataset and zero otherwise. 
 
Family 
Control Rights 
 
 
The total number of shares held by the family blockholder as a percentage 
of the shares outstanding of the firm. 
 
Family 
Manager 
 
Equals one if family is in the firm’s active management, zero otherwise. 
Control 
Enhancing 
Mechanisms 
 
A company has control enhancing mechanisms in place if it uses one of 
the following (source: Faccio and Lang (2002)):  
1. Dual class shares; 
2. Pyramids; Firm; 
3. Holding through multiple control chains;  
4. Cross-holding. 
I use a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if one of the mechanisms 
described above is used by the firm and zero otherwise. 
Controlling 
Owner Alone 
 
A controlling shareholder is determined to be “alone” if no other 
blockholder controls at least 10% of the voting rights. The presence of a 
controlling owner alone is indicated with a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
the company has a controlling shareholder with the described 
characteristics and zero otherwise. (source: Faccio and Lang (2002)). 
 
Wedge 
 
The difference between the largest shareholder’s voting rights and his 
cash flow rights. It is calculated as the difference between the percentage 
of the votes held by the blockholder and the percentage of outstanding 
shares held by the blockholder. 
The wedge will be positive in the case the largest shareholders uses 
control enhancing mechanisms. 
 
Country-Level Governance Measures 
 
Anti  
Self-Dealing 
Index 
 
 
Anti Self-Dealing Index addresses the channels through which the law 
deals with corporate self-dealing (or tunnelling). It is obtained from 
Djankov et al. (2006). It takes a value between 0 and 1.Using this index I 
create a dummy variable equal to one if the Anti Self-Dealing index is 
higher than the average in the sample and zero otherwise. Countries for 
which the Anti Self-Dealing Index Dummy is zero are called “Countries 
with Low Anti Self-Dealing Index”, while all the others are defined as 
“Countries with High Anti Self-Dealing Index”. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for DATASET A 
 
The table shows descriptive statistics for the 1,565 non-financial firms in DATASET A.  
Panel A shows the decomposition of the number of firms in the dataset by the country of 
incorporation and also distinguishing among family, non-family. Panel A gives also the 
number of observation in countries with Low Anti Self-Dealing index (all country but UK). 
For each country monthly data has been collected from February 1992 to December 2006. 
Panel B1 shows the descriptive statistics for monthly stock return, ownership characteristics, 
external governance measures, and market and value factors for the entire dataset. The 
loading factors described have been collected from Kennet French’s website. For the latter, I 
always use the more restrictive ones calculated using value and growth portfolios obtained 
only sorting firms for which it was possible to have all the data about the following ratios: 
Book-to-market (B/M), Earning/Price (E/P), Cashflow/Price (C/P), or Dividend/Price (D/P). 
Panel C shows descriptive statistics Market Return and Value Premium by country. The rest 
of the variables shown in each panel are described in Table 1. I obtain monthly returns from 
Worldscope and ownership characteristics from Faccio and Lang dataset. For the latter, we 
always apply the 10% control rights cut-off point. For each country monthly data have been 
collected from February 1992 to December 2006.  
 
 
Panel A: Country of Origin 
 
Country 
Number 
Of 
Firms 
Number 
of 
Family 
Firms 
Number 
of Non-
Family 
Firms 
Monthly 
Observations 
All Firms 
Monthly 
Observations 
Family 
Firms 
Monthly 
Observations 
Non-Family 
Firms 
       
Finland 93 19 74 11,953 2,309 9,644 
France 236 84 152 38,725 14,029 24,696 
Germany 179 74 105 28,422 11,182 17,240 
Italy 40 20 20 6,337 3,262 3,075 
Norway 77 11 66 10,773 1,578 9,195 
Sweden 35 10 25 4,878 1,156 3,722 
Switzerland 36 11 25 5,861 1,882 3,979 
 696 229 467 106,949 35,398 71,551 
       
UK 869 226 643 143,040 36,694 106,346 
       
Total 1,565 455 1,110 249,989 72,092 177,897 
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Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for Entire Dataset 
 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Median Min Max 
      
Company Stock Returns 0.8346 8.4969 0 -23 40 
Beta 0.3083 0.383 0.261 -1.471 2.431 
      
Family Dummy 0.2884 0.4530 0 0 1 
Family Manager 0.6862 0.4640 1 0 1 
      
Wedge 1.7667 5.3652 1 0.7040 172.4138 
Control Enhancing Mechanisms 0.3957 0.4891 0 0 1 
Controlling Blockholder Alone 0.5023 0.50 1 0 1 
      
Market Premium 0.7564 4.9939 1.05 -28.34 32.55 
Value Premium 0.3096 5.0322 0.54 -32.27 41.59 
Anti Self-Dealing Index 0.6978 0.2946 0.95 0.27 0.95 
      
 
Panel B1: Descriptive Statistics for Family Firms 
 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Median Min Max 
      
Company Stock Returns 0.9173 8.8634 0 -22.994 40 
Beta 0.280 0.377 0.239 -0.604 2.250 
      
Family Control Rights 39.0197 20.6947 35.0000 10.02 100 
Family Cash Flow Rights 35.8958 20.3465 31.1800 2.685 100 
      
Wedge 1.213 1.037 1 1 16.667 
Control Enhancing Mechanisms 0.308 0.462 0 0 1 
Controlling Blockholder Alone 0.576 0.495 1 0 1 
      
 
Panel B2: Descriptive Statistics for Non-Family Firms 
 
Variable Mean StandardDeviation Median Min Max 
      
Company Stock Returns 0.8011 8.3435 0 -23 40 
Beta 0.320 0.386 0.272 -1.471 2.431 
      
Wedge 2.053 6.549 1 0.704 172.414 
Control Enhancing Mechanisms 0.432 0.496 0 0 1 
Controlling Blockholder Alone 0.470 0.499 0 0 1 
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Panel C:  
Descriptive Statistics for Market Returns (denoted as “A”) and Value Premium (denoted as “B”) 
 
 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Median Min Max 
Finland       
(A) 1.484 9.388 1.22 -28.34 30.72 
(B) -0.286 11.517 -0.15 -31.96 41.59 
      
France       
(A) 0.851 5.288 1.46 -16.64 14.32 
(B) 0.264 5.052 0.64 -25.63 14.41 
      
Germany       
(A) 0.758 5.861 1.35 -24.06 19.14 
(B) 0.568 5.065 0.39 -18.16 13.22 
      
Italy       
(A) 0.976 6.571 0.91 -15.55 23.34 
(B) 0.332 4.726 0.63 -15.12 21.94 
      
Norway       
(A) 1.175 5.989 1.6 -25.47 14.42 
(B) 0.578 7.203 0.65 -26.41 30.81 
      
Sweden       
(A) 1.26 6.645 1.31 -16.08 32.55 
(B) 0.55 7.352 0.47 -32.27 23.17 
     
Switzerland     
(A) 1.016 4.435 1.76 -17.09 11.26 
(B) 0.204 5.163 0.13 -22.9 18.48 
      
UK       
(A) 0.601 3.848 0.88 -11.99 9.97 
(B) 0.295 3.645 0.58 -10.74 14.65 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Each Country in the Dataset A 
The table shows descriptive statistics for restock returns, beta and ownership structure for both family and non-family firms. All variables are described in 
Table I.  
 
    
Finland 
 
      
France 
  
            
Non-Family Firms Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Median Min Max  Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Median Min Max 
            
Company Stock Returns 1.11 8.738 0 -22.9943 40  0.9004 8.5618 0 -22.994 40 
Beta 0.1707 0.2208 0.1059 -0.1427 1.1995  0.4158 0.3665 0.3425 -0.4631 1.7097 
            
Wedge 1.7924 2.8265 1 1 19.5313  1.2517 0.8833 1 1 7.3801 
Control Enhancing Mechanisms 0.4187 0.4934 0 0 1  0.2291 0.4202 0 0 1 
Controlling Blockholder Alone 0.4078 0.4914 0 0 1  0.5616 0.4962 1 0 1 
            
Family Firms            
            
Company Stock Returns 1.2133 10.0049 0 -22.6667 38.8889  1.0148 8.7536 0 -22.994 39.9922 
Beta 0.1742 0.1474 0.1763 -0.0609 0.6102  0.304 0.2613 0.2671 -0.2055 1.0275 
            
Wedge 1.1964 0.2369 1.25 1 1.9775  1.0066 0.0404 1 1 1.3301 
Control Enhancing Mechanisms 0.599 0.4902 1 0 1  0.1866 0.3896 0 0 1 
Controlling Blockholder Alone 0.4205 0.4938 0 0 1  0.7060 0.4556 1 0 1 
            
Family Control Rights 35.3902 16.2743 32.06 12 65.57  49.7342 18.6278 50 12.4 97.12 
Family Cash Flow Rights 30.2682 14.9011 25.648 9.6 65.57  49.5466 18.7426 50 12.4 97.12 
Family MANAGER 0.5873 0.4925 1 0 1  0.6775 0.4675 1 0 1 
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Germany 
 
  
 
   
Italy 
  
            
Non-Family Firms Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Median Min Max 
 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Median Min Max 
            
Company Stock Returns 0.6334 8.8818 0 -22.9412 40  0.5264 7.951 0 -22.3315 39.37474 
Beta 0.3948 0.3335 0.3702 -1.047 1.3023  0.4733 0.3222 0.496 -0.01216 1.913167 
            
Wedge 2.2601 5.1477 1 1 31.5457  1.7301 2.1411 1 1 10.23541 
Wedge Dummy 0.3441 0.4751 0 0 1  0.4956 0.5001 0 0 1 
Controlling Blockholder Alone 0.5616 0.4962 1 0 1  0.6836 0.4652 1 0 1 
            
Family Firms            
            
Company Stock Returns 0.5879 9.4269 0 -22.9152 40  1.0351*** 8.9301 0 -22.4806 39.7661 
Beta 0.3204 0.327 0.2756 -0.3253 1.2023  0.6757 0.3616 0.6988 -0.2037 1.3189 
Idiosyncratic Risk -0.4537 9.3988 -1.0754 -25.5034 39.7503  -0.0178 8.908 -0.8682 -24.8537 38.711 
            
Wedge 1.2726 0.505 1 1 3.5224  2.0957 2.4372 1.0774 1 10.49318 
Control Enhancing Mechanisms 0.4001 0.4899 0 0 1  0.7259 0.4461 1 0 1 
Controlling Blockholder Alone 0.7060 0.4556 1 0 1  0.5494 0.4976 1 0 1 
            
Family Control Rights 53.8636 21.9796 53.53 11.93 100  46.7687 10.8723 47.54 28.17 65.76 
Family Cash Flow Rights 47.1702 23.2676 50 5.2358 100  37.9814 17.7028 40.98 2.685 65.76 
Family MANAGER 0.6015 0.4896 1 0 1  0.7934 0.4049 1 0 1 
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Norway 
 
      
Sweden 
  
            
Non-Family Firms Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Median Min Max  Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Median Min Max 
            
Company Stock Returns 1.2171 9.3159 0 -22.9508 40  1.4316 8.5968 0 -22.9167 39.94169 
Beta 0.5349 0.415 0.3912 -1.4637 2.4239  0.3761 0.2673 0.4685 -0.0442 0.932 
            
Wedge 5.203 19.7433 1 1 172.4138  2.7866 3.3884 1 0.703978 19.45525 
Control Enhancing Mechanisms 0.4622 0.4986 0 0 1  0.6243 0.4844 1 0 1 
Controlling Blockholder Alone 0.3811 0.4857 0 0 1  0.4208 0.4938 0 0 1 
            
Family Firms            
            
Company Stock Returns 1.4181 9.8977 0 -22.8571 40  1.9792** 10.5157 0 -22.5579 40 
Beta 0.5104 0.3287 0.5391 -0.0863 1.0482  0.4357 0.2674 0.4061 -0.0085 0.9108 
Idiosyncratic Risk 0.3361 9.8775 -0.7902 -24.2269 39.0772  0.8833 10.4682 -0.7767 -26.2802 38.2933 
            
Wedge 1.1606 0.2727 1 1 1.8591  1.4633 0.8335 1 1 3.1797 
Control Enhancing Mechanisms 0.3695 0.4828 0 0 1  0.4801 0.4998 0 0 1 
Controlling Blockholder Alone 0.3815 0.4859 0 0 1  0.4161 0.4931 0 0 1 
            
Family Control Rights 39.0141 16.2 43.47 10.02 69.4  37.3454 14.1415 31.1 12.1 59.6 
Family Cash Flow Rights 34.0992 13.9226 37.33 10.02 50.7  30.8863 16.9476 30.6 12.1 59.6 
Family Manager 0.6534 0.4761 1 0 1  0.8359 0.3705 1 0 1 
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Switzerland 
 
      
UK 
  
            
Non-Family Firms Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Median Min Max  Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Median Min Max 
            
Company Stock Returns 0.7069 6.4408 0 -22.9236 38.3085  0.7306 8.1363 0 -23 40 
Beta 0.322 0.3338 0.3384 -1.026 1.1515  0.2536 0.3498 0.2027 -0.7666 1.9283 
            
Wedge 1.4091 0.7843 1 1 3.5855  1.7978 2.4548 1 1 24.4499 
Control Enhancing Mechanisms 0.3704 0.483 0 0 1  0.5034 0.5 1 0 1 
Controlling Blockholder Alone 0.5726 0.4948 1 0 1  0.4255 0.4944 0 0 1 
            
Family Firms            
            
Company Stock Returns 1.1846*** 7.5246 0 -22.4084 36.579  0.8826*** 8.5965 0 -22.9885 40 
Beta 0.4489 0.3254 0.5346 -0.1195 0.8799  0.1709 0.3896 0.1121 -0.5993 2.2648 
Idiosyncratic Risk 0.0456 7.4795 -1.0255 -25.0439 34.695  -0.1373 8.5636 -1.0163 -26.6718 39.5743 
            
Wedge 3.5071 4.3417 2.2732 1 16.6667  1.0946 0.5983 1 1 9.3721 
Control Enhancing Mechanisms 0.9049 0.2934 1 0 1  0.2388 0.4263 0 0 1 
Controlling Blockholder Alone 0.5632 0.4961 1 0 1  0.5455 0.4979 1 0 1 
            
Family Control Rights 46.2158 27.5034 50.4 15.5 100  29.66825 16.45108 25.53 10.05 84.5 
Family Cash Flow Rights 22.1992 17.8659 16.9 3.846 66.101  28.34727 16.08202 24.22 4.9338 84.5 
Family Mananger 0.4513 0.4978 0 0 1  0.7236 0.4472 1 0 1 
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Table 4: Difference in Means: Family vs. Non-Family Firms 
 
For the whole dataset and each country, this table presents the results for difference in means test for (A) company stock performance, (B) wedge, (C) 
controlling blockholder alone, (D) control enhancing mechanisms between family and non-family. Family firms are indicated with FF while non-family 
firms are NFF. * indicates significance at one percent (***), five percent (**), ten percent (*) levels based on the t-statistic assuming unequal variance. 
 
 
  FF Mean 
NFF 
Mean 
Difference 
FF-NFF>0  
FF 
Mean 
NFF 
Mean 
 
Difference 
FF-NFF>0 
 
 FF Mean 
NFF 
Mean 
Difference 
FF-NFF>0 
 Overall Sample    Finland    France    
(A)  0.9173 0.8011 0.1162***  1.2133 1.11 0.1033  1.0148 0.9004 0.1144 
(B)  1.2132 2.0527*** -0.8396  1.1699 1.7446** -0.5748  1.0066 1.2401*** -0.2338 
(C)  0.5758 0.4704 0.1055***  0.4205 0.4078 0.01276  0.6740 0.6150 0.0590*** 
(D)  0.3076 0.4319*** -0.1248  0.5990 0.4187 0.1803***  0.1866 0.2291*** -0.0425 
 Germany    Italy    Norway    
(A)  0.5879 0.6334 -0.0455  1.0351 0.5264 0.5087***  1.4181 1.2171 0.201 
(B)  1.2700 2.1818** -0.9117  2.0202 1.6804 0.3398  1.1770 5.8557** -4.6788 
(C)  0.7059 0.5616 0.14434***  0.5494 0.6836*** -0.134221  0.3815 0.3811 0.00041 
(D)  0.4001 0.3342 0.0659***  0.7259 0.4956 0.2303***  0.3695 0.4622*** -0.0928 
 Sweden    Switzerland    UK    
(A)  1.9792 1.4316 0.5476**  1.1846 0.7069 0.4777***  0.8826 0.7306 0.152*** 
(B)  1.4171 2.9603*** -1.5432  3.4348 1.4603 1.9744*  1.0808 1.7770*** -0.6887 
(C)  0.4161 0.4208 -0.0047  0.3735 0.5726 -0.1991  0.5455 0.4255 0.1200 
(D)  0.4801 0.6243*** -0.1442  0.9049 0.3704 0.5344***  0.2388 0.5034*** -0.2646 
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Table 5: Performance-Attribution Regression 
Equal Weighted Portfolios Family vs Non-family Firms 
 
This table presents the coefficient and level of significance of the performance attribution 
regressions with robust standard errors for the entire sample and for each country. These 
regressions are based on 179 observations, one for each month in 15 years time period 
between February 1992 and December 2006. Alpha is the abnormal return. RMRF is the 
value-weighted market return minus the risk free rate. HML is Fama and French value factor. 
The p-values are below each coefficient. Panel A shows results for the entire dataset. Panel B 
shows the results for Italy, Sweden, Switzerland and the U.K. Panel B shows the results for 
Finland, France and Germany and Norway.  
 
 
 
Panel A: Results From the Entire Sample 
 
Country Excess Return R2 Alpha RMRF HML 
 
 
Family- Risk Free Rate 0.0101 1.1199 0.0058 0.0703 
   (0.0000) (0.7970) (0.0020) 
      
All Sample Non- Family- Risk Free Rate 0.0190 0.8561 0.0151 0.0747 
   (0.0000) (0.3890) (0.0000) 
      
 Family – Non- Family 0.0003 0.2638 -0.0093 -0.0044 
   (0.0060) (0.5870) (0.8250) 
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Panel B: Results for Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, UK 
 
Country Excess Return R2 Alpha RMRF HML 
  
  Family- Risk Free Rate 0.0229 0.9043 -0.0252 0.1683 
   (0.0260) (0.6890) (0.0340) 
      
Italy  Non- Family- Risk Free Rate 0.0277 0.4339 -0.0237 0.1574 
   (0.2040) (0.6670) (0.0280) 
      
 Family – Non- Family 0.0004 0.4704 -0.0015 0.0109 
     (0.0250) (0.9580) (0.8010) 
            
 
  Family- Risk Free Rate 0.0021 2.0402 -0.0252 0.0248 
   (0.0000) (0.7520) (0.7340) 
      
Sweden  Non- Family- Risk Free Rate 0.0051 1.4505 -0.0040 0.0406 
   (0.0000) (0.9480) (0.3810) 
      
 Family – Non- Family 0.0015 0.5898 -0.0213 -0.0159 
   (0.0730) (0.6220) (0.7860) 
            
 
  Family- Risk Free Rate 0.0609 1.0460 0.0566 0.1551 
   (0.0000) (0.4610) (0.0140) 
      
Switzerland  Non- Family- Risk Free Rate 0.0501 0.6110 0.0523 0.0717 
   (0.0010) (0.2580) (0.0480) 
      
 Family – Non- Family 0.0263 0.4350 0.0042 0.0834 
   (0.0340) (0.9290) (0.0640) 
            
 
  Family- Risk Free Rate 0.0131 0.8866 -0.0776 0.0238 
   (0.0000) (0.2130) (0.6860) 
      
UK  Non- Family- Risk Free Rate 0.0087 0.7122 -0.0636 0.0206 
   (0.0010) (0.2840) (0.7730) 
      
 Family – Non- Family 0.0018 0.1744 -0.0140 0.0032 
      (0.0940) (0.6500) (0.9030) 
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Panel C: Results for Finland, France, Germany, Norway 
 
Country Excess Return R2 Alpha RMRF HML 
 
  Family- Risk Free Rate 0.0026 1.3579 -0.0253 0.0098 
   (0.006) (0.7330) (0.8750) 
      
Finland  Non- Family- Risk Free Rate 0.0148 1.3419 -0.0302 0.0238 
   (0.0000) (0.470) (0.5330) 
      
 Family – Non- Family 0.0007 0.0159 0.0049 -0.0139 
   (0.9770) (0.9530) (0.8450) 
            
 
  Family- Risk Free Rate 0.0197 0.9450 -0.0117 0.0901 
   (0.0000) (0.8060) (0.0450) 
      
France  Non- Family- Risk Free Rate 0.0391 0.7713 0.034 0.1109 
   (0.0010) (0.4470) (0.0060) 
      
 Family – Non- Family 0.0318 0.1737 -0.0457 -0.0208 
   (0.1620) (0.0580) (0.3890) 
            
 
  Family- Risk Free Rate 0.0087 0.4944 0.0089 0.0554 
   (0.0330) (0.8290) (0.2840) 
      
Germany  Non- Family- Risk Free Rate 0.0061 0.5268 0.0295 0.03004 
   (0.0180) (0.4280) (0.5310) 
      
 Family – Non- Family 0.0109 -0.0325 -0.0207 0.0254 
      (0.8070) (0.3390) (0.3880) 
 
  Family- Risk Free Rate 0.0383 1.3715 -0.0175 0.137 
   (0.0010) (0.7480) (0.0160) 
      
Norway  Non- Family- Risk Free Rate 0.0866 1.0719 0.0234 0.1491 
   (0.000) (0.6140) (0.0010) 
      
 Family – Non- Family 0.0058 0.2996 -0.0409 -0.0121 
   (0.2980) (0.3650) (0.7940) 
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Table 6: Market Risk and Risk-Adjusted Returns 
 
This Table shows the results from the difference in means tests for the Sharpe Ratio, Beta, 
and Treynor Ratio. The Sharpe Ratio, Beta and Treynor Ratio are obtained for the portfolio 
made up of family firms and a portfolio made up of non-family firms. Beta is corrected for 
thin trading. The results are shown for the entire dataset and for countries with low minority 
protection. Family firms are indicated with FF while non-family firms are NFF. P-values for 
the difference between FF and NFF are in parenthesis. * indicates significance of one percent 
(***), five percent (**), ten percent (*) levels based on the t-statistic assuming unequal 
variance 
 
 
Country 
 
 Sharpe Ratio Beta 
Treynor 
Ratio 
       
All Sample     
     
 Family Firms 0.0887 0.3805 2.8074 
 Non-family Firms 0.0691 0.3783 1.7175 
 Difference FF-NFF>0 0.0195 0.0067 1.0899* 
    (0.1387) (0.1102) (0.0908) 
    
Countries with LOW Anti Self-Dealing Index    
    
 Family Firms 0.0685 0.3645 24.5952 
 Non-family Firms 0.0583 0.3997 0.6412 
 Difference FF-NFF>0 0.1020* -0.0351 23.9540 
    (0.0583) (1.0000) (0.1581) 
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Table 7: Market Risk and Risk-Adjusted Returns by Country 
 
For each country this table presents the results for difference in means test for Sharpe ratio, 
Beta and Treynor Ratio between family and non-family firms. Family firms are indicated 
with FF while non-family firms are NFF. P-values for the difference between FF and NFF 
are in parenthesis. * indicates significance of one percent (***), five percent (**), ten percent 
(*) levels based on the t-statistic assuming unequal variance. 
 
Country 
  
Sharpe 
Ratio Beta 
Treynor 
Ratio 
Finland     
 Family Firms 0.0993 0.1567 8.8416 
 Non-family Firms 0.1180 0.1753*** 5.2658 
 Difference FF-NFF>0 -0.0186 -0.0185 3.5757 
    (0.6204) (1.000) (0.2737) 
France     
 Family Firms 0.0741 0.3113 2.0067 
 Non-family Firms 0.0604 0.4259*** 1.1201 
 Difference FF-NFF>0 0.0137 -0.1146 0.8866 
    (0.3665) (1.000) (0.1789) 
Germany     
 Family Firms 0.0250 0.3289 0.6817 
 Non-family Firms 0.0304 0.4063*** 0.6196 
 Difference FF-NFF>0 -0.0054 -0.0774 0.0620 
    (0.5610) (1.000) (0.4719) 
Italy     
 Family Firms 0.0553 0.6845 0.6909 
 Non-family Firms 0.0040 0.4893 0.0506 
 Difference FF-NFF>0 0.0512 0.1951*** 0.6403 
    (0.2070) (0.000) (0.2399) 
Norway     
 Family Firms 0.1048 0.5361 1.8472 
 Non-family Firms 0.0866 0.5638*** 1.3230 
 Difference FF-NFF>0 0.0182 -0.0277 0.5242 
    (0.3647) (1.000) (0.2815) 
Sweden     
 Family Firms 0.1668 0.4376 3.7267 
 Non-family Firms 0.1336 0.3823 2.8716 
 Difference FF-NFF>0 0.0332 0.0552*** 0.8551 
    (0.2915) (0.000) (0.2605) 
Switzerland     
 Family Firms 0.1302 0.4533 2.0227 
 Non-family Firms 0.0848 0.3283 1.4449 
 Difference FF-NFF>0 0.0454 0.1249*** 0.5777 
    (0.1854) (0.000) (0.2441) 
UK     
 Family Firms 0.0542 0.1681 2.7427 
 Non-family Firms 0.0353 0.2550*** 1.0441 
 Difference FF-NFF>0 0.0189 -0.0868 1.6985 
    (0.2927) (1.000) (0.1321) 
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Table 8: Family Ownership and Control 
 
This table provides the estimates of a panel regression model with country fixed effect for 1,565 firms in European countries. The dependent variable is the 
Company Stock Return as defined in Table 1. Standard errors are robust. The p-values appear in parentheses below parameter estimates. 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Family Dummy 0.1465 0.1542 0.1533  0.1059 0.1173 0.1173  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)  
Family Control Rights    0.0032    0.0017 
    (0.000)    (0.041) 
         
Control Enhancing Mechanisms -0.0087  -0.0114  0.0021  -0.0003  
 (0.803)  (0.756)  (0.951)  (0.993)  
Controlling Blockholder Alone  0.0020 0.0024   -0.0268 -0.0268  
  (0.954) (0.947)   (0.446) (0.446)  
Wedge    0.0036    0.0057 
    (0.239)    (0.062) 
Anti Self-Dealing     -0.2022 -0.2025 -0.2025 -0.2467 
     (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
         
         
Country Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES NO NO NO NO 
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
         
Number of Observations 249,876 238,710 238,710 212,118 249,876 238,710 238,710 212,118 
R2 0.0047 0.0048 0.0048 0.0046 0.0047 0.0048 0.0048 0.0047 
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Table 9: Family Ownership, Family Management and Control 
 
This table provides the estimates of a panel regression model with country fixed effect for 
1,565 firms in European countries. The dependent variable is the Company Stock Return as 
defined in Table 1. Standard errors are robust. The p-values appear in parentheses below 
parameter estimates. 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Family Manager 0.2459 0.2500 0.2088 0.2212 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Control Enhancing Mechanisms  -0.0125 0.0038 0.0003 
  (0.729) (0.912) (0.992) 
Controlling Blockholder Alone  -0.004  -0.0352 
  (0.892)  (0.316) 
Wedge     
     
Anti Self-Dealing   -0.1990 -0.2015 
   (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Country Fixed Effect YES YES NO NO 
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES 
     
Number of Observations 249,876 238,710 249,876 238,710 
R2 0.0047 0.0048 0.0047 0.0048 
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Table 10: Agency Costs and Returns in Family Firms 
 
This table presents the results of a difference in means test between family firms with 
different agency costs. I divided the entire dataset with respect to the minority shareholders 
protection law, the enforcement of which is measure Anti-Self dealing Index (see Table I for 
details). Panel A shows results for the U.K. (country with high Anti Self-Dealing Index) and 
Panel B shows the results for countries with low Anti Self-Dealing Index. The top number in 
each cell is the mean of Company Stock Returns, and the bottom number is the number of 
monthly-observations for each group (in square brackets).The presence of classic agency 
cost is measured by the absence of a family-manager in the firm. The presence of agency 
cost of control is measured by the sum of two dummy variables: a dummy that equals one 
when there are control-enhancing mechanisms that lead family vote holdings to exceed 
family shareholdings and a dummy variable equal 1 if the family is a controlling owner 
alone. A controlling shareholder is said to be “alone” if no other owner controls at least 10% 
of the voting rights. P-values are in parenthesis. * indicates significance of one percent (***), 
five percent (**), ten percent (*) levels based on the t-statistic assuming unequal variance.  
 
 
 
Panel A: Country with HIGH Anti-Self Dealing Index-UK 
 
  
  
 
Agency Cost Of Control 
 
 
  
 
NO 
 
 
LOW 
 
 
HIGH 
 
 
 
NO 
 
0.97047 
[7,538] 
1.1310 
[11,731] 
1.0881 
[3,588] 
1.0713 
[22,857] 
     
 
Classic Agency 
Cost 
 
 
YES 
 
0.45152 
[3,628] 
0.7653 
[4,230] 
0.3960 
[872] 
0.59805 
[8,730] 
      
Difference 
t-test  
0.5189*** 
(0.0025) 
 
0.3656*** 
(0.0095) 
 
0.6921** 
(0.0189) 
 
0.4733*** 
(0.0000) 
 
      
 
Panel B: Countries with LOW Anti-Self Dealing Index 
 
 
NO 
 
1.168 
[4,016] 
0.9028 
[13,072] 
0.9146 
[5,153] 
0.9535 
[22,241] 
     
 
Classic Agency 
Cost 
 
 
YES 
 
1.0183 
[3,053] 
0.8292 
[6,681] 
1.0968 
[2,160] 
0.9263 
[11,894] 
      
Difference 
t-test  
0.14988 
(0.2385) 
 
0.07359 
(0.2942) 
 
-0.1821 
(0.7723) 
 
0.02712 
(0.3964) 
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Table 11: Agency Costs and Risk-Adjusted Performance in Family Firms 
 
This table presents the results of a difference in means test between family firms with 
different agency cost. I divided the entire dataset with respect to the minority shareholders 
protection law, the enforcement of which is measure Anti-Self dealing Index (see Table I for 
details). Panel A shows results for the U.K. (country with high Anti Self-Dealing Index) and 
Panel B shows the results for countries with low Anti Self-Dealing Index. In each panel I 
first analyze the Sharpe Ratio and then the Treynor Ratio. The presence of classic agency 
cost is measured by the absence of a family-manager in the firm. The presence of agency 
cost of control is measured by the sum of two dummy variables: a dummy that equals one 
when there are control-enhancing mechanisms that lead family vote holdings to exceed 
family shareholdings and a dummy variable equal 1 if the family is a controlling owner 
alone. A controlling shareholder is said to be “alone” if no other owner controls at least 10% 
of the voting rights. P-values are in parenthesis. * indicates significance of one percent (***), 
five percent (**), ten percent (*) levels based on the t-statistic assuming unequal variance.  
 
 
 
Panel A : Country with HIGH Anti-Self Dealing Index-UK 
 
 
Sharpe Ratio 
 
  
  
 
Agency Cost Of Control 
 
 
  
 
NO 
 
 
LOW 
 
 
HIGH 
 
 
 
NO 
 
0.0632 0.0782 0.0702 0.0722  
Classic Agency 
Cost 
 
 
YES 
 
0.0039 0.0434 -0.0135 0.0199 
      
Difference 
t-test  
0.0593* 
(0.0630) 
0.03480 
(0.1824) 
0.0838* 
(0.0533) 
0.0531* 
(0.0684) 
      
 
Treynor Ratio 
 
 
NO 
 
-2.7631 2.9686 2.5972 3.2094  
Classic Agency 
Cost 
 
 
YES 
 
0.0591 3.7148 -3.4009 1.2422 
      
Difference 
t-test  
-2.82 
(0.6183) 
-0.7461 
(0.5870) 
5.9981 
(0.1966) 
1.9671 
(0.1654) 
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Panel B : Countries with LOW Anti-Self Dealing Index 
 
 
 
Sharpe Ratio 
 
  
  
 
Agency Cost Of Control 
 
 
  
 
NO 
 
 
LOW 
 
 
HIGH 
 
 
 
NO 
 
0.0976 0.0603 0.0636 0.0678  
Classic Agency 
Cost 
 
 
YES 
 
0.0801 0.0554 0.0839 0.0669 
      
Difference 
t-test  
0.0174 
(0.2338) 
0.0048 
(0.3728) 
-.00203 
(0.7848) 
0.0008 
(0.4699) 
      
 
Treynor Ratio 
 
 
NO 
 
2.8049 1.3479 1.0185 1.4533  
Classic Agency 
Cost 
 
 
YES 
 
2.6452 1.1527 2.1457 1.6116 
      
Difference 
t-test  
0.1596 
(0.0.4530) 
0.1952 
(0.4131) 
-1.1271 
(0.8575) 
-0.1585 
(0.5699) 
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Table 12: Performance Attribution Regression 
Results of Equal-Weighted Portfolios of Family Firms 
 
This table presents the coefficient and level of significance of the performance attribution 
regressions with robust standard errors. I divided the entire dataset with respect to the 
minority shareholders protection law, the enforcement of which is measure Anti-Self dealing 
Index (see Table I for details). Panel A shows results for the U.K. (country with high Anti 
Self-Dealing Index) and Panel B shows the results for countries with low Anti Self-Dealing 
Index. These regressions are based on 179 observations, one for each month in 15 years time 
period between February 1992 and December 2006. Alpha is the abnormal return. RMRF is 
the value-weighted market return minus the risk free rate. HML is Fama and French value 
factor. Panel A shows the results for UK. Panel B shows the results for countries with low 
Anti Self- Dealing Index. FF indicates Family Firms. Following Villalonga and Amit (2006), 
ACI means classic agency cost, ACII means agency cost of control. The p-values appear in 
below parameter estimates. 
 
 
Panel A: Country with HIGH Anti-Self Dealing Index – UK 
         
Excess Return R2 Alpha RMRF HML 
     
FF WITHACII – FF NOACII 0.0143 1.8027 -0.1945 0.0422 
  0.0140 0.1810 0.7900 
     
FF WITH ACII and ACI- FF NO ACII and ACI  0.0110 1.1537 -0.1073 0.0358 
  0.0050 0.2540 0.7380 
     
FF with Family Manager- FF with no Family Manager  0.0200 0.4855 -0.0872 -0.0454 
  0.0000 0.1570 0.0950 
 
Panel B: Countries with LOW Anti-Self Dealing Index  
     
Excess Return R2 Alpha RMRF HML 
     
FF WITH ACII - FF NOACII 0.0019 1.8976 0.0113 0.3720 
  0.0000 0.9000 0.0030 
     
FF WITH ACII and NO ACI - FF NOACII and NO ACI  0.0027 1.0317 0.0274 0.1862 
  0.0840 0.6560 0.0050 
     
FF WITH ACII and ACI - FF NO ACII and ACI  0.0008 0.8659 -0.0303 0.1858 
  0.0050 0.7300 0.012 
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Table 13: Family Ownership and Institutional Blockholders 
 
This table provides the estimates of a panel regression model with country fixed effect for 
1,565 firms in European countries. The dependent variable is the Company Stock Return as 
defined in Table 1. Standard errors are robust. The p-values appear in parentheses below 
parameter estimates. 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Family Dummy 0.1478   0.0851 
 (0.000)   (0.065) 
Institutional Blockholder Dummy  -0.1316  -0.1296 
  (0.006)  (0.015) 
Unlisted Company   -0.1025 -0.0874 
   (0.008) (0.056) 
     
Country Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES 
     
Number of Observations 249,989 249,989 249,989 249,989 
R2 0.0046 0.0046 0.0046 0.0047 
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Table 14: Performance-Attribution Regression Of Closely-held Firms 
Family vs Non-family Blockholders 
 
This table presents the coefficient and level of significance of the performance attribution 
regressions with robust standard errors for the entire sample. These regressions are based on 179 
observations, one for each month in 15 years time period between February 1992 and December 
2006. Alpha is the abnormal return. RMRF is the value-weighted market return minus the risk 
free rate. HML is Fama and French value factor. 
 
 
Excess Return R2 Alpha RMRF HML 
     
Family – Institutional and Unlisted Ultimate Blockholder 0.0023 0.3287 -0.0252 0.0013 
  (0.000) (0.126) (0.942) 
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Table 15: Descriptive Statistics for Dataset B 
 
The Table shows descriptive statistics of the main variables for 2,048 non-financial firms 
DATASET B. Panel A shows the decomposition of the number of firms in the dataset by the 
country of incorporation, also distinguishing between family and non-family. For each country 
monthly stock returns and accounting data has been collected from February 1992 to December 
2006. Panel A also shows the number of family firms with a family manager. Panel B of this 
Table present the statistic descriptive for the main variables in the entire dataset. Panel C 
presents the statistic descriptive for the main variables in each country in the dataset. Moreover, 
for both the entire dataset and each country this Table gives the results for a difference in means 
test for Company Stock Returns between family and non-family. Family firms are indicated with 
FF while non-family firms are NFF. Values are calculated as the cross-sectional mean of firm 
time-series averages over the period 1992-2006. * indicates significance at one percent (***), 
five percent (**), ten percent (*) levels based on the t-statistic assuming unequal variance. 
 
 
 
Panel A: Countries and  Number Of Observations 
 
Country Number 
Of 
Firms 
Number 
of 
Family 
Firms 
Number 
of 
Non 
Family 
Firms 
Family 
with 
Family 
Manager 
Monthly 
Observations 
Non-Family 
Firms 
Monthly 
Observations 
Family Firms 
       
Austria 82 46 36 17 5,766 4,094 
France 428 158 270 74 19,502 32,649 
Germany 464 174 290 105 22,722 33,498 
Italy 261 69 192 127 8,240 21,243 
Netherlands 170 78 92 56 10,818 12,916 
Spain 131 45 86 53 6,552 12,017 
Sweden 262 88 174 133 10,705 19,070 
Switzerland 250 94 156 124 13,961 19,181 
       
Total 2,048 752 1,296 689 98,266 154,668 
        
 
Does Ownership Matter For Returns and Returns Volatility? 
 153
 
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics and Difference in Means Test – All Sample 
 
  Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Median Min Max 
       
Company Stock Returns NFF 0.66 10.42 0.00 -47.91 47.99 
 FF 0.92*** 11.15 0.60 -48.00 48.68 
       
BETA NFF 0.720 0.536 0.655 -2.804 5.063 
 FF 0.658 0.595 0.546 -5.405 5.146 
       
Idiosyncratic Risk NFF 10.657 3.881 10.053 0.557 25.910 
 FF 11.174 4.178 10.743 1.103 28.342 
       
Operating Margin NFF -4.287 223.593 0.054 -17651.330 358.660 
 FF -1.717 32.352 0.046 -1573.500 214.542 
       
Book-to-Market (ln) NFF 0.762 1.185 0.623 -4.479 6.062 
 FF 0.543 1.115 0.512 -6.635 7.439 
       
Market Value (ln) NFF 12.840 2.253 12.732 6.138 19.205 
 FF 11.634 1.896 11.513 4.543 17.853 
       
Leverage NFF 0.244 0.493 0.107 0.000 5.604 
 FF 0.375 7.675 0.079 0.000 601.400 
       
Total Assets (ln)  NFF 13.534 2.640 13.327 4.852 21.169 
 FF 12.110 2.109 11.928 1.609 18.997 
       
Sales/Total Asset (%) NFF 0.956 0.801 0.886 -0.194 18.720 
 FF 0.919 0.881 0.813 -2.392 16.590 
       
Dividend Yield NFF 0.031 0.752 0.015 0.000 66.074 
 FF 0.034 0.912 0.012 0.000 95.521 
 
 
Does Ownership Matter For Returns and Returns Volatility? 
 154
 
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics and Difference in Means Test - By Country 
    Austria 
 
     
 
France 
  
  Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Median Min Max   Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Median Min Max 
              
Company Stock  NFF 0.62 9.19 0.19 -47.17 47.14  0.49 11.19 0.00 -47.86 47.76 
Returns FF 1.49*** 9.11 1.03 -44.67 46.33  0.41 11.82 0.00 -48.00 47.98 
             
BETA NFF 0.69 0.49 0.71 -0.01 2.70  0.61 0.62 0.46 -0.74 3.18 
 FF 0.57 0.47 0.56 -1.59 2.60  0.57 0.68 0.37 -4.72 3.62 
             
Idiosyncratic Risk NFF 8.74 4.02 8.81 0.56 20.73  11.11 4.12 10.46 3.68 23.45 
 FF 8.58 4.03 8.28 1.10 16.72  11.73 4.03 11.12 3.25 28.34 
             
Operating Margin NFF 0.02 0.33 0.04 -4.49 2.54  0.004 0.92 0.04 -29.72 1.32 
 FF -0.29 4.68 0.04 -78.69 1.59  -0.12 2.50 0.05 -82.21 13.82 
             
Book-to-Market (ln) NFF 1.25 1.26 1.07 -2.99 5.58  0.74 1.14 0.64 -2.66 4.06 
 FF 0.57 1.03 0.73 -3.14 5.51  0.59 1.08 0.59 -4.09 4.74 
             
Market  
Capitalization 
NFF 866,113 2,015,951 254,155 2,469 17,500,000  2,411,644 9,024,785 138,894 
463 135,000,000 
 FF 309,261 550,421 75,000 953 3,685,218  966,114 4,109,434 64,057 363 56,700,000 
             
Leverage NFF 0.16 0.15 0.12 0.00 0.77  0.12 0.13 0.09 0.00 0.86 
 FF 0.11 0.13 0.07 0.00 0.52  0.12 0.19 0.07 0.00 5.47 
             
Total Assets  NFF 6,324,449 22,800,000 869,760 1,675 198,000,000  17,300,000 95,700,000 210,964 1,288 1,490,000,000 
 FF 600,329 1,088,614 116,591 133 5,999,714  1,372,002 4,047,535 111,944 36 37,300,000 
             
Sales/Total Asset (%) NFF 0.77 0.62 0.77 0.02 3.81  0.96 0.67 0.94 -0.19 4.86 
 FF 0.61 0.58 0.43 -0.72 2.74  0.98 0.78 0.94 -0.65 16.59 
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    Germany 
 
     
 
Italy 
  
  Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Median Min Max   Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Median Min Max 
              
Company Stock  NFF 0.30 11.04 0.00 -47.84 47.92  0.62 9.47 0.06 -44.77 47.63 
Returns FF 0.41 12.00 0.30 -47.98 48.68  1.10*** 10.28 0.50 -47.01 48.20 
             
BETA NFF 0.74 0.56 0.64 -0.24 3.78  0.86 0.39 0.82 -0.31 2.05 
 FF 0.61 0.64 0.45 -1.90 3.37  0.88 0.50 0.82 -5.40 4.54 
             
Idiosyncratic Risk NFF 11.36 4.13 10.44 3.25 25.91  10.73 2.69 10.89 3.54 15.42 
 FF 11.84 4.71 11.29 2.54 28.16  11.40 2.77 11.27 2.72 21.24 
             
Operating Margin NFF -0.04 1.03 0.03 -19.53 46.41  0.04 0.28 0.06 -5.60 0.81 
 FF -0.38 10.58 0.01 -483.00 214.54  -0.24 6.19 0.04 -247.38 1.89 
             
Book-to-Market (ln) NFF 0.80 1.21 0.71 -4.48 4.65  1.31 1.16 1.29 -2.29 4.88 
 FF 0.45 1.14 0.40 -4.48 4.78  0.86 1.06 0.77 -3.47 5.23 
             
Market  
Capitalization 
NFF 4,084,912 11,800,000 331,500 525 215,000,000  4,891,160 11,800,000 555,318 
4,524 103,000,000 
 FF 290,730 861,906 59,991 94 15,800,000  906,483 1,845,227 221,387 934 18,400,000 
             
Leverage (%) NFF 0.12 0.13 0.07 0.00 0.84  0.12 0.11 0.10 0.00 0.66 
 FF 0.10 0.14 0.04 0.00 1.03  0.11 0.11 0.08 0.00 1.18 
             
Total Assets  NFF 28,600,000 108,000,000 550,319 512 1,300,000,000  27,100,000 68,200,000 1,900,461 10,484 923,000,000 
 FF 1,023,994 4,414,854 90,946 27 49,600,000  4,258,604 15,400,000 449,228 1,662 178,000,000 
             
Sales/Total Asset (%) NFF 1.04 0.91 0.95 0.00 18.72  0.52 0.44 0.43 0.02 2.97 
 FF 1.05 0.91 0.94 -0.02 10.45  0.61 0.46 0.60 -0.04 4.10 
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    Netherlands       Spain   
  Mean Standard Deviation 
Median Min Max  Mean Standard Deviation 
Median Min Max 
             
Company Stock  NFF 0.90 10.08 0.44 -47.90 47.62  1.45 8.77 0.43 -42.86 47.37 
Returns FF 1.17** 10.03 0.86 -47.72 47.76  1.85*** 9.62 1.03 -47.21 47.84 
             
BETA NFF 0.84 0.51 0.75 -2.80 2.21  0.62 0.46 0.68 -0.40 2.40 
 FF 0.73 0.51 0.69 -0.43 2.62  0.53 0.38 0.51 -0.48 1.72 
             
Idiosyncratic Risk NFF 10.39 3.42 9.99 5.71 19.73  9.29 2.11 9.45 4.08 13.64 
 FF 9.82 4.34 9.10 1.48 21.35  9.76 2.92 9.57 3.38 20.03 
             
Operating Margin NFF 0.09 0.67 0.06 -4.77 17.16  0.05 0.42 0.08 -5.19 0.81 
 FF 0.04 2.79 0.05 -48.42 41.58  -0.07 1.97 0.06 -50.50 1.15 
             
Book-to-Market (ln) NFF 0.40 0.97 0.33 -3.11 3.62  0.73 0.88 0.63 -1.79 2.93 
 FF 0.27 1.02 0.26 -6.64 3.98  0.70 0.98 0.67 -2.45 3.68 
             
Market  
Capitalization 
NFF 
7,357,201 24,200,000 462,404 787 219,000,000  5,383,722 12,400,000 961,516 4,103 89,300,000 
 FF 1,051,543 2,229,702 169,868 1,093 15,500,000  945,520 1,954,644 187,623 2,578 15,000,000 
             
Leverage (%) NFF 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.00 0.95  0.12 0.12 0.09 0.00 0.49 
 FF 1.50 27.11 0.05 0.00 601.40  0.11 0.13 0.07 0.00 1.31 
             
Total Assets  NFF 26,600,000 114,000,000 602,566 492 1,370,000,000  20,500,000 75,400,000 1,604,236 13,358 946,000,000 
 FF 1,165,647 2,190,973 235,238 5 17,200,000  3,189,879 10,100,000 340,029 4,175 103,000,000 
             
Sales/Total Asset (%) NFF 1.45 1.03 1.27 0.00 7.00  0.56 0.44 0.41 0.00 2.38 
 FF 1.23 1.25 1.01 -0.21 16.39  0.63 0.50 0.61 0.00 3.56 
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    Sweden       Switzerland   
  Mean Standard Deviation 
Median Min Max  Mean Standard Deviation 
Median Min Max 
             
Company Stock NFF 0.71 12.18 0.00 -47.91 47.95  0.95 8.64 0.31 -47.06 47.99 
Returns FF 1.10*** 12.79 0.86 -47.44 48.09  1.40*** 9.42 0.86 -47.85 47.69 
             
BETA NFF 0.67 0.49 0.53 -0.09 2.26  0.72 0.44 0.69 -1.51 5.06 
 FF 0.64 0.48 0.54 -0.61 5.15  0.65 0.58 0.47 -2.89 4.24 
             
Idiosyncratic Risk NFF 12.29 3.82 11.05 4.99 23.22  8.64 2.79 8.58 0.56 19.22 
 FF 12.65 3.88 11.76 5.23 23.65  8.95 3.73 8.83 2.07 21.27 
             
Operating Margin NFF -17.42 390.26 0.43 -17651.33 358.66  -5.82 196.19 0.10 -6475.07 8.90 
 FF -9.90 74.52 0.29 -1573.50 158.59  -2.39 51.32 0.09 -1502.65 81.33 
             
Book-to-Market (ln) NFF 0.20 1.07 0.15 -2.98 5.12  0.91 1.28 0.71 -2.45 6.06 
 FF 0.12 1.04 0.13 -4.98 9.55  0.78 1.24 0.64 -2.99 7.44 
             
Market  
Capitalization NFF 2,665,204 7,732,800 289,056 1,003 126,000,000  5,626,220 17,900,000 414,339 10,081 132,000,000 
 FF 432,688 1,289,248 72,514 227 14,000,000  673,244 1,944,165 157,441 885 39,700,000 
             
Leverage (%) NFF 1.12 1.11 0.92 0.00 5.60  0.22 0.19 0.19 0.00 1.00 
 FF 1.24 1.48 0.60 0.00 8.25  0.23 0.23 0.17 0.00 1.43 
             
Total Assets  NFF ,589,528 34,600,000 327,947 128 384,000,000  24,900,000 118,000,000 1,115,643 6,704 1,560,000,000 
 FF 1,275,033 9,440,679 80,647 476 154,000,000  2,220,481 7,214,681 276,234 1,826 103,000,000 
             
Sales/Total Asset (%) NFF 1.08 0.68 1.05 -0.02 3.59  0.84 0.73 0.79 -0.19 4.96 
 FF 1.10 1.14 1.03 -0.58 13.53  0.74 0.73 0.72 -2.39 5.28 
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Table 16: Performance-Attribution Regression 
Equal Weighted Portfolios Family vs Non-family Firms 
 
This table presents the coefficient and level of significance of the performance attribution 
regressions with robust standard errors for the entire sample and for each country. These 
regressions are based on 179 observations, one for each month in 15 years time period between 
February 1992 and December 2006. Alpha is the abnormal return. RMRF is the value-weighted 
market return minus the risk free rate. HML is Fama and French value factor. P-values are below 
each coefficient. Panel A shows results for the entire dataset. Panel B shows results for Austria, 
Italy Netherlands, Spain Sweden and Switzerland. Panel C shows results for France and 
Germany. 
 
 
Panel A: Results From the Entire Sample 
 
Country Excess Return R2 Alpha RMRF HML 
      
  Family- Risk Free Rate 0.0118 0.7804 0.0662 0.0533 
   0.0000 0.0160 0.0500 
      
All Sample Non- Family- Risk Free Rate 0.0143 0.4031 0.0699 0.0694 
   0.0020 0.0090 0.0130 
      
 Family - Non- Family 0.0020 0.3766 -0.0032 -0.0153 
     0.0000 0.7640 0.1880 
     0.2600 0.5340 0.7670 
 
 
Panel B: Results From  Austria, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland 
 
Country Excess Return R2 Alpha RMRF HML 
      
  Family- Risk Free Rate 0.0484 0.9792 0.1162 -0.1173 
   0.0000 0.0580 0.0520 
      
Austria  Non- Family- Risk Free Rate 0.0434 0.1967 0.1434 -0.0865 
   0.4680 0.0290 0.1850 
      
 Family - Non- Family 0.0075 0.7760 -0.0272 -0.0308 
     0.0000 0.4670 0.3770 
        
  Family- Risk Free Rate 0.0339 0.5997 -0.0031 0.2318 
   0.1770 0.9650 0.0120 
      
Italy  Non- Family- Risk Free Rate 0.0456 0.1277 -0.0330 0.2669 
   0.7710 0.6190 0.0020 
      
 Family - Non- Family 0.0192 0.4719 0.0303 -0.0351 
     0.0000 0.2230 0.2990 
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  Family- Risk Free Rate 0.0102 1.1478 0.0797 0.0122 
   0.0000 0.3250 0.8490 
      
Netherlands  Non- Family- Risk Free Rate 0.0132 0.9057 0.1085 -0.0167 
   0.0100 0.2010 0.8120 
      
 Family - Non- Family 0.015 0.2420 -0.0288 0.0289 
     0.0420 0.1670 0.140 
      
  Family- Risk Free Rate 0.0085 1.2739 0.0485 0.0869 
   0.0010 0.5180 0.4850 
      
Spain  Non- Family- Risk Free Rate 0.0134 0.8531 0.0788 0.0846 
   0.0150 0.2610 0.4820 
      
 Family - Non- Family 0.0066 0.4208 -0.0303 0.0022 
     0.0130 0.3130 0.9610 
      
  Family- Risk Free Rate 0.0090 1.0175 0.0810 0.0101 
   0.0270 0.3460 0.8730 
      
Sweden  Non- Family- Risk Free Rate 0.0143 0.4196 0.1000 0.0439 
   0.3820 0.1750 0.4600 
      
 Family - Non- Family 0.0122 0.5979 -0.0193 0.0337 
     0.0020 0.5670 0.2920 
      
  Family- Risk Free Rate 0.0622 1.1572 0.0694 0.1558 
   0.0000 0.3840 0.0170 
      
Switzerland  Non- Family- Risk Free Rate 0.0768 0.6922 0.0484 0.2049 
   0.0260 0.5910 0.0020 
      
 Family - Non- Family 0.0244 0.455 0.0211 -0.0491 
     0.0000 0.4830 0.0270 
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Panel C: Results From France and Germany 
 
Country Excess Return R2 Alpha RMRF HML 
      
  Family- Risk Free Rate 0.0176 0.0516 0.0433 0.0813 
   0.8550 0.488 0.1300 
      
France Non- Family- Risk Free Rate 0.0241 0.1690 0.0370 0.1134 
   0.5740 0.5920 0.0500 
      
 Family - Non- Family 0.0139 -0.1173 0.0063 -0.0321 
     0.2390 0.7360 0.0520 
      
  Family- Risk Free Rate 0.0349 0.1176 0.1033 0.0580 
   0.6650 0.0520 0.4350 
      
Germany Non- Family- Risk Free Rate 0.0167 -0.0380 0.0872 0.0477 
   0.9080 0.1770 0.6170 
      
 Family - Non- Family 0.0033 0.1557 0.0160 0.0107 
     0.2600 0.5340 0.7670 
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Table 17: Performance-Attribution Regression 
Equal Weighted Portfolios Family vs Non-family Firms 
Industry Adjusted Stock Return 
 
This table presents the coefficient and level of significance of the performance attribution 
regressions with robust standard errors for the entire sample and for each country. These 
regressions are based on 179 observations, one for each month in 15 years time period 
between February 1992 and December 2006. The dependent variable is the Industry 
Adjusted Stock Returns. For each company, the Adjusted Stock Returns is calculated 
subtracting the appropriate average industry return from the stock return each month. Alpha 
is the abnormal return. RMRF is the value-weighted market return minus the risk free rate. 
HML is Fama and French value factor. The p-values are below each coefficient. 
 
 
 
      
Country Excess Return R2 Alpha RMRF HML 
           
All Sample Family - Non- Family 0.0030 0.2826 -0.0021 -0.0144 
   0.0000 0.7970 0.1040 
      
Austria Family - Non- Family 0.0074 0.4215 -0.0266 -0.0166 
   0.0040 0.3660 0.5250 
      
France Family - Non- Family 0.0230 -0.1444 0.0083 -0.0383 
   0.1150 0.6640 0.0120 
      
Germany Family - Non- Family 0.0240 0.2794 0.0049 0.0124 
   0.0080 0.8160 0.6450 
      
Italy Family - Non- Family 0.0335 0.5096 0.0311 -0.2080 
   0.0000 0.0230 0.3610 
      
Netherlands Family - Non- Family 0.0331 0.2674 -0.0409 0.0313 
   0.0080 0.0330 0.0920 
      
Spain Family - Non- Family 0.0035 0.2024 -0.0150 -0.0096 
   0.0700 0.4960 0.7850 
      
Sweden Family - Non- Family 0.0201 0.3738 -0.0072 -0.0329 
   0.0050 0.7110 0.1530 
      
Switzerland Family - Non- Family 0.0262 0.3544 0.0022 -0.0383 
   0.0000 0.9202 0.0250 
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Table 18: Fama-MacBeth Return Regression 
 
For the entire dataset, this table reports the average coefficients and time series standard 
errors for 179 equally weighted cross-sectional regressions for each month from February 
1992 to December 2006. The dependent variable is (1) raw monthly Company Stock Return. 
or (2) the Industry-Adjusted Stock Return calculated subtracting the appropriate average 
industry return from each firm’s stock return each month h.   Family is 1 if the company is a 
family firm and 0 otherwise. The independent are illustrated in Table I. The p-values appear 
in parentheses below parameter estimates. 
 
 
 
 
 (1)  (1)  (2)  (2) 
        
Family Dummy 0.4787  0.4610  0.2319  0.2352 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0170)  (0.0150) 
Market Value 0.1358  0.0362  0.0341  -0.0121 
 (0.0150)  (0.5880)  (0.3780)  (0.7620) 
Book-to-Value 0.0534  -0.0214  -0.0240  -0.0346 
 0.4660)  (0.7440)  (0.6280)  (0.4260) 
Dividend Yield  -10.4624  -11.7445  -6.3383  -7.5323 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Return_2_3 0.0102  0.0400  0.0296  0.0422 
 (0.8020)  (0.3010)  (0.3670)  (0.1980) 
Return_4_6 -0.0518  -0.0060  -0.0356  -0.0247 
 (0.1580)  (0.8510)  (0.1710)  (0.3470) 
Return_7_12 -0.0646  -0.0498  -0.0359  -0.0379 
 (0.0090)  (0.0240)  (0.0440)  (0.0540) 
Operating Margin   0.7622    0.5593 
   (0.0000)    (0.0000) 
Leverage   0.2099    -0.0775 
   (0.2340)    (0.5280) 
Total Assets    0.0947    0.0441 
   (0.1510)    (0.3760) 
Sales/Total Asset (%)   0.2852    0.1537 
   (0.0100)    (0.0550) 
Idiosyncratic Risk   -0.0508    -0.0084 
   (0.2710)    (0.7700) 
Intercept -0.1134  -0.1513  0.3410  0.2527 
 0.8680  (0.8570)  (0.5350)  (0.7060) 
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Table 19: Industry Adjusted Stock Returns and Ownership 
 
This table provides the estimates of a robust regression for 2,048 firms. The model was run 
over the period February 1992- December 2006. The dependent variable is the Industry 
Adjusted Stock Returns. For each company, the Adjusted Stock Returns is calculated 
subtracting the appropriate average industry return from the stock return each month. 
Standard errors are robust. The p-values appear in parentheses below parameter estimates. 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Family Dummy 0.3383 0.3325 0.3327 0.8047 0.2499 0.2390 1.0871 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0220) (0.0270) (0.0120) 
Market Value 0.0034 0.0025 0.0059 0.0066 0.0326 0.0541 0.0517 
 (0.8720) (0.9030) (0.7700) (0.7520) (0.5490) (0.3950) (0.3300) 
Operating Margin 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 
 (0.4240) (0.4260) (0.4360) (0.4450) (0.5450) (0.5570) (0.5570) 
Dividend Yield  0.0165 0.0158 0.0151 0.0158 0.1216 0.1192 0.1214 
 (0.2680) (0.2890) (0.3130) (0.2900) (0.0780) (0.0890) (0.0810) 
Leverage -0.0250 -0.0009 0.0058 0.0062 -0.0968 0.0387 0.0373 
 (0.5460) (0.9780) (0.8550) (0.8460) (0.4110) (0.6620) (0.6760) 
Total Assets  0.0550 0.0485 0.0451 0.0459 -0.0065 -0.0371 -0.0324 
 (0.0040) (0.0090) (0.0160) (0.0140) (0.8930) (0.4310) (0.4930) 
Sales/Total Asset (%) 0.0785 0.0850 0.0895 0.0928 0.0353 0.0629 0.0673 
 (0.0030) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0000) (0.6520) (0.4160) (0.3900) 
Return_2_3     0.0540 0.0530 0.0524 
     (0.0760) (0.0810) (0.0850) 
Return_4_6     -0.0293 -0.0296 -0.0305 
     (0.2470) (0.2410) (0.2280) 
Return_7_12     -0.0381 -0.0365 -0.0372 
     (0.0270) (0.0350) (0.0310) 
Idiosyncratic Risk     -0.0325 -0.0162 -0.0147 
     (0.1060) (0.4160) (0.4620) 
Anti Self-Dealing Index  -0.3891 -0.2854 0.6133  -0.1364 1.4769 
  (0.1270) (0.2630) (0.1100)  (0.8500) (0.1660) 
Block Premium   0.3800 0.4551   -0.0265 
   (0.0690) (0.0310)   (0.9570) 
Family Dummy *  
Anti Self-Dealing Index    -1.4885   -2.7107 
    (0.0030)   (0.0460) 
        
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
        
R2 0.0012 0.0012 0.0013 0.0013 0.0019 0.0016 0.0017 
        
 Number of Observations  219,088 219,088 219,088 219,088 28,368 28,368 28,368 
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Table 20: Performance-Attribution Regression 
Equal Weighted Portfolios Family with Family Manager vs Non-family Firms 
 
This table presents the coefficient and level of significance of the performance attribution 
regressions with robust standard errors for the entire sample and for each country. The 
dependent variable is Company Stock Returns. These regressions are based on 179 
observations, one for each month in 15 years time period between February 1992 and 
December 2006. Alpha is the abnormal return. RMRF is the value-weighted market return 
minus the risk free rate. HML is Fama and French value factor. The p-values are shown 
below each coefficient. 
 
 
 
Country Excess Return R2 Alpha RMRF HML 
      
All sample Family - Non- Family 0.0024 0.4417 -0.0028 -0.0217 
   0.0000 0.8210 0.1280 
      
Austria Family - Non- Family 0.0055 0.8315 -0.3280 -0.0399 
   0.0040 0.5350 0.4080 
      
France Family - Non- Family 0.0348 -0.2420 0.0280 -0.0782 
   0.1220 0.3350 0.0060 
      
Germany Family - Non- Family 0.0047 0.7625 0.0279 -0.0082 
   0.0000 0.4260 0.8760 
      
Italy Family - Non- Family 0.0161 0.4305 0.0255 -0.0468 
   0.0050 0.3470 0.1970 
      
Netherlands Family - Non- Family 0.0161 0.2094 -0.0437 0.0376 
   0.1420 0.1080 0.1080 
      
Spain Family - Non- Family 0.0043 0.5138 -0.0214 0.0145 
   0.0040 0.5100 0.7900 
      
Sweden Family - Non- Family 0.0106 0.4193 -0.1965 -0.0350 
   0.0040 0.5540 0.3300 
      
Switzerland Family - Non- Family 0.0131 0.6083 0.0083 -0.0377 
   0.0000 0.7960 0.1160 
 
